

PHILOSOPHY
OF THE
SUNYASAMPADANE
VOLUME - 1

V. S. KAMBI, M.A., B.Ed.

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PHILOSOPHY
OF THE
SUNYASAMPADANE
VOLUME-1

By

V. S. KAMBI, M. A., B. Ed.

**Institute of Kannada Studies,
Karnatak University,
Dharwar.**

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
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To,
H. H. Mahantaswamigalu
Gurudeva Ranade

By the same author

- (1) **Śūnyasāmpādane (on'cu sa'nikşe)**
- (2) **Vīraśaiva Darśana Mīmāṃsā, vol. 1.**
- (3) **Dīgnāga**
- (4) **Vaiṣṇava matada ugama hāgū pragati (Tr)**
- (5) **Chaudadanpur— A Monograph (Ed)**



H. H. VIJAYA MAHANTASWAMIJI
Ilakal, Dist. Bijapur



GURUDEVA RANADE
Nimbal Ashram
Dist Bijapur

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FOREWORD

Vīraśaiva mystics have enriched Indian mystical literature with their contributions. The Anubhava Maṇṭapa was the meeting place for religious aspirants and sādhakas. It provided the inspiration for discourses and debates on subjects of religious interest. Vīraśaiva mystic literature is enshrined in Kannada language.

Shri V. S. Kambi proposes to make that treasures of Vīraśaiva mysticism available to all those who do not know Kannada, by bringing out a series of volumes. The present work is volume I and is entitled Philosophy of the Śūnya Sāmpādane. Students of mysticism will be grateful to Shri Kambi for his valuable publication.

I wish him all success in his laudable work.

University buildings
madras : 3rd of July 73 }

T. M. P. Mahadevan
dr. t. m. p. mahadevan
director
c. a. s. in philosophy
University of madras

INTRODUCTION

In India, Philosophy and Religion have merged into a complete whole. Mysticism flourished side by side with schools of regeous logic. The six systems of Indian Philosophy along with three atheistic schools have more or less been studied. But a constructive survey of the mystic tradition of India has still been desideratum. To the mystic, 'Word' is of paramount importance and the followers of Bhartṛhari, the grammerian-philosopher, have made out that the empirical word owes its origin to the Absolute word-principle, i. e. Eternal verbum. The Mīmāṃsaka Theory of the eternity of word and yoga concept of praṇava are rooted on this absolutistic concept of word. The genesis of this tradition goes back to the Ṛgveda— and brings out a long unbroken tradition through the Upaniṣads ultimately culminates in the mystic schools, which are still lying neglected in different parts of India, particularly in the South and Kashmir. A host of mystic philosophers of the 12th century in Karnataka made substantial contribution to Ṣaṭsthala school.

It is gratifying to see that Shri Kambi has taken up the difficult task of presenting a comparative study of this neglected branch of Indian school of thought. In this arduous task he has always been faithful to the text of Śūnyasāmpādane published from Karnatak University. The chapter 'Śabda' and 'Niṣṣabda' specially where the author attempts a comparison with the parallel thought in Buddhism and Yoga, are highly interesting. The book, I am sure will evoke unstinted admiration from serious students of Indian Philosophy and will be well-received by the lovers of Indian Mystic traditions.

Centre for Indic Studies,
Kurukshetra University,

Kurukshetra

15-5-73

G. Bhattacharya
Dean

PREFACE

Karnatak witnessed a renaissance during the twelfth century which was led by Basavanna – a great mystic thinker. A band of mystics rallied round him and worked for the regeneration of Society. They gave expression to the mystic experience in the Vacana form in Kannada literature. These Vacanas are systemetised in three forms. They are-*ṣaṭhsthalakaṭṭu*, *Uddharaṇi* and *Śūnyasaṃpādane*. The first two forms of systemetised literature are not in dialogue form; whereas *Śūnyasaṃpādane* in this regard is in the form of a dialogue. We are here reminded of the dialogues of Plato.

Shri V. S. Kambi has given a philosophical study of *Śūnyasaṃpādane* in this book entitled ‘Philisophy of *Śūnya-saṃpādane*. He has based his discussions on the translation of *Śūnyasaṃpādane* published by Karnatak University.

In the first chapter he deals with the problem of Viraśaiva view points on *aṇvikṣiki*. In the second chapter he analyses the meaning of *Śūnya* and *Saṃpādane* and compares the same with the concept of *Śūnya* in *Ṛgveda*, Buddhism, Agamika-yoga, and the void in the Existentialist philosophy. The Viraśaiva concepts of evolution and the philosophical categories have also been studied in the light of the Sāṅkhya, the Buddhist doctrines of evolution. Then he proceeds in the third chapter to analyse sense experience and other *pramāṇas*. The *Śivaśaraṇas* give their own interpretation of *śabda*. In the next two chapters, Shri Kambi shows that *śabda* and *niśśabda* are the same and the knowledge and the substance are one. This, I think, is an original and special contrirbution of Shri Kambi in interpreting the concepts presented in the *Śūnyasaṃpādane*.

This work deals with epistemological and ontological categories in Vacana literature. In doing so Shri Kambi has done

well in giving a comparative study of the problem with special reference to the categories in Buddhist, Sāṅkhyā and Vedāntic systems of Philosophy. I wish he has extended his study to the analysis of the categories presented in the Jaina and the Mīmāṃsaka epistemology.

Philosophy of Śūnyasampādane is a systematic and scholarly work, specially emphasising the philosophical concepts and not merely concerned with literary and social significance of the Vacanas. The book is welcome addition to the study of Viraśaiva Philosophy.

Department of Philosophy
Karnatak University
Dharwar
3-9-73

T. G. Kalghatgi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Vīraśaivism is one of the Āgamic schools of thought. Āgamic philosophy is dominated by the tendency of spiritual practice of the words or mantras with different number of words that have different metaphysical, religious, mystical functions. This extended a very healthy influence on the life of the people as stated by Dr. R. C. Pandeya in his work "The problem of Meaning." "The Tantras (Āgamas) stressed the importance of the mantras in the life of man. They showed that the power of words (mantras), are infallible and they are capable of giving every thing, even mokṣa (liberation) to one who repeats them. The Tantrika philosophy has accepted that the whole world is an evolution out of words and the Real, Śiva, coupled with his power, Śakti, is of the nature of powerful word.... The Absolutistic tendency of the philosophy of language in India has its beginning in the Vedas and its end in the Tantras. Those who did not believe in the Absolute word began to follow the lead of the Tantras, and in the spiritual realm they tacitly accepted the Tantric philosophy. Even the Buddhists and the Jainas accepted the authority of the Tantras and implied thereby the supremacy of the tantras and implied thereby the supremacy of the Absolutistic philosophy. At the end and in the realm of spiritual sādhanā all philosophers in India joined hands. The philosophy of the Vedas branched off into various schools only to converge in the Tantras". It is in this background that we know more about the activities of Śaraṇas' thought. My treatment of Śabda in its ontological and epistemological aspects in this work is based on vacanas of Basavaṇṇa, Allamaṇḍaprabhu, Cennabasavaṇṇa and others. In its long history of eight hundred years a student of philosophy having training in Indian and Western philosophies is to work on this subject. The contribution of the school to Indian philosophy is yet to be shown. An attempt, however, is made here to show its unique contribution.

The whole of India was undergoing a process of revolutionary thinking during the pre-Basava period since the sixth century. The distinguished Brahmādvaitins and Śabdādvaitins were active in these centuries. Śankar and Bhartṛhari the two great luminaries belonging to the Brahmādvaita and Śabdādvaita schools respectively made a great advance in this process of thought.

The development of the Śabdādvaita philosophy reached a new stage at the hands of Maṇḍana Mishra. "Mandana, who accepted the theory of sphota advocated by Bhartṛhari and others, tried to harmonise the doctrine of Śabdādvaita with the Brahmādvaita of the Advaitins.... This is indeed a peculiar feature of Mandana's Advaita."

But the thinkers of the twelfth century in Karnatak developed a new kind of system that harmonised from quite a different standpoint. This is a big change in the history of the harmonisation of Brahmādvaita and Śabdādvaita. They are different from those of Śankara and Bhartṛhari. This is a new type of activity of thought which sought to propound a new line of thinking.

The Indian thinkers since immemorial realised the importance of the Śabda. They have discovered different levels in śabda (word) that revealed different forms of reality accordingly. The modern Western writers also state that there are different levels of language similarly. They claim the highest place for it as it gives a picture or meaning of the reality. All the levels of language, as recognised by the modern Western writers, belong to that level of language recognised as the fourth form of language by the Vedic seers. Each level-word has a kind of knowledge peculiar to it. The Western writers on metaphysics state that the empirical knowledge is the knowledge which most readily comes to mind when the word is used. This is the same as saying that knowledge is possible only through the use of word which is the central teaching of the Grammarian school in connection with the empirical knowledge, namely,

sivikalpaka and nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. The Vedic view of the word and that of the mystic thinkers of the twelfth century in Karnatak, who said that the word of the mystics (Śaraṇas) contains Reality in abundance, is still higher. The role of word in the thinking of the Śivaśaraṇas is conspicuous. The important aspect of the word, that is revealed by the use of word in connection with 'śabda' and 'artha,' is given the highest place by the thinkers. And it is recognised by the modern Western thinkers. One of them is Bertrand Russell who complains that the writers previous to him unmeritedly ignored the important role of word in recognising the truth. The problem of word in one form or the other occupied the minds of thinkers in India without break.

One of the forms in which the word appears in the classical age of Indian thinking is Śabdapramāṇa. Some of the Western thinkers say that it is peculiar to Indian philosophy. But today in the Western world also we find philosophers who are deeply interested in it and have developed schools of thought. Some of them claim that 'All philosophy is a "critique of language."' It amounts to what the Indian thinkers mean when they say that the word reveals truth: Śaraṇaru manaderedu mātanāḍidare liṅgava kāṇabahudu. The aim of both is to show that the work of seekers after truth is to reveal the truth but not to make it confused. This is clarifying the truth by clarifying the word. The work is done in a number of ways – by tracing the etymological meaning, by finding out the context or by pointing out to the definition or by appeal to the wisdom-words of the fellow-thinkers, etc.

The distinction between the Indian and the Western schools lies not in the kind of knowledge acquired by the words but in attaching a peculiar authorship as accepted by the Indians. Bertrand Russell states that there is not that perspective of the kind that lies beyond the scope of this type of activity which is acquired by the deists. This wider vision belongs to the apauruṣeyatva view that is coupled with the eternity of the word. What we are interested in is not this but the interpretation of

the 'apauruṣeyatva' of the word. Apauruṣeyatva is interpreted by different schools differently. The knowledge of the historical development of this helps to know more about the way in which ṣaṭsthala school treats it as based on the Vacana literature.

It is the Mīmāṃsakas who propounded the theory of apauruṣeyatva on the basis of the Veda. The Naiyāyikas, according to the history of Indian philosophy, introduced an interpretation of 'apauruṣeyatva' by bringing in the idea of authorship of God. This is supposed to be self-borm-hood of word. The view of the Naiyāyikas entails difficulties. The people accepted it inspite of the difficulties. The classical age, the age of commentators among whom Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja and Śrīpati Paṇḍita are supposed to be distinguished commentators who follow the Naiyāyikas in this connection, is a very important period in its history. These three commentators accept the Naiyāyika view of Śabda. The authorship, according to Śrīpati goes to Rudra and to Viṣṇu according to others. There are two views of protecting the Veda. According to the one it is founded on the Ṛgveda and according to the other it is founded on the Purāṇas. The former view states that the Rudra is the protector and the latter states that Viṣṇu is the protector of the Veda. The origin of the former may be traced to Rgveda. The Veda is with Rudra who narrated it to Brahma (i. e. Hirnyagarbha) when he created him so that he may create the world on the basis of the Veda. This point is made clear on the basis of Śvetāśvataropaniṣad. The necessity of the reconciliation work was due to the contradiction of the eternity of Rudra and of the word (Veda). This reconciliation work was done by introducing the argument from the eternal causality of Rudra. In other words the Vedic eternity is reduced to the origin of the cause - Rudra is the efficient cause of the Veda. Śrīpati Paṇḍita did not refer to the Ṛgvedic source but to the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad only. The type of authorship may be said to be the custodianship-authorhood. This may be better traced to the Rgvedic origin as I pointed out for the first time. in connection with the interpretation of śabda according to

Viraśaivism. I name it custodianship-authorhood of the Veda, because the Veda is treasured up in the cupboard of God's memory to be safe eternally as a commodity. God does not express the Veda in the way a creative writer expresses. But his way of expression may be compared to the way of a writer who borrows ideas from others. In the case of the latter the sources of the ideas may be traced; whereas in the case of the former it is not possible. The Veda is a part and parcel of God's mind as it depends for its existence on the mind of God. This view of authorship was not acceptable to some of the Advaita Vedantins. They introduced a new argument from the theory of causation which is different from the earlier one. They have based their argument on the text. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka states :

asya mahato bhūtasyaniśvasitametaḍṛgvedo
yajurvedassāmavedaḥ. II. 4. 10.

(The Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Atharvaveda are the out-going breaths of the great Being.) This is the essence of the Brahma sūtra : Śāstrayonitvat / I. 1. 3. (Brahma is the cause of the Veda.)

The material causal view is akin to the vacana view of the twelfth century. There is difference between the efficient and the material causal views. The latter view is a sort of synthesis of the Mīmāṃsā view and the Naiyāyika view which is accepted by both the Advaita and the Śaṭsthala schools of thought. But both the schools of thought interpret it differently. The former school adumbrates vivartavāda whereas the latter school accepts the pariṇāmavāda which is different as it does not approve of the asatkāryavāda or the theory of illusion or imposition of the Veda on Brahma. Thus though both the schools accept the material causal theory they differ from one another.

There is another aspect of the word called 'indriya likhita', which may be translated as sense-word as against the Veda or 'Līṅgalikhita' i.e. word without human composition. This is

transcendental-word and very important type of word. Sense-word attracted the distinguished modern Western thinkers like Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, and others. The sense-word, states Wittgenstein, is a language-game which distinguishes itself from all other language-games. The special class of words refers to inner events. The further explanation of the sense-word is very important from the point of view of comparison with that of śāsthalā school. According to Wittgenstein no criterion of truth can be applied to them. So it is no name-word as there is no criterion for its proper use. It is not a part of any language-game. It has no function. It has no task to perform. It is also in no way an assertion. In such case logical condition is not being satisfied. It is the same with Bertrand Russell when he distinguishes it as 'primary occurrence' different from 'secondary occurrence'. Another modern metaphysician is Strawson who says that 'a sentence' is different from 'the use of a sentence in a statement'. The above pairs are very important logical classification of word into sense-word and name-word which have different connotations. They mean what the 'nirvikalpa' (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) in connection with 'pratyakṣa' mean respectively. Sense-word acquires, in the latter sense, a new status which is being a part of public language. So it is clear that if sense-word as an utterance is like a nirvikalpa pratyakṣa, the name-word is like a savikalpapratyakṣa in Indian Nyāya.

Wittgenstein in pointing out the logical status of name-words makes it clear that the sense-word is not to be treated as 'assertion'. Because this implies logical status which really does not belong to the sense-word. Treating the 'sense-word', according to Wittgenstein, as 'assertion' is misunderstanding which implies the same sense in Indian philosophy when the Naiyāyikas (i. e. logicians) make a clearcut distinction in the treatment of pratyakṣa as svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. 'Svalakṣaṇa' is the same as 'utterance' or 'sense-word' in Wittgenstein; 'primary occurrence' in Bertrand Russell and 'a sentence' in Strawson; where as 'sāmānyalakṣaṇa' means

'name-word' in Wittgenstein; 'secondary occurrence' in Bertrand Russell and 'the use of a sentence in a statement' in Strawson. To put the same in the language of psychology, it is 'sensation' and 'perception' respectively. This is a very broad way of showing the resemblances.

The peculiar connotation of the term 'Śruti' as found in the vacana literature helps to distinguish from the connotation as found in the orthodox schools. I have distinguished and pointed out why the Śivaśaṅkas made such a distinction. I have also traced such a use in the pre-Basava literature as an evidence in support of my argument. The role of 'samaya' in the pramāṇa śāstra of Ṣaṭsthala school is not only shown to be a pramāṇa but also its due place. In doing this I have given a historical background of 'samaypramāṇa' so that one may better know the changes that took place in due course of time and also the dialectical value recognised by the varcanakaras of the twelfth century. I have also pointed out the new distinguishing feature of Śabdapramāṇa as understood by the Vacanakaras which is unique and first of its kind in its long history that belongs to pre-Basava era. The new feature of Śabdapramāṇa is that it is a Śabda without human element i. e. 'jñānaṣṭaśabda' or 'tānilladaśabda'. This is a great change brought about in the characteristic feature of Śabdapramāṇa which occurs in the writings of Vidyāraṇya, a distinguished Vedic scholar of Karnatak that belongs to post-Basava period while dealing with the Śabda. So it is the genius of the mystic-thinkers that excludes the human composition from the word and recognises aptly that it is the apauruṣeyatva or the word of Liṅga.

It is necessary to know what the commentators like Śrīpati Paṇḍita and Gubbiya Mallanārya did in this connection. Śrīpati Paṇḍita while dealing with Brahmasūtra (i.e. śāstra yonitvat ॥ and also with śabda : iti chennātaḥ prabhavāt pratyakṣānumabhyaṃ ॥) has given an account of Śabdapramāṇa as already stated. But his treatment does not point out all the new features as pointed out here and also there is no such classification which is shown in the treatment of pramāṇa. So his treatment

of śabda does not show how the change took place in the connotation of śabdapramāṇa. Therefore the treatment in this book is new and also an independent investigation. Even then it cannot be stated that it is final one. But this gives me a preparatory training for a still deeper investigation. My recent publication on Dīgnāga is a good testimony of the broad perspective with which I made a beginning to help myself to take up this difficult job Pramāṇa as such. Śaṭsthala school is unmeritedly neglected branch of an Indian School of thought as stated by Prof. R. B. Kulkarni in a letter to me as back as 1971. This new contribution made by the Śaṭsthala school to the Indian dialectics is, therefore, of historical value shown as in this book. This is interesting to those who are interested in this school and also in the contribution of the kind made to the Indian philosophy. The kind of treatment as found in this book needs further detailed investigation for which this is a prelude.

It pleased Gurudeva Ranade to utter these remarkable words in his opening lecture of a series of "Lectures on Karnatak Mysticism" arranged under the auspices of Karnatak University in the year 1954 — "When I was reading 'Śūnya-sāmpādane', I wondered whether a comprehensive volume could not be written about the mystics after the manner of such eminent Platonic scholars like Jewett and Barnet. It is a very extraordinary work."

These inspiring words coming from 'one of the great mystics of modern times', as H. E. Dr. D. C. Pavate writes in his foreword to Pathway to God in Kannada literature and a direct suggestion made by H. H. Kumaraswamiji were incentives to H. E. Dr. D. C. Pavate to take up the work of translating 'Śūnyasāmpādane' in order to make it available to the scholars who do not know Kannada language. The text is divided into five volumes. I worked in this U. G. C. scheme as a Research Assistant in Viraśaiva literature for the last seven years and contributed my humble share in translating the text.

I was in contact with Gurudeva Ranade in connection with the study of mysticism and cherished an idea of doing research in Viraśaiva mystic tradition. He is one of the great inheritors of the tradition of the 'strand of Ācāryas' through the saint Gurulingajāṅgama. Gurulingajāṅgama was 'a great Līṅgāyat' whose disciple was 'a great Brahmin'. Gurudeva states : I am particularly interested in Siddhagiri and Kāḍasiddha hills, simply because the saint of Nimbargi had his initiation from a saint called Muppina muni, who lived about the year 1810 in Siddhagiri, and who was in the Kāḍasiddha line.* It is in this great mystic tradition Dr. R. D. Ranade was reborned who made himself a wellknown mystic-teacher in the line of Nimbargi saint which led him progressively "in the onward progress of the one common religion for all humanity." Gurudeva's mystic-resort (Āśrama) is at Nimbāl in Bijapur District.

I contact H. H. Kumaraswamiiji another Viraśaiva saint that belonged to the strand of modern saints. He was pleased to know my sincere and dedicated zeal for learning and research. He used to tell me to work on Vacana literature, when I was studying Viraśaiva philosophy under him in the year 1963-65 to prepare myself well for the task. It is the blessings of H. H. Kumaraswamiiji that led me in the difficult journey of my pursuit of research. Dr. R. R. Diwakar is another scholar who made a comparative study of Vacana literature with whom I am in contact since long. I meet Dr. R. C. Hiremath now and then who is one of those that dream of building a system of Ṣaṭsthala philosophy on the lines of Modern Western Philosophy.

* "As I told you at the beginning... belongs to to the great saint, Revāṇasiddha. Those who have studied the history of Viraśaiva religion know that there are two strands in the development of that religion, namely, the strand of the Ācāryas and the strand of modern saints. Revāṇasiddha is regarded as one of the earliest Acaryas,Those who live near Kolhapur may know that Revāṇasiddha is connected with the great saint Kāḍasiddha." — Pathway to God in Kannada Literature, pp. 13-14.

I prepared a research plan on Śūnyasampādane and showed it to Prof. R. B. Kulkarni, who is one of the disciples and the students of Gurudeva Ranade, in the year 1971. He approved the plan and wrote : “....I am glad that you are taking deep interest in Virāṣaiva philosophy – a branch which unfortunately neglected. A proper estimation of its contribution to philosophy is quite necessary.” He kindly further advised me not to take a long leave to workout the plan as it is very undesirable in these hard days. I must thank him for the fellow feeling and the guidance. Dr. R. C. Hiremath was kind enough to see my manuscript with great interest who is deeply interested in research work in Virāṣaiva literature, Vaiṣṇavism and Jainism. He is using all the available resources to provide opportunities to the students of literature to work in the fields.

H. H. Vijayamahantaswamiji of Chittaragi Śūnyasimhasana peetha, like Nimbargi saint, is another great mystic of the time. He belongs to the strand of modern saints who worked for the socio-religious reconstruction of Virāṣaiva religion by contributing to the renaissance movement of modern Karnatak. He worked in collaboration with H. H. Hanagal Kumar-swamiji. Like Nimbargi saint he also had great Brahmin disciple called Ramaraya of Hireotageri who wrote his biography. H. H. Vijayamahantaswamiji had his centre of activity at Ilkal in Bijapur district. The present head of this peetha H. H. Mahantaswamiji is kind and learned swamiji who dedicated all his energies to the cause of Virāṣaivism. He kept open his library for my study and guided me in traditional matters and mystic lore. He is kind enough to encourage the plan of working on the mystic tradition of the twelfth century. Another swamiji is H. H. Sadasivaswamiji of Hanagal who is also interested in the building up of metaphysical system. He too encouraged me. I acknowledge my debt of gratitude.

My respectful salutations are due to H. H. Tapaswiji Kumaraswamiji and H. E. Dr. D. C. Pavate who gave me a golden opportunity to do research in this field of philosophy

in the Karnatak University. Both of them were kind enough to encourage me to make a constructive survey of the Viraśaiva mystic tradition. I made use of the vacanas that could help me to clarify the meaning of 'Sūnya' and 'śabda' which will give a clear picture of the kind of work in which I am deeply engrossed. This opens me a vast vistas of metaphysical study that could be done in a still deeper manner. My object is to build up a kind of Ānvīksikī that could be discerned in the sayings of the Śivaśaraṇas required for the acceptance of this tradition as a school of thought. This is a long felt need. I know my shortcomings better.

I thank H. E. Shri Sukhadia for his encouragement, and the authorities of the Karnatak University for their response there to. I express my thanks to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan for his valuable foreword. I acknowledge my thanks to Dr. Gopikamohan Bhattacharya, the Dean, Centre for Indic Studies of Kurukshetra University who wrote a learned introduction to my book. I acknowledge my thanks to Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, the Head of the Dept. of Philosophy, Karnatak University Dharwar, who kindly wrote his valuable preface to my book. My thanks are also due to Prof. Menezes, Mr. Bredford and Mr B. T. Shettar who went through my manuscript. The Book, however, would not have come in this nice manner, were it not for my friend Mr. Ghanalinga Manavachar to whom I offer my thanks.

I thank the proprietor of Mahantesh Printing Press and the working staff for their pains taken in bringing out the book in the present form.

16-5-1973

Kannada Adhyayana Peetha,
Karnatak University,
Dharwar-3.

V. S. Kambi

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

Vowels

Dēvanāgarī	अ आ इ ई उ ऊ ऋ ॠ ए ऐ ओ औ
Kannaḍa	ಅ ಆ ಇ ಈ ಉ ಊ ಋ ೠ ಎ ಏ ಐ ಒ ಔ
Roman	a ā i ī u ū ṛ ṛ e ē ai oṛ au

<i>anusvāra</i>	Dēvanāgarī	अं
	Kannaḍa	ಅಂ
	Roman	aṁ

<i>visarga</i>	Dēvanāgarī	अः
	Kannaḍa	ಅಃ
	Roman	aḥ

Consonants

<i>velars</i>	क ख ग घ ङ
<i>(gutturals)</i>	ಕ ಖ ಗ ಘ ಙ
	ka kha ga gha ṅa

<i>palatals</i>	च छ ज झ ञ
	ಚ ಛ ಜ ಝ ಞ
	ca cha ja jha ṅa

<i>retroflex</i>	ट ठ ड ढ ण
<i>(cerebrals)</i>	ಟ ಠ ಡ ಢ ಣ
	ṭa ṭha ḍa ḍha ṇa

<i>dentals</i>	त थ द ध न
	ತ ಥ ದ ಧ ನ
	ta tha da dha na

labials

प फ ब भ म
 प् फ् ब् भ् म्
 pa pha ba bha ma

semi-vowels

य र र ल व
 य् र् र् ल् व्
 ya ra r la va

sibilant

श
 ष (palatal)
 śa

sibilant

ष
 ष (retroflex)
 ṣa

sibilant

स
 स (dental)
 sa

aspirate

ह
 क
 ha

lateral

ळ
 ल
 ḷa

conjunct

क्ष
 क्ख
 kṣa

ज्ञ

ज्ञ
 jña

CHAPTER I

The religious history of India during the eleventh and the twelfth centuries is seething with the spirit of enquiry. The masters in the field who appeared earlier created an intellectual ferment that gave birth to the revolutionaries in the field of metaphysics and mysticism. These two great strands, that made a unique contribution to the cultural life of India, had their centres in the different parts of the country. One of them was at Kalyāṇa. Kalyāṇa was a capital of Kalacuryas. It had been since the eleventh century the centre of Viraśaiva religious activities. For the Daṇḍanāyaka of Bijjala's father, namely, Koṇḍiguḷi Kēśirāja was an eminent Viraśaiva who wielded influence.¹ He is supposed to be one of the powerful personalities of the time. It was here in this capital that Revaṇasiddha spent some of his time. He is one of the brightest luminaries of the spiritual firmament of Viraśaiva saints². He was an enlightened travelling mystic who served the cause of Viraśivism. Śrīśailapīṭha that is situated in the mount Śrīśaila was an active centre of Viraśaiva culture at the same period of time. It was dominated by a great ācārya called Candraguṇḍa Śivācārya who initiated distinguished Dēvara Dāsimayya into Ṣaṭsthala. He was sent to spread Viraśaiva philosophy and religion. Dāsimayya on his tour encountered people belonging to other communities. One of the events that highlights his victory is this, that he initiated Suggaḷadēvi who was the wife of King Jayasimha of the Chalukya dynasty. The latter lived from 1018-1042 A. D. Kalyāṇa was his capital.³

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- 1 Dr. M. M. Kalburgi, Śāsanagaḷalli Śivaśaraṇaru, pp. 40-43. Sirigannada Prakashana, Kannada Vibhaga, Karnatak University, Dharwar. 1970.
 - 2 Kapatralla Krishnarao, Karnatak Samskriti Adhyana, p. 3. Usa Sahityamale, Mysore 1971.
 - 3 Dr. P. G. Halakatti, Dāsimayyana Vacanagalu, introduction, Bijapur, 1936
Dr. M. M. Kalburgi, Śāsanagaḷalli Śivaśaraṇaru, pp. 38-39.

Thus we see that South India in the eleventh century was full of religious activities. The distinguished Vīraśaiva mystics prepared a very good climate by their dedicated work and extraordinary spiritual abilities. So when Basavaṇṇa, in whom unparalleled mystic qualities were combined with political power, entered the field it was almost miraculously possible for him to turn out such work in the field of mysticism, philosophy, literature and the social life. The central part of South India became a centre of enchantment for pilgrims. So saints from different parts of India hailed and settled. All of them sought admission into Vīraśaivism and they became eligible to obtain entry into the portals of Anubhava Maṇṭapa to take part into the debates that were going on in the Anubhava Maṇṭapa on religion, ethics, yoga, philosophy. No single individual other than Liṅgāyata was allowed to enter the gates of the Anubhava Maṇṭapa.⁴ This is evident from the practice and preaching of Vīraśaiva saints. The permission to learn parāvidyā is not given to the lower subcastes in the Vedic Hindu Varṇāśrama according to Manu. But it is given in almost all the Āgamic Hindu religions and it is not peculiar to Vīraśaivism. Even in such broad minded Āgamic religions

4 There are writers who believed that there was no restriction for entry into Anubhava Maṇṭapa and to take part into the discussions. But this is quite contradictory to the fact. For it was a rule that those who were not having Linga on anga (i. e. body) could not be allowed to enter or participate in the debate. This does not mean that the people, who desired to follow the religion that was practised by the Saranas, were not allowed. This is something that is to be noted. For there was no practice of converting those who were not Hindus; or those who belonged to lower subcaste to the higher subcaste of the Hindu religion. Perhaps this might have forced people to presume that it is Vīraśaivism which knew no barriers of caste, creed, sex and so on, as every member may choose the vocation he likes and at the same time learn the mystic lore, paravidya. There is some wrong notion about Hadapadappaṇṇa in some of the writers that he was a barber. This is also contradictory to the fact. For he was not a barber but one who served tumbula according to the Vīraśaiva literature of C. D. Uttangi, Anubhava Maṇṭapa, pp. 13-15. Kānataka Sahitya Mandira, Dhārwar, 1955.

we see subtle distinctions. Pañcarātrāgamas allow even parih or antyaja to learn parīvidyā. But the initiation does not give him all the social facilities that the highest religious man has in this religion. If on the other hand he is initiated into Viraśaivism or the religion of the later phase of Āgama (Āgamānta) he does. It is this that may be said to be democratic in spirit. Therefore it is rightly pointed out by Dr. R. D. Ranade when he writes that one of the chief aims of that institution was to democratise religion.⁵ Thus the democratic spirit is found inherent in the religious thoughts that constitute the texts. This practice was strictly brought into being in day-to-day life. It is the Anubhava Maṇṭapa which is the fountainhead for both the theoretical and practical sides of religion. It is in this sense that all the distinctions of caste, creed and sex were wiped out. We find discussions on such matters as work, mystic lore, place of guru in mystic life, texts and the personal experience, relation between God (Linga) and devotee (Aṅga), prasāda (grace) and Karma (action), unificants that unify the organs of sense, objects of sense, the organs of action and the divinity in all the phases of the personality of man, theory of mysticism and the practice, the distinction between gods and the realised person and so on. Thus we have a rich store of the knowledge of these subjects. Therefore Anubhava Maṇṭapa is supposed to be the place where "highly philosophical discussions on the theoretical and practical aspects of Reality took place, and in this sense Anubhav Maṇṭapa resembled the court of King Janaka of the Upanisadic times."⁶ So the historical Anubhava Maṇṭapa was the heart of the Śaraṇas of the time. We have not only the discussions that took place in Anubhava Maṇṭapa where only Viraśaivas participated, but also the debates that took place outside the Anubhava Maṇṭapa between

⁵ Dr. R. D. Ranade, Pathway to God in Kannada literature, p. 310. Bharatiya Vidyabhavana, Bombay, 1955.

⁶ Dr. Ranade, Pathway to God in Kannada Literature, p. 310, Bharatiya Vidyabhavana, Bombay, 1960.

Vīraśaivas and non-Vīraśaivas, such as we sometimes find in Śūnyasaṃpādana. Therefore Śūnyasaṃpādana gives a more comprehensive picture of the debates of the time. So in this sense Śūnyasaṃpādana provides us with more material and more important material.

The term Anubhava Maṇṭapa is used in another sense, where Anubhava is the Brahma Maṇṭapa is the abode. Therefore Anubhava Maṇṭapa is the Abode of Brahma or Liṅga. In other words the human body is supposed to be the Anubhava Maṇṭapa. This interpretation is seen in the sayings of the Vīraśaiva Mystics. This is explained by Dr. R. D. Ranade. If the former presupposes the socio-religious idea of the cult the latter presupposes the personal religious idea. Thus the Anubhava Maṇṭapa gives two types of religion and their synthetic view. We find both the forms of religion in Śūnyasaṃpādana. This is one of the aspects of the Śūnyasaṃpādana. There is another part of the picture of the work under study. This is also very important from the point of view of metaphysics.

It is true that there are no independent works on Āṇvikṣiki in the sense of logic and dialectics in Vīraśaivism. There is a single work called 'Karaṇahasuge' i. e. division or classification of categories which refers to the other part of Āṇvikṣiki. Dr. S. C. Nandimath states that the work "Karaṇahasuge" is called from Vijayabhairavi Āgama as mentioned in one of the manuscripts.⁷ Vīraśaivāmṛta mahāpurāṇa (7-3-12) upholds the same. This work, therefore, is not in that sense of the term Āṇvikṣiki. But we have commentaries on Brahmasūtra and Vāda-kāṇḍa Vīraśaivānanda cendrike. The former are written by Śrīkaṇṭha Śivācārya and Śrīpatipaṇḍitārādhyā and the latter is written by Maritoṇḍadārya. They help us to understand the nature of both logic and dialectics. The term 'vāda' is what is known as dialectics, dealing with arguments (vāda), sophistry

7 Ed. A. K. Puranik, Cennabasava Sahitya, p. 3. Sahajivana Prakasana, Haidarabad, 1958.
Haidarabad, 1958. Digitized by eGangotri

(jalpa) wrangling (vitaṇḍa), fallacies (hētvābhāsa), quibbling (chala), far-fetched analogies (jāti), and a point of defeat (nigraha sthāna). But in this work Maritoṇṭadārya deals not only the dialectics but also logic in so far that he deals with the logic of ethics and religion. To add something to this the study of śūnyasāmpādane is necessary which consists of the records of the debates that took place during the twelfth century either in the precincts of the palace of Basavēśvara at Kalyāṇa or outside it. It is this that gives us a kind of Āṇvikṣikī as understood by the Ṣaṭsthala school of thought. This removes in a limited sense the remark that it has no Āṇvikṣikī of its own and hence it is no school of thought. A special study in this direction is yet to be made by the modern students of philosophy to show that what kind of views on perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and testimony (śabda) are developed by the thinkers and in what sense they differ from the rest of the schools of thought. This is a very important part of Āṇvikṣikī.

The dialectical discourses in ancient India were conducted by learned people. It was one of the religious duties to participate in religious debates. It was in the days of the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads that the ṛiṣis took part in the debates on religious matters out of which Āṇvikṣikī—the science of ātma or vastu and the science of reason—grew. These debates on such highest matters were conducted by selected people who were qualified and the others who were not fit were not allowed to participate in the debate. Hence it was called rahasyavidyā or upaniṣadvidyā. We come across such councils in the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, Upaniṣads, Buddhist and Jaina religious literature. This tradition was kept burning throughout the ages. We see such councils at work during the eleventh and the twelfth centuries in Karnatak and the adjacent states in south India in particular and in India in general as this type of activity knows no barriers. The council may consist of two persons or innumerable meritorious learned persons. These councils were called Śivānubhava goṣṭhis.

These Śivānubhavaḡoṣṭhis were held at holy centres, at maths⁸ (houses), in public places⁹, before the king¹⁰, in temples¹¹. These were the places traditionally accepted by all the schools of thought for the last thousands of years, and this practice is one of the features of the Āṇvikṣikī. Choosing a place for debates on religious, philosophical matters, thus, was on the part of the people an ethical rule laid down by Āṇvikṣikī.¹² Kalyāṇa became a famous centre to which people from different parts of India flocked together. For Basavaṇṇa the primeminister to the King Bijjala was the leader who gave prophetic turn and popular appeal to Viraśaiva religion, and it was in his house at Kalyāṇa the Śivānubhavaḡoṣṭhis were conducted. Kalyāṇa is in the district of Gulbarga. At the portals of this spiritual assembly, every earnest seeker after divinity brought, in all humanity, his own spiritual experience, and occupied the place in the assembly to which his spiritual experience entailed him¹³. The hall where the Śivānubhavaḡoṣṭhis were conducted is called Anubhava Maṇṭapa later on. "In this Church of Religious Experience, every member considered his brother greater than himself. For the residence of the members, caves cut in hillocks were constructed within the

8 i) Ed. Dr.P.G. Halakatti, Śūnyasaṃpādane, Mukṭāyakkagaḷasampādane, Bijapur, 1930.

ii) Basavarājadēvararagaḷe as quoted by Dr. M. Cidananda Murthy, in Śūnyasaṃpādaneyannu kuritu on p. 142. Mohana prakasana Mysore, 1962.

iii) Ed. S. S. Basavanal, Basavaṇṇanavarasaṭṭhala vacanagaḷu, p. 103

9 Dr. M. M. Kalburgi, Śāsanagaḷalli Śivaśaraṇaru, p. 44, Sirigannadaprasasana, Dharwar, 1970.

10 Ibid. pp. 92-93.

11 Dr. M. Cidananda Murthy, Śūnyasaṃpādaneyannukuritu, p. 143, Mohana Prakasana, Mysore, 1962.

12 Guiseppe Tucci, The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, p. 456, 1929.

13 Dr. R. D. Ranade, Pathway to God in Kannada literature, pp. 309-10, Bhavans Publications, Bombay, 1962.

radius of a few miles from the Maṇṭapa and the ruins of which are still found within the precincts of Kalyāṇa"¹⁴ It was this religious Academy or Council which provided the opportunity for personal contact between these members of the religion. In this sense it was a stable institution established firmly – a fountainhead of deep religious experience from which the people drew inspiration. The vacanas were written by Śivaśaraṇas; and were read at the time of Śivānubhava goṣṭhi or Anubhava-goṣṭhi. They sometimes simply narrate the experience and at times clarify the concepts which are answers to some of the questions raised in the council. It is for this reason the people rightly recognised that it is in the Anubhava Maṇṭapa that religion, ethics, mysticism and philosophy were written for the first time. This shows the high place it enjoys in the minds of the intellectual people of Karnatak. We have a parallel example in Greek philosophy. "It was organised apparently on the lines of Pythagorean order. Apart from this it was first real school of Greek philosophy, for no more than tentative beginnings had been made before. Master and pupils together comprised a religious guild which was dedicated to the Muses.. The pupils lived in a small houses scattered about the garden of the Academy."¹⁵

The religious Council consisted of truthful people, people who are pure of heart, self-realised people, great seers, eminent śivayogis, those who gained experience of God, those who have Śivaliṅga as their breath of life, those who have united with Śivaprasāda and pādōdaka, those well versed in Śivācāra, those accomplished in Śivāgamas.¹⁶ The entrance to the council is forbidden to those who are non-Viraśaivas and also those who have not Iṣṭaliṅga on the body. The participants

14 Rev. C. D. Uttangi, Anubhava Maṇṭapa, p. 15, Karnatak Sahitya Mandir, Dharwar, 1955.

15 Edward Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 118-9, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960.

16 Śūnyasāmpādane, V. 34.

have to wash their feet before they could enter into the Assembly Hall and have to perform the Iṣṭaliṅga worship in order to enter into the discussion. Each should have a vocation which is necessary to have personal experience by performing the work in the purity of heart, word and deed. Such persons alone can contribute the personal experience to the fundamental fund of wisdom that was accumulated in this spiritual centre. This was compulsory, for it was this that could purify the senses of knowledge and the organs of action. The purity of the senses of knowledge and the organs of action was prescribed by the schools of thought both orthodox and heterodox. So this comes under the logical method in the extended sense of the term "logic" as it is used by one modern logician.

Śūnyasāmpādane deals with two types of pramāṇas since it accepts these alone to be the proper source of valid knowledge. They are indriyalikhita and liṅgalikhita. Indriyalikhita is the word for the organs of sense. Liṅgalikhita is the word for God. This is consistent with the definition of the Āṇvikṣiki which is stated in the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama :

pratyakṣāgamaiah ikṣi tasya āṇvikṣaṇam
āṇvikṣā tayā pravarta ityāṇvikṣiki

(Āṇvikṣikā is a reconstruction of what has been attained through perception and (āgama). āṇvikṣi is so called because it adopts that as its method.)

The term word (likhita) means knowledge in both cases according to Śūnyasāmpādane. One is superior to the other, namely, the Liṅgalikhita i. e. divine knowledge to indriyalikhita i. e. sense knowledge. For they prefer divine knowledge (Liṅgalikhita) to sense knowledge (indriyalikhita). So the Āṇvikṣiki according to this school is the same that is accepted by Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. Yet there is a difference between the Śaṭsthala school's view of āgama and that of Gautama's view of Āgama. In the latter case God's word i. e. Āgama is not the same as that of the Liṅgalikhita. For in the case of

Nyāya God and man cannot be identified, whereas in the case of Ṣaṭsthala school of thought it is possible. 'Liṅgalikhita' is, therefore, no different from that knowledge which comes from the pure heart of the devotee. Self-realised persons' words are the Āgama where there is the absence of ego. It is, therefore, mantra. This is divine perception. It is this that distinguishes it from Nyāya sūtra. The 'Liṅgalikhita' may also be compared with the Āgama as accepted by Advaita, Viśiṣṭhādvaita, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and pre-Dinnāga logic of the Buddhists and the Jaina view of Āgama. The other part of the Āṇvikṣikī, namely, the dialectics, is to be shown as present in the debates that are recorded in the Śūnyasaṃpādana. This is also an important part without which the Āṇvikṣikī cannot be completed. It demands study by the modern students of logic. Thus we have sufficient material for the construction of Āṇvikṣikī in the traditional sense of the term in accordance with the Ṣaṭsthala school of thought. This is one of the challenges that we meet when we go to make a philosophical study of the Śūnyasaṃpādana. A deep study of the work in this direction makes a contribution to Indian logic; one can also locate it in the history of Āṇvikṣikī that was developed during the eleventh and the twelfth centuries.

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CHAPTER II

“ It is a very extraordinary work. The dialogues in Śūnya Sampādane are planned very much on the lines of Platonic dialogues.”— Dr. R. D. Ranade.

The work under study, Śūnyasampādane, is the essence of the teachings of the mystic-philosophers of the twelfth century. This book of mystic discourses is an unique contribution to the Indian philosophical literature that was made by the Kaṇṇadigas.¹ Kaṇṇadigas just like Buddha taught the mystic-wisdom in the regional language. The literary form used by the mystics to express their experience is known ‘vacana’. Vacana is a short pithy-saying that could be put to tune very conveniently and was sung then as to day. So they are also called ‘gītas’. These vacanas are arranged in the form of discourses which constitute the present work.

The plan of the book, Śūnyasampādane, was conceived by Śivagaṇaprasādi Mahādēvayya for the first time who lived during the first half of the fifteenth century.² So there is a

1 (i) Kittle's Kannada Dictionary, Kaṇṇadiga is he who has one eye of Viṣṇu in his foot : Śiva (KK. 4), Paramēśvara (Ss. 5)— Vol. II p. 368 Madras University, 1969.

(ii) Śiva has eye of Viṣṇu in his foot says Akkamādēvi in one of her vacanas.

(iii) Tr. Dr. S. C. Nandimath, Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Prof. A. Menezes. He who has eye in the foot is the Śaraṇa of Gohēśvara, Śūnyasampādane, Vol. I. Ch. III V. 22, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1965.

(iv) R. Y. Dharwadkar, Modern writers state that Kaṇṇadiga is Śiva. Kannada Bhāṣāśāstra.

2 (i) Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Śivagaṇaprasādi Mahādēvayya's Śūnyasampādane, p. 9, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1971.

(ii) Dr. L. Baṣavaraju, Śivagaṇaprasādi Mahādēvayya, Preface, Manasagan-gotri, Mysore, 1970.

(iii) Dr. M. Chidananda Murthy, Śūnyasampādane yannu Kuritu, p. 44, Mohan Prakashan, Mysore, 1962. The Buddha's teachings also were edited by Buddhists only after hundred and more years.

considerable gap of two hundred years between the actual discussions that took place and the planning of the work. There are others who followed him and edited the Śūnyasaṃpādane thinking that the preceding work did not cover the other problems. Therefore there are as many as four Śūnyasaṃpādane in all.³ The nature of editing Śūnyasaṃpādane is quite different from the editing the works as usually is done to day. The difference is the difference of method and the material used. Therefore this work makes a new history in the field by introducing the kind of approach which is peculiar in editing the kind of material and the topics. The other editors are Keñcaviraṇṇodeyaru, Gummaḷāpurada Siddhaliṅgadēvaru, Gūḷūra Siddhaviraṇṇāryaru. The works of these three and that of Śivagaṇaprasādi Mahādēvayya are available today. But the scholars in the field mention one more author Halagedēvaru.⁴ The work of this author is not available so far.

The editing work of the vacanas was in progress since the days of the vacanakāras. And the writing work was given the most important place by the Śivasaraṇas of the twelfth century.⁵ The historicity of the art of editing goes to pre-Christian era and was not a new thing to them and also they

³ The scholars differ as to the number of versions. Some say that there are as many as five; whereas others state that there are only the four versions. The research work is still going on. The work under study is the final version.

⁴ (i) Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Śūnyasaṃpādane (Śivagaṇaprasādi Mahādēvayya) p. 3, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1971.

(ii) Prabuddha Karnatak, Vol. XV. S. No. 14 p. 6, Mysore University as quoted by Dr. R. C. Hiremath Śūnyasaṃpādane, p. 3, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1971.

(iii) Dr. M. Cidananda Murthy Śūnyasaṃpādaneyannu kuritu, p. 35, Mohan Prakasan, Mysore, 1962.

⁵ Śūnyasaṃpādane, X. 25. The same view is held by the Christian writers which is pointed out in the Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion on Tradition. One may also see the same contention in the Older Academy on ethics of Sophists by Zeller.

were well-versed as they had the training in the philosophical literature, the Nigamāgamas.⁶ The important traditional educational centres were already in existence in such places like Kūḍalasaṅgama where Basavaṇṇa had religious education and was well-versed in Nigamāgamas, which is clear from the sayings. Allama had the deepest knowledge of Nigamāgamas and the educational centre in which he had his education was not far away but in the vicinity of his birth place, namely, Baḷlegāvi. Baḷlegāvi was an important centre of both orthodox and heterodox schools of thought, where he had his education. He too had the deepest knowledge whose views on the vedic-gods and the supremacy of the Śaiva religion as depicted in the Vedas are similar to that of Dr. A. B. Keith, Pigott, Sharma and others. The Śivaśaraṇas were well aware of the types of metaphysical or dialectical activities that were going on during their previous ages in all the schools of thought which needs special research in the vacana literature. I tried to point out the change the Śivaśaraṇas brought about in the field of pramāṇas as understood by the orthodox schools of thought during the twelfth century.⁷ The centres of education were not only in Karnatak but also in Telagaṇaḍu. Kedāra was a principal centre of education in Kṛtayuga, Vāraṇāsi in Trētāyuga, Viṣṇupākṣa in Dvāpara and Śrīśaila in Kaliyuga states Basavaṇṇa.⁸ It was Basavaṇṇa, who gave prophetic

6 The terms such as gaṅgevaḷuka samārudraru and vedic view of the supremacy of Rudra could be traced to Śatapatha brāhmaṇa and the RK. Yajus, Sāma and Atharva respectively.

7 Dr.M. Chidananda Murthy states in his book Śūnyasāmpādaneyannu kuritu on page 133, that there are no links sometimes or consistency in the discourses of the Śūnyasāmpādane. But he does not give reasons and also the contexts. So they are sweeping remarks. The kinds of logic introduced in the discourses could only be pointed out by the students of the history of logic.

8 (i) Ed. S. S. Basavanal, Basavaṇṇanavara vacanagaḷu, p. 103 v. 394, L. E. Association, Dharwar, 1962.

(ii) The some of the centres of education quoted by Basavaṇṇa are the pontifical seats of Viśaiva religion since the time immemorial according to the tradition.

turn and popular appeal to the Viraśaiva religion, as Dr. S. Radhakrishnan remarked,⁹ a philosopher–primeminister to the king Bijjala around whom the distinguished mystic thinkers clustered¹⁰ and worked for the furtherance of the Viraśaiva religion and philosophy.

Viraśaivism as a ṣaṭsthala school of thought is the highest culmination of the Āgamic thought just as the Upaniṣadic thought is the flowering of the Vedic ideal. Almost all the aspects of philosophy, religion, Yoga and ethics of this school of thought find place in twenty one Chapters (Saṃpādanegaḷu) of the Śūnyasaṃpādane. Just like the Upaniṣads these chapters consist of monologues and dialogues. This school of thought was not only well-versed in the Vedic and Tāntric types of yoga but also synthecised them both. There is the production of a new kind of literature called 'Uddharaṇis.' This type of literature is a great contribution to the world's Tāntric literature made by the Śivaśaraṇas. This literature makes use of the circles, squares, figures and the nyāsas and mudrās. The explanation of Śāmbhavamudrā was done with a help of the vacana that is found in the Śūnyasaṃpādane. So they were quite familiar with this sort of yogic science. The term 'Uddharaṇi' is made use by Ādayya¹¹ who is one of the distinguished Śivaśaraṇas a junior most contemporary of Śivaśaraṇas of twelfth century movement. Thus the contribution to the allsided development of the school of thought is unique both in form and matter. Apart from the Uddharaṇi

9 Ed. H. R. Sakhare, Liṅgadhāraṇa cendrike, foreword. Liṅgaraja College, Belgaum, 1942.

10 (i) Earlier to Basavaṇṇa Koṇḍaguli Kēśirāja, who was Viraśaiva, worked as a prime-minister to the king Vikramaditya VI did to Virasaivism which helped the work of Basavaṇṇa.

(ii) This reminds me of the Platonic theory of philosopher king.

11 Ed. Chennappa Uttangi, Ādayyana Vacanagaḷu, p.17, V. 32, Murughamath Dharwar, 1955 The Vacanakāra makes use of the term 'Cakroddharaṇa' which is one of the subjects of the Uddharaṇe.

and Śūnyasāmpādane there are other types of edited literature called sthalakaṭṭusāhitya which may be compared to the Tripiṭakas in Buddhism. These are based on the mystical, ethical and metaphysical principles just as the Tripiṭakas are based on the ethics, religion and metaphysics. These are the chief forms of the literature edited: Sthalakaṭṭu, Śūnyasāmpādane and Uddharāṇi.

The very title of the book demands clarification. This is made clear by the translators of the Śūnyasāmpādane in the preface to the first volume of the Śūnyasāmpādane: "The exact meaning of the title of this compilation presents the first of many problems the student has to encounter on his way."¹² So the problem of the title is the subject matter of pages.

If we make a survey of the titles of the books on orthodox religion and heterodox religion we have three types of the title generally. They are the names of the personal God or the names of the vehicles of the personal God or the highest metaphysical category. We are concerned with the latter type of the titles of the books. They are Vēda, Upaniṣad, Brahma, Śūnya, Ṣaṭṣtala, Dharma and so on. The very titles of the kind are enigmatic or beyond the comprehension of ordinary understanding. Even then one cannot but attempt to understand the nature of the principle, which is used as a title of the book and in what way it is used significantly.

There are two books of the same title, namely, 'Śūnya.' One of them belongs to Mahāyāna school and the other to Viraśaiva school. The full title of the work on Mahāyāna buddhism is "Śūnyasāmhita". The subject matter is the worship of the Śūnya. It is in Oriya language which is the fusion of Mahāyāna buddhism and Śiva-Śakti cult or Tāntrikism. The fusion was due to the influence of the missionaries of the Śiva-Śakti cult during the eighth and the ninth centuries

¹² Tr. Dr. S. C. Nandimath, Dr. R. C. Hiremath and Prof. A. Menezes, Śūnyasāmpādane, Vol. I, Karnatak University, Dharwar 1965.

in Orissa.¹³ "Śūnyasaṃhitā" in Oriya literature is a work of Virāṣimha a Tamil. As brahma is the highest metaphysical category in the Upaniṣads so also Śūnya is the highest metaphysical category in both Viraśaivism and Mahāyāna buddhism. The worship of the Śūnya or Brahma is not the worship of the Deist's God. So the nature and function of Śūnya as an object of worship differ and the religion too. So the titles give the precise meaning to the subject matter of the works.

The title of the work under study consists of two Parts : 'Śūnya' and 'Sāmpādane'. The term 'Sāmpādane' has a number of senses : Chapter, collection, teaching, investigation, dialectics, self-realization, attainment, spiritual gain, testing, etc. This brings to light the importance of word and the theory of meaning. A word may stand for certain fact in life as well as ideas. The ideas may not necessarily and does not stand for customary meanings.¹⁴ So the meanings enumerated above in connection with 'Sāmpādane' cannot be found in dictionary. The meanings appear in a quite different manner. Allamaprabhu is of the stand that the many senses lead to one word or one word consists of multiplicity when he says¹⁵ Gohēśvaranēmba liṅgavanaridabaḷika, gītavellā ondu mātinolagu. (All the vacanas are in one word when one realises Liṅga called Gohēśvara). Brahmasūtra also states : tattu samanvayāt// (All the words seek their meaning in one word 'That' or 'Brahma').

Allamaprabhu is one great wise man of the time like Socrates who puts questions to clarify the words. Throughout the work Allamaprabhu is busy in putting questions and

13 Dr. Mayadhar, History of Oriya Literature, pp. 31-33 and 70 Chief Editor, Oriya Encyclopaedia Sahitya Academy, New-Delhi 1962.

14 Ed. Adrienna and Keith Lehrer, Theory of meaning, Printice-Hall, Inc., Englewood cliff, New Jersey, 1970.

15 Ed. Dr. L. Basavaraju, Allamana Vacanacendrike, p. 137. V. 627 Mysore, 1960.

clearing the meanings of guru, liṅga, jaṅgama, prasāda, yoga, bhakta and so on which mean one thing, namely, Śūnya. Therefore saṃpādane means dialectics or clarification of the concepts. One may see the dialectical development, from simple questions to the development of systematization or theory of thought in one sense and the dialectical theory of the universe or cosmos as in Hegel in another.

Saṃpādane means spiritual gain. Because the highest end either of piṇḍāṇḍa (microcosm) or of brahmāṇḍa (macrocosm) is the realization of the union of aṅga and Liṅga (devotee and God) which is nothing but becoming the Absolute. So Saṃpādane is spiritual gain. Saṃpādane is teaching or enlightenment. Allamaṃprabhu removed the difficulties whenever and wherever the Sādhakas were met with predicaments. This is clear when Allamaṃprabhu faced himself with the predicament of initiation. It was none else but the voice from within resolved the difficulty. So it is bodhe (i. e. enlightenment) in case of Allamaṃprabhu. In the second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twenty-first chapters the śaraṇas faced with the predicaments relating to the experience of the forms of śūnya. Therefore "Saṃpādane" means enlightenment and teaching. So Gūḷūra Siddhavīraṇṇa states that it is "Paramānubhava bōdhe", where 'paramānubhava' means the supreme-brahma and 'bodhe' means enlightenment. This term "Paramānubhava bōdhe" is synonym of "Śūnyasaṃpādane". Śivagaṇaprasādi Mahādevayya gives a number of synonyms of the term 'Saṃpādane.' They are 'Mata' i.e. view point or darśana; 'pravardhana' i.e. enhancement of the knowledge; where śūnya is knowledge; 'samārūḍhasaṅgraha' i.e. the possession of the store of "sarvācārasaṃpattu", "that is the wealth of all good discipline in accordance with the religious texts of Vīraśaivism where 'śūnya' is 'Sarvācārasaṃpattu'; 'saṃpādane' is dialectics of the śūnya; 'saṃpādane' is 'tantra' or 'samhitā' of śūnya. 'Saṃpādane' is a vidyā like veda vidyā or purāṇavidyā. Just

as Vēda, Nyāya, Purāṇa, etc. were being cultivated by specialists who derived their names after the śāstra or Knowledge in which they were experts, similarly the Sāmpādanā vidyā was preserved through succession of teachers and pupils who studied this śāstra. Thus the word 'Sāmpādanē' has meanings of philosophical value.

The other part of the title is 'Śūnya.' This is very important concept which forms the central teachings of the Ṣaṭsthala school of thought. The term śūnya has a great history in the Indian philosophical thinking. This, as Dr. R.D. Ranade points out in one of the senses of the term śūnya, occurs in the philosophy of Gorgias—an ancient Greek thinker. In its negative sense it predominates the teachings of Yājñavalkya a distinguished Upaniṣadic teacher which is known as the famous 'nētivāda.' Therefore 'Śūnyavāda' is 'nētivāda'—a metaphysical method or view point of the Upaniṣadic thinking.

When we survey the Indian religious, moral, mystical and metaphysical literature and the works on secular subjects like mathematics we find that number is primarily the metaphysical symbol. We may take for example the number 'zero' that embraces the infinite and finite i. e. the biggest of the big and the smallest of the small. It is both 'is' and 'is not'. So it is All and None. It is All because it is that category which has All the particulars. It is None because it is not one of the particulars which it has. Therefore it is said to be transcendental. Thus the arithmetical figure is made use of to understand the nonempirical or supra-empirical Being. Hence it is rightly recognised by the students of Indian philosophy that arithmetic serves the purpose of metaphysics. Zero is called Bayalu i. e. space or Void. This is the ground of the physical space and also all that it contains. So Śaraṇas say that it (zero, Bayalu) is 'Bayaliṅge Bayalu.' The Upaniṣadic sages spoke of this greatest and at the same time the smallest Being : 'anōraṇiyānmahatō mahiyān'. This is a statement that states experience of the

kind that cannot be translated into the empirical statement. So it is said to be supra-sensible and supra-empirical Reality. The Reality is self-born. It is the ground and goal of the evolutionary process. Thus the zero as an arithmetical category has metaphysical functions. So also as a geometrical category, namely, space (Bayalu), it has metaphysical functions. Hence both the arithmetic and geometry are said to be raised to the status of metaphysics.

The meaning of 'Zero' is both positive and negative. So also the methods are of two kinds. They are positive and negative. As the Śūnya is used by the metaphysicians so also the positive and the negative methods are used in metaphysics. Both heterodox and the orthodox schools of thought used the methods. Śaṣṭhala school of the orthodox schools, makes use of the positive and the negative methods. The representatives of the methods are Basavaṇṇa and Allamaṣṛabhu respectively as Cennabasavaṇṇa states.

The view point of great Śaṅkara, an advaita-vedāntin, is characterised as a śūnyavāda. He is the propounder of the negative method. So some of the Indian thinkers called him a covert or disguised Buddhist (pracchannabauddha). Allamaṣṛabhu is a philosopher who adopted a negative method in contrast with Basavaṇṇa who accepted the positive method.¹⁶ The philosophy either of Yājñavalky or Allamaṣṛabhu is not the eristic philosophy of Gorgias. So this philosophy is in the words of Dr. R. D. Ranade a positive philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.¹⁷

'India revels in the exploration of the significance of' the numbers. It occupies an important place in almost all walks of life. The slogans such as 'ondu eraḍu bēku mūru

16 Uṇṭerbuda Basavannakoṇḁa, illembudanallama koṇḁa. E. d. Dr. P. G. Halakatti Śūnyaasarpādane, Ch. VIII. 2. Bijapur. 1930.

17 Dr. R. D. Ranade A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic philosophy, p. 82 Oriental Book Agency, Poona. 1926.

nālku sāku' – (one and two are wanted, three and four are enough) are seen wherever our eyes are cast. This marks the significant use of the numbers in the reconstruction of modern India. The basic notion that lies under such slogans is this that the wants should be few and at the same time happiness should be more. The growth of the individual adds to the growth of the nation. This is in accordance with Bharatiya ancient ideal, namely, the restraint or selfcontrol. The ideal, peaceful, rich social life is the result of such life. This is how the number concept works in changing the course of life. So the number concept, one may say, synthesises the secular and the spiritual life.

The ethical sphere is another important aspect of life where the number concept is aptly used. The numbers five six and seven are supposed to be auspicious numbers. The number five represents the śīla or auspicious behaviour both in social and international life. So do the numbers six and seven. There are six prohibitions declares Basavaṇṇa. They are : steal not, kill not, speak not lies, be not absorbed in self praise, be not jealous of others, despise not others. There are six enemies of man against which man is to be guarded. Thus the number concept assumes an ethical importance.

Yoga is a science that makes use of the numbers since long. The numbers eight, six and five are such numbers that are used in yoga: aṣṭāṅga, ṣaḍāṅga and that of pañcāṅga are the yogas. Thus the numbers are used to designate the yogas. The numbers are also used to name the cakras or ādhāras. There are six types of unificants that bring union between Liṅga and Aṅga. The numbers have an important role to play in this spiritual science.

Theology is another field where number plays an important role. One may state that there is no theology that does not make use of the numbers, both in West and East.

The numbers such as zero, one, two, three, five and six are very important numbers that play a significant part in the explanation of the nature and functions of gods. The spheres of gods have their own numbers. The theological lores have special numbers.

We find the numbers in cosmogonic range as they are introduced significantly. Śūnya (Asat), one, two, three, five, six, etc., have the power to evolve the world. Zero (Śūnya) in Śaṭsthala school is said to be the primordial substance. It is said to be beyond our comprehension. There are schools that accept earth, water, fire, air, space, as the primary substances and call them by numbers. We find this sort of use both by ancient Greeks and Indians. Even the expansion and the contraction as a process of evolution and involution are shown by numbers. In this connection the number two is used to signify pravṛtti and nivṛtti. This is the way down and the way up according to Heraclitus. The individual is said to be six (Śaṭsthala) are five (Pancaskandha) in Viraśaivism and Buddhism respectively.

The geometrical concept also is used as the primary substance. This is Bayalu. There are different types of Bayalu. They are the bayalus (spaces) of mind, body, etc., in Vacana literature.¹⁸ The text under study quotes the vācanas where the concept of Bayalu in its different uses is found.

Both Śūnya (Zero) and Bayalu (Space) are said to be the goal of man. The whole process of Nature according to Śaṭsthala school is aiming at Śūnya. One becomes Bayalu by uniting with Bayalu. It is also called Nirbayalu state.

Sri Nijagūṇa Shivayogi states that he who knows the simple arithmetic of adding and subtracting is free from the bonds of life. The number is an innermost potential of

¹⁸ Bertrand Russel used such concepts in his works.

the dynamic things. In this way the special importance of the numbers is philosophically interesting.

“As to the numbers, there is one outstanding only which alone fulfils this purpose completely because of its widest import and impact. It is the number and symbol Zero. All positive and negative numbers are inherent in it. The concept of Zero has its position in all branches of Indian thought, primarily in metaphysics and cosmology, secondarily in mathematics and science. Zero is the transition-point between opposites. It symbolises the true balance within divergent tendencies. Zero has now taken on, in a more deepened and philosophical way, the functions earlier assigned to the number....zero is the, productive All and None, the matrix of positive and negative, of addition and subtraction, of generating and destroying capacities.” states Prof. Betty Heimann. The number in its temporal and the spatial concepts has wonderful implications.

The etymological meaning of the word “Śūnyam” will be of much use to understand. K. F. Brugmann in comparative Grammar derives two senses from the single root, ‘śūn’, namely, excessive, the swollen and also the void.¹⁹ This is beset with difficulties. Because the two meanings derived from a single root are positive and negative. So it seems to be paradoxical for the philologist. He may not deny that the Śūnyam and the śūnya are the derivation of the single root. But he defies or is reluctant to accept the interconnected meaning. They are the same for the Indian logician and metaphysician essentially which is not acceptable for the Western logician. This is so because the Western logic adheres to definite single, distinct number, whereas the Indian logic dwells on one basic mathematical notion : the All and

19 Purana, Vol. II, No. 2 All India Kashiraj Trust, Fort Ramanagara Varnasi, July, 1961.

No-number, the Zero. Zero is the sum, and more than the sum, of all single perceivable phenomena.²⁰

A special feature of almost all the major Tantric (Āgamic) schools is this, that they make use of the concept of śūnya either in the metaphysical sense or in the mystical sense. According to Vaiṣṇavism, it is a stage when Viṣṇu is about to create the world but has not yet started creation.²¹ Śūnya in Kashmira-śaivism is a state of latent urges, which are not yet active.²² These two schools use it for a reality lower than the highest Reality. Śūnya for these two schools is a state of experience which is indeterminate and without form. Śūnya in Śaivāgamas is the Absolute;²³ in Buddhism it is the highest Being.²⁴ Virāṣaiva mystic philosophers say that the śūnya is termed differently in Tantra and Vedānta. Śūnya in Vedānta is 'Prajñā.' 'Śūnya' according to Tantra is 'Hakāra.'²⁵ There is no difference between the two. Śūnya has as many as ten synonyms which is called Śuddhaprasāda.²⁶

Śaivāgamas and Vacanāgamas tried to understand the kernel of the universe in numbers. They followed the Veda which is the precursor of the number philosophy and mysti-

20 Betty Heimann, *Facts of Indian Thought*, pp. 151-52 George Allen & Unwin, 1964.

21 Ed. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man*, p. 269 George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960.

22 Ed. Dr. K. C. Pondey *Bhāskari*, Vol. III PP. 210-11 *The Prince of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Texts*. 1954

23 Ed. Sri Prabhuswāmīgala, *Gaṇabhāṣita ratnamāle*, p. 91 Murugamath, Dharwar. 1948

24 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. pp. 662-663 George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956

25 Ed. Sri Chennamallikarjuna *Muktāṅgana kṛtāhamāle mattu Jyōtirmāya śāmbhavi*, p. 17 *Saddharmā deepika Granthamale*.

26 Nijaguna Śivayogi viracita *Saṭika āruṣāstra*, *Paramarthaprakasike*, p. 3. Kārnatak Book Dept. Ballari. 1929

cism²⁷. The Ṛgvedic seer in the East and Pythagoras in the West²⁸ are the first practicers of the number philosophy and number mysticism. 'Eka' in the Veda is being given the dimension of the Reality,²⁹ whereas Pythagoras has given the space dimension to the numbers.³⁰ The Śaṭsthala school of thought like Veda accepts the fundamental doctrine that the cosmos is the evolute of Zero or Śūnya. As we see that the Rudra became the Absolute of the Upanisads so also Vedic 'Eka' became the Zero of the Tantra (Āgama).

This is very clear from the fact that the Āgamas are the essence of the Veda as stated by the Āgamas³¹ and also from the inner evidence of the Ṛgveda and the other Vedas. A ṛk in the Ṛgveda which is ascribed to Vaśiṣṭha and addressed to Rudra states that the Rudra is the father of the three worlds.³² So it is the one that is the ground of the universes. In other words it is the one that became many. This line of thought is carried out in the later Vedas. Yajurveda (x) states that in the beginning there was one (Ekorudra). Atharvaveda gives the status of the Absolute and all the transcendental powers are attributed to 'Eka' which is termed Vrātya.³³

27 Tr. Max Muller, The Upanisads, Pt. II p. XII Doyer Publication 1962.

28 The Fundamental doctrine of the Pythagoreans is the proposition that the nature of things is number. Outlines of Greek Philosophy, p. 35 Routledge & Kegan Paul 1950

29 Rgveda, I. 1964. 46

30 Robert Adamson, The Development of Greek Philosophy, p. 23. Calcutta. 1908

31 Ed. Topigi, Tantra sangraha, p 14 Murusavirmath, Hubli.

32 tryambakaṃ yajāmahē sugandhiṃ puṣṭhivardhanāṃ / urvārukamivā bandhanānmṛtyōrmukṣiya māmrtāt/ / Rgv. VII. 59. 12 (We adore the father of three worlds, Tryambaka of auspicious. Fame, increaser of fullness and strength. May I be detached from Death like cucumber from the shell (or the stem), not from the Immortal T. V. Kapalishastrī Further lights : The Veda and Tantra pp. 191-192 Shri Aurobindo Ashram Press, Pondicherry. 1951

33 Atharvaveda, XV, i, 1, 6

This is the Absolute of the Upaniṣad. This is a fully developed idea of Absolute in both transcendent and immanent aspects.³⁴ This is 'Brahma' says Umāhaimavati. This is, therefore, said to be 'Tadvan' and 'Upaniṣad'.³⁵ This Rudra, who is beyond this, is formless and nameless (Arūpaṁ, anāmayaṁ).³⁶ This Rudra is one only.³⁷ That Rudra alone is all this, what has been and what will be.³⁸ This idea may be supplemented by the Ṛgvedic idea of Rudra. That Rudra has sway over both heaven and earth i. e. physical and suprāphysical states of cosmos³⁹. They are under his control which developed into that sort of train of thought in the Āgamas by describing the ultimate Reality as follows:

utpadyatē liyatēca liṅgēsmin sacarācaram
 nirālambamidaṁ sarvaṁ nirālambaprakāṣitaṁ
 nirālambamidaṁ kṛtvā nirālambōbhaviṣyati
 vyōmākāraṁ mahāśūnyaṁ vyāpakaṁ yōnabhāvayet
 ...yē dhyāyanti paraṁśūnyaṁ niṣkalaṁ niravasthitaṁ⁴⁰
 ahamēva jagatsraṣṭā punarmayyēva liyatē
 ahamēvasthalaṁ viddhi....⁴¹
 antaḥ śūnyaṁ bahiḥ śūnyaṁ śūnyā daśādīṣaḥ
 sarva śūnya nirākāraṁ nirdvandvaṁ paramaṁ padaṁ⁴²

34 Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, III. 2, 4, IV. 12

35 Kēnōpaniṣad, IV. 1, 6, 7. Umāhaimavati and Śvetāśvatarōpaniṣad refer to the same thought and describe the Rudra. Umāhaimavati is wife of Śiva says Max Muller. Upaniṣads, Pt. I. p. 151. Same is the view of Dr. R. D. Ranade

36 Śvetāśvatara, III. 10

37 Ibid, III. 2

38 Ibid, III. 15

39 Rgveda, VII. 46.2

40 Ed. S. A. Topigi, Tantrasaṅgraha, pp. 106-107 jñānācārabodhakapatala. Sts 22, 23; 43 Murasavirmath, Hubli. 1914

41 Pāramēśvara tantra, Pat. VI. 7

42 Ed. Sri Prabhuswamigalu Ganabhasita ratnamale, p. 91 Murughamath, Dharwar. 1948

liyate gamyate yatra yētayena sarvaṃ carācaram / tadēlīṅgami-
 tyuktaṃ līṅgatatva parāyaṇaiḥ⁴³. This 'Eka' or Rudra idea
 of the Vedōpaniṣad developed into the incomprehensible idea
 of the Absolute as śūnya in the Āgamas. Śūnya, therefore, in
 the number system of the Āgama represents 'niravaya'—an
 unmanifested state of the Absolute. The term śūnya is one of
 the most difficult concepts in the history of Indian philosophy.
 This term is interpreted variously. Śūnya, according to some, is
 nihilistic principle; whereas according to others it is eternal,
 ineffable, transcendental and immanent principle. It is
 said to be mūlabrahma (i. e. root-Absolute). It is supposed to
 be Māyā for some and the highest value for others. According to
 Vīraśaivism it is niravaya which is the primary
 substance. The Being evolved out of this niravaya or Śūnya
 and it is called Śūnyaśakti. It is conscious-force (cit-śakti).

The theory of evolution according to this school has
 three stages. The evolution is called śūnyalīṅga sṛṣṭi. The
 three-stages of the evolution are as follows :

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|
| 1) Sarvaśūnya nirālīṅba sṛṣṭi | Causal form |
| 2) Śūnya nirālamba sṛṣṭi | Subtle form |
| 3) Nirmala sṛṣṭi of Iśānyamūrti | gross form |

This is according to Allamaṇḍaprabhu as stated in Muktaṅgane
 Kaṇṭhamāle and Jyotirmaya Śāmbhavividya. This is how the
 number philosophy reached the final stage of monistic
 thought. Āgama used 'chipher' to symbolise the Reality.
 Had the Greeks known the 'Zero' they would have made use
 of it state the historians writing on the development of the
 Greek philosophy. This may be compared with the 'Asat' of
 the Ṛgveda, Bṛhadāranyaka, Chāndōgya, Taittirīyōpaniṣad and
 Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa. The method and meaning of the Āgamas,
 thus, agree with the Vedopaniṣadic.

43 Prabhudevaru Kalmāth, Līṅgalīlāvīlāsacāritra, p. 13 Murughamath,
 Dharwar. 1955

But this school of thought differs with the number school of thought called the Sankhya school. The numbers, though common to both the schools, differ in their meanings (i. e. artha-the object or reality represented by the number symbol). This school of thought knows no 'one' but 'two'. The 'two' are the ultimate numbers in the Sankhya school of thought. They represent 'prakṛti' and 'puruṣa' categories. Therefore this school is dualistic or pluralistic. There are two numbers in ṣaṭsthala school of thought also. They are reducible to one which in turn turns to 'Zero'. But in Sankhya school they cannot be reduced to one as they are ultimates. Therefore the 'two' in Sankhya and the two in ṣaṭsthala school of thought are not the same as some one modern scholar thinks today.⁴⁴ The Vacanāgamic 'One' and the Vedic and the Vedantic 'One' means sat, chit and ānanda. This one is the ultimate or the highest metaphysical category in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic thought, whereas in ṣaṭsthala school of thought it is not the ultimate category. This One disappears in the Śūnya. This Śūnya and Asat of the Ṛgveda are same. This is clear from the study of literature.⁴⁵ It is here in the realization of Non-Being we have the suggestion for the idea of Śūnya. The metaphysical counterpart of Asat is recognised in the Absolute or Void of the Buddhists. It is to be remembered that the conception of the primary Void or Night could be met with even in Greek Philosophy in the theory of Epimenides.⁴⁶

44 Sri S. S. Bhoosnurmath, a retired Professor in Viraṣaiva Philosophy in the Dept. of Kannada K. University, compares both and states that they are same. Śūnyasāmpādane, Vol. III. intro. to V. 25 Ch. VIII. Karnatak University, Dharwar 1969

45 (i) Allamana vacanacendrike, p. 1, V. 5 (ii) Ed. Dr. R. C. Hiremath Satsthala jñanasārāmṛta, pp. 6-12, V. 10-16 Murughamath, Dharwar 1962 (iii), Ṛgveda, X. 129.

46 Dr. R. D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p.82 Oriental Book Agency, Poona 1926

Thus the Śūnya in Viraśaivism is the positive principle. It is the highest category of Ṣaṭsthala school of thought. This forms a part of the title of the book and is the subject matter of the text. So Śūnyasaṃpādane has a good number of meanings that suggest the dimensions of the subject matter that need expositions from different standpoints according to the subject matters.

It is the doctrine of evolution that brings solace to the human heart⁴⁷ as propounded in some of the philosophical schools the origin of which is found in the beginning of the birth of philosophical thinking both in the Western and the Indian worlds of thought.

There are monistic thinkers in the West as in the East in whom the idea of evolution dawned first as there are dualistic thinkers in whom it occurred. Anaximander and Empedocles are the advocates of the two schools of evolution respectively among Greeks. The nāsadiyasūkta and the other one that advocates the dualism are parallel examples as depicted in the Ṛgveda in Ancient India. The Greek idea of evolution begins with 'air' as the substance which evolves. Therefore the course of evolution starts with the materialistic phase. This is more akin to the empirical view of some of the modern scientists than to the transcendental view of the Vedic sages.

The Viraśaiva theory of evolution as depicted in the Śūnyasaṃpādane is similar to the one that is put forth by the Vedic sage of the Nāsadiyasūkta. So this differs from the Anaximandarean monistic theory in a limited sense, whereas from that of Empedocles and of Sankhya view of Kārikā basically. The 'asat' of the Ṛgveda and the 'Śūnya' of the text under study are similar in nature. The cause of the

47 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy p. 64, George Allen and Unwin, 1957

evolution is not outside of the substance both in the 'asat' of Ṛgveda and the 'sūnya' of the Śaṭsthala school. It is called the germ of chit or conscious-force in the form of desire. This is the non-dualistic principle which gives rise to two ultimately. Both of them advocate satkāryavāda leading to the transformation called 'avikṛtapariṇāmavāda' which is the same in Sankhya, even then there is a subtle difference as the cause i. e. efficient cause, is quite different in Sankhya from the material cause. In this sense it resembles the Aristotalian view of evolution. But the Aristotalian theory of evolution and the Sankhya theory of evolution differ as each has its own purpose. The Aristotalian course of evolution is linear whereas the Sāṅkhyan view of the evolutionary course is cyclic. The Vīraśaiva theory of evolution like that of Aristotle is teleological. It is of becoming the Divine. So the advocates of this theory state that the Aṅga becomes Liṅga. This is 'avikṛtapariṇāma' whereas in Sankhya the transformation does not lead to that end which is efficient cause. It is that distinguishes both the Aristotalian and the Vīraśaivite view of 'avikṛtapariṇāmavāda' from that of Sāṅkhya. There is another point of dissimilarity that distinguishes the evolutionary process as propounded in the Śūnyasāmpādane from the one in Sankhyakārikā. The dynamism or motion attributed to Prakṛti in Sankhya needs the presence of Puruṣa to set a change in the homogeneous dynamic process to heterogeneous dynamic process. This is foreign to the Śaṭsthala school of thought as put forth in the Śūnyasāmpādane. The Śāṅkara view and the Śaiva-siddhānta view of evolution are the same as the evolution taking place in the Avidyā or Māyā which in both the schools is jaḍa (i. e. inert or nonsentient). The transformation in Śāṅkara is 'Vikṛtapariṇāmavāda.' So it is in a sense 'asatkāryavāda.' 48 Śāṅkara reconciles this with the Advaitic stand by stating that it is an imposition in the sense of Māyā

48 G. Vishnumurti Bhatta, Sankhyakarima, p. 14, Sharada Press, Mysore 1959

This 'asatkāryavāda' of Śāṅkara differs from the Mādhyamika view. For in the former case the evolutionary-substance is Avidyā whereas it is Śūnya or no cause in the latter. Like the Mādhyamika, Śaṭsthala school or the text under study states that the Śūnya is the substance in which the evolution takes place. But both are not the same as the Śūnya is 'asaktārya' in Buddhism and it is 'satkārya' in the Śaṭsthala school.

The evolution in Sankhya has two phases, namely, the primary and the secondary. The primary stage of evolution consists of twenty four categories. The secondary stage of evolution consists only of the result of the gross stage of the gross elements (mahābhūtas). The secondary stage of evolution has no other process than the result of the gross elements. It is limited to the field of the results. One may make this point clear by giving an example of a tree which is a result of the five gross elements. If a tree is burnt it is not destroyed but turned to the state of the constituent five gross elements. This is the knowledge we have at this stage of evolutionary process. This stage cannot go beyond this realm. Beyond this stage is the primary stage of the evolutionary process that gives us the subtle forms of the gross elements and others. It is only in this stage the gross elements return to the subtle forms and still further back to the original source. So also the subtle states change to gross state at this phase of evolution. Therefore the primary stage of the evolutionary process is much deeper than the secondary stage of evolution. The evolutionary process takes place in three stages according to Śaṭsthala school. The first stage is called the Śūnyaliṅgasṛṣṭi (Mahāliṅga). It is a stage of the growth of desire called bindu (conscious-force) that took the form. This is the causal state which is the 'comming-to-be' known as sādākhyā. This is both consciousness and existence. It is the state that leads to the next stage called subtle stage. This consists of eleven supramental forces. The idea of forces is common to the evolutionary schemes of almost all the Indian schools. The above-stated two stages are the Bhāvaliṅga and Prāṇaliṅga

which are supposed to be the noumenon and the mystic-world respectively. The mystic-world of forces leads to the third stage called Iṣṭaliṅga or Aṅgasrṣṭi. This is visible or Sākāra-srṣṭi whereas the Prāṇaliṅga is Sākāra-nirākāra or form-formless state and the Bhāvaliṅga is nirākāra or formless state. So We have in Viraśaivism quite different stages of the evolutionary process. The gross stage and subtle stage in the Sankhya are the two stages of the gross stage in the evolutionary scheme of Ṣaṭsthala school. The gross stage according to the text under study consists of Aṅgatattvas. They are twenty four in number as in Sankhya, Śaivasiddhānta or Śankara. The twentyfour subtle tattvas which are the constituents of the primary stage of the evolutionary process in the Sankhya are the constituents of the gross process in the Ṣaṭsthala school. What is the secondary stage in the Sāṅkhya school is grosser stage of the evolutionary process in the Ṣaṭsthala school. The subtle stage in the Ṣaṭsthala school has quite a different number of principles. They are eleven in number. They are Liṅga tattvas in the Ṣaṭsthala school which we do not find in the Sankhya evolutionary process. But we have the same number of them in Śaivasiddhānta. This group of eleven principles either in Śaivasiddhānta or in Śankara are called Vidyātattvas or Śuddhamāyātattvas. The Vidyā or the Māyātattvas are insentient tattvas which differ from the subtle tattvas of Ṣaṭsthala school as they are not insentient. They are the subtle forms of the Liṅga or Chicchakti (conscious-force). There is one more stage in the evolutionary process according to the Ṣaṭsthala school as stated in the Śūnyasāmpadane which is called the causal state or stage. This is foreign to the Śaivasiddhānta or the Śankara siddhānta. It is the stage where the difference of Aṅga and Liṅga vanishes in the union of both. It is called Śūnyaliṅga or Mahāliṅga that disappears in Nisthala i.e. Nostage. This is Sarvaśūnyānirālamba tattva. This is called 'Bayaluga' in the Śūnyasāmpadane. Thus the monistic view of evolution is maintained in Ṣaṭsthala school systematically which is an advance over Śankara view. Śankara did it by

introducing the doctrine of imposition artificially. Therefore Ṣaṭsthala view of the Absolute is not that of Abstract Absolute but of the concrete Absolute. The dichotomy of subject and object is solved not by abstraction and reducing the world to illusion thereby but by the one view advocated by the Existentialism as Jaspers conceives. This is the uniqueness about the theory of evolution as depicted in the Sūnyasaṃpādane.

It is mechanistic either in Sankhya—or in Śankara—or in Śaivasiddhānt schools. Because the Māyātattva is jaḍa i.e. non-sentient principle. But it is raised to semi-spiritualistic as the Puruṣa is reflected in the Mahat. The evolutionary process in Ṣaṭsthala school is neither mechanistic nor semi-spiritualistic as in the above-said schools but spiritualistic process as the substance that evolves is not insentient but sentient. It is spiritual in another sense unlike Sankhya or Vaiśeṣika or Śankara or Śaivasiddhānta as the process of evolution is teleological. The purpose of evolution of Prakṛti in Sankhya or of Māyā in Śankara and Śaivasiddhānta and of atoms in Nyāyavaiśeṣika differ. So also in Viraśaivism. Except Ṣaṭsthala school of thought the rest of them have no purpose in the strictest sense of the term as the substance that evolves is insentient. So the nature of it prevents one applying the term purpose. The purpose is imposed in these schools. If the purpose of evolution is to please the Puruṣa in Sankhya, it is to provide a field for the multiplicity of the selves in order to remove the malas or taints in Śaivasiddhānta. But it is to perform worship of the self which is not different from the individual self in Ṣaṭsthala school. This idea is Upaniṣadic in origin as it is found in Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as I showed elsewhere.

There are two evolutionary series in Sankhya. They are the psychical and the physical according to Sankhyakārikā of Īśvarakriṣṇa. The psychical series that are the inner senses called antaḥkaraṇa are not psychical in the real sense of the term, but are seemingly so. Because they are not

different from the elements (tanmātra) as both of them are the evolutes of the ahaṅkāra. Materially they are same. So the difference is that of degree but not of kind. The psychical nature to the insentient matter is lent by the reflection of Puruṣa. The evolution of antaḥkaraṇa and the organs of sense and action are the gross forms of the substance that gives rise to antaḥkaraṇa which are subtle forms. The evolution is not of insentient substance as in the case of Sankhya. Therefore there is a distinction in the psychical and physical series of evolution.

This is the theory of evolution of the doctrine of Śūnya as stated in the Ṣaṣṭhala school of thought. There are difficulties that entail. They are of ethical, religious, and social nature. These need further investigation.

The term 'Śūnya' occurs in the opening chapter (The Prathamōpadēśa) of the work under study. The context in which it occurs is very significant. For the yogic state described by Allamaṣṛabhu and to which he introduced the gardener called Goggayya throws light on a yogic method quite different from the Karmayoga practised by Goggayya. The yoga taught by Allama also is called Karmayoga. A new event occurs when Allamaṣṛabhu came across a yogi soon after he departed from the garden of Goggayya. It was here that the editor of the Śūnyasaṁpādane introduces a mantra of an Āgamic text called Siddhānta-vākya. It gives a vivid description of the trance of the yogi called Animiṣayya whom Allamaṣṛabhu met. The mantra that gives the characteristic features of the trance runs thus :⁴⁹

ūrdhvaśūnyamadhaśśūnyaṁ madhyaśūnyaṁ
nirāmayam |
sarvaśūnyamanābhāsam samādhistasya
lakṣaṇam |

⁴⁹ Tr. Dr. S. C. Nandimath, Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Prof. A. Menezes Śūnyasaṁpādane, Vol. I. pp. 78-79 prose to vacana ch. I. 30, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1965.

(Void at the top, void at the base, and void at the centre; free from defect; all empty of mental appearances—these are the characteristics of one who is in a trance—become an image absorbed in the trance of Reality). Allama finds newness in the trance in which Animiṣayya was absorbed as it opened new vistas in the spiritual realm which he found in the heart of himself. This forced Allamaprabhu to have initiation once again in this lore. He had the initiation in order to have the mystic-trance of the type Animiṣayya had so that he may undergo the experience as stated in the above quoted ' Siddhānta Vākya '. This mantra gives a clue for the nature and the historicity as well as the source literature of the *Sūnya* concept.

Regarding the nature of the ' *śūnya* ' as occurred in the experience we have to go to the source literature that describes the yogic experience. The literature that deals with the description of the experience of *Sūnya* provides us with the historicity and the origin which are quite different from that found in the literature called the *Āgamic* literature of the Buddhists. This is a very important fact from the point of view of the concept of *Sūnya*. So the yogic method is an important way for knowing the *Sūnya*. There is another method called metaphysical which helps us to know the metaphysical nature, function and the origin of the concept *Sūnya*. Both the methods are used by the text under study.⁵⁰ The metaphysical method shows that the Reality is characterised by *Sūnya* in one sense and it is the highest Reality in another sense. The following exposition makes clear these both the points, namely, yogic and the metaphysical respectively.

Regarding the historicity of the concept and the source literature the investigation by the students of *Vīraśaiva* literature seems to be almost nil as far as my knowledge goes. Because it is a very irksome and impossible task as the Tantric literature is not available in the printed form. It is also true

⁵⁰ Ibid Vol. I, p. 48; Ibid Vol. II, pp. 43-44

that it is not accessible easily as the custodians of the Tantric manuscripts are not disposed to show them to the scholars. The other reason is that the largest, valuable portions of the Tantric literature are lost or are destroyed due to either natural calamities or because of hostile people. These are some of the reasons why the research in the field is unsatisfactory. Even then this hopeless, discouraging task of tracing the source literature, and depicting the characteristics of the *śūnya* as a mystic experience and Reality and its evolution must not be given up. This could be done with the stray mantras that are found here and there in Vacana literature or Sanskrit works edited under different titles such as : *Dikṣābodhe*, *Anādivīra-śaivasārasaṅgraha*, *Śivapurāṇas*. *Viṣṇupurāṇas* also will be of some use in this connection. The Tantric literature of the *Śakti* cult provides us an opportunity to have some insight into the matter.

The first of the two methods, as stated earlier, is yoga⁵¹ which according to the reply to the question what is meant by *śūnya* is available. So it is with this aspect of the *śūnya* we have to deal. Yoga is the practical side of both the orthodox and heterodox systems. It is only the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* system which is exceptional to this as the scholars in the field point out. Therefore *śūnya* as fact in the yogic experience occurs in almost all the systems. The *Śaivism*, *Śāktaism*, *Vaiṣṇavism*, which are Vedic in origin as the modern research depicts,⁵² have *Āgamic* literature in which the experience of *śūnya* is depicted. *Śaivism* and *Śāktaism* make use of the *Tantra* as a synonym for the term *Āgama*. *Viraśaivism* borrows, sometimes the mantras not only from the *Śaivāgamas* but also from the *Śaktāgamas* usually called *Tantras*. This may be so because *Viraśaivism* makes no difference between *Śiva* and *Śakti*, while

51 More about Yoga in *Viraśaivism* will be dealt in the III volume of *Philosophy of the Śūnyasāmpādane*.

52 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. Chapters on *Saktism*, *Śaivism* and *Vaiṣṇavism*.

explaining some of the metaphysical notions and yogic experiences. The writers on Virāṣaivism refer to the Tantras such as Kulārṇava, Svachchanda. They make use of the Yāmaḷa texts. So the study of the Tantra literature throws light on the notion and experience of Śūnya.

The yoga in its special sense is a science that deals with the nature and function of Cakras and the working of power that lies in the centre at the bottom. In Virāṣaivism it is called Liṅgaśakti whereas in Tantric literature it is called Kuṇḍalini-śakti. Śaraṇas refer not only to six cakras which are classified into ūrdhvahṛdaya (upper-heart), madhya-hṛdaya (mid-heart), and adhōhṛdaya (lower-heart). They also speak of sahasrāra which is above the three stories. They, again, give four more names of the four cakras. They are : Sahasrāra, Śikhā, Paścima and Aṇu. They describe the experience therein.⁵³ These are called the over-head cakras. Therefore the experience is called over-head or overmind and divine experience. According to Śivayōga or Ṣaṭsthalā the experience of Śūnya occurs above the heart-triad. It is the experience where the function of the mind ceases. To put in the words of the Śivaśaraṇas the mana (mind) becomes ghanamana (the Absolute mind). So Allamaprabhu states that the Śaraṇa has no mind :⁵⁴

“ mana uṇṭe maruḷe Śivayogige ?
 mattomme mana magna uṇṭe Śivayogige ?....”
 (Fool, does a Śivayogi have a mind ?
 Has he a mind to merge it again ?....)

This change takes place as one leads along the central nerve, and has been enthroned in the thousand-petalled bower.⁵⁵ This yoga, therefore, is called ‘ amanaska-yoga ’.

53 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti, Śūnyasaṃpādane, XVII. 15-25, Bijapur, 1930.

54 Tr. Dr. S. C. Nandimath, Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Prof. A. Menezes, Śūnyasaṃpādane, Vol. I, p. 339, Ch. III, 122, Karnatak University, 1965

55 Ibid. Vol. I, p. 331, Ch. III, 115

This is an experience which is termed as *advaita* different from *śuddhādvaita* of Śāṅkara. The experience of *śuddhādvaita* can be had in the *Turiyāvasthā* whereas that of 'amanaska' state in the *Turiyātītāvasthā*. This state of experience as depicted in the *Śūnyasampādane* is introduced to Siddharāma. It is traced to the second *brāhmaṇa* of the *Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇōpaniṣat* by Mr. Shricennamallikārjuna in the introduction to *Paramayogamantragopya*.⁵⁶ The mind becomes no mind (*amanaska*). The same is also depicted in the Tantras. It is here the experience of *śūnya* occurs but not below this *cakra*. One may have more and more vivid experience in these overhead centres such as *sikhācakra*, *aṇucakra* and *pascimacakra*. Here is an explanation that is depicted in the Tantric texts :

“ It is well known that what is figured as the pericarp of the thousand-petalled lotus within the crown of the head is the so called *Brahmarandhra* which is often referred to as Void. It extends through the *Suṣumnānāḍi* down to the very bottom of the interior of the spinal column. If the mind rests in the Void it loses its restless nature and becomes a blank—a state usually known as *unmañi* or *Nirbījasamādhi*. It is here that one attains to the realization of oneself as *Paraśiva* above the *guṇas*. The Will Power and Supreme *Nāda* emerge from this source. Evidently, this *Mahāśūnya* is identical with *Vyāpni*.⁵⁷”

Therefore according to *Svacchanda Tantra* Void (*śūnya*) is *Brahmarandhra*. So it is *śūnya* in the terminology of

56 “*na hi madanyaditi jāta vivēkah śuddhādvaita brahmāha miti bhidā-gandharī nirasya... sarva paripūrṇa turiyātita brahmabhūtoḽyōgi bhavati taṁ brahmēti stuvanti sarvalōka stutipātrah sarvadēśa sancārāśilah paramātma gaganē bindurī nikṣiphya śuddhādvaitājādyā sahaajāmanaskā yoganidrākhaṇḍānanda padānanda padānuvartyā jivaṁmuktōbhavati taccānanda samudramagnā yoginō bhavanti tadapēkṣa yā indrādayah svalpānandah evaṁ prāptāndah paramayogi bhavati*”— Ed. Shricennamallikārjuna, *Paramayogamantragopya*, p. 7, Haveri, 1932

57 M. M. Gopinath Kaviraj, *Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute* Vol. III, p. 100 Feb. 1946, pt. 2

Vacanakāras which is used for the gate of the sky. The Śaraṇas find their way in this hole of the sky for still higher over-head experiences and say that there is a bayalu, mahābayalu and nīrbayalu which are Śūnya, Mahāśūnya and Nīśśūnya. These terms are used synonymously. The terms Śakti and Śūnya are synonymously used in Tantric literature as also in the Vacanāgamic literature. So the deep study in this direction demands the attention of the erudite scholars in the field.

The Śūnya-experience is an experience that occurs in the Śivayoga-practice according to the literature which could be traced to the Vedic and Tantric literature but not to the yoga-experience as taught either by Hīnayāna school or Mahāyāna school which are indebted to the Śivayoga as taught by Jaigīṣavya who lived earlier to Buddha himself. This is all about the Śūnya as depicted in Yoga stated in Tantraliterature, and Śūnya sāmpādane.

Buddhism is another school of thought that uses "Śūnya" just like Vīraśaivism which is one of the ancient Indian schools of thought. So a comparative account helps to understand the points of view. Both the schools use the concept Śūnya with a number of synonyms one of which is the term 'Kāya'. The 'doctrine of Kāya' is found in both the schools. In Buddhism it occurs in two great streams of thought, namely, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The modern research throws a flood of light on the development of the doctrine of Kāya in Buddhism. So also one may show the development of the doctrine of Kāya in Vīraśaivism in particular and Śaivism in general. The source literature in Buddhism is in Pāli and Sanskrit whereas in Vīraśaivism it is in Sanskrit and Kannada. Lankāvatāra, Aṣṭasāhasrikā, Prajñāpāramitā, Abhisamayālaṅkārikā, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi are some of the Buddhist works that give an account of the doctrine of Kāya whereas Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi, Āgamas, Pāramēśvara, Sūkṣma, etc. in Sanskrit and Vacana literature in general and ekōttaraśatas-thala, Śūnyasāmpādane in particular in Kannada deal with the doctrine of Kāya.

The fundamental idea that underlies the doctrine of Kāya is this that it is the uplift of the self by the self. Both the schools preach the doctrine : work out your own salvation. The doctrine of Kāya is consistent with this brave ideal which is the virtue of the self. This is Nāigamic in origin according to Viraśaivism whereas it is Traipitakic in origin according to Buddhism.⁵⁸ There is the other side of religion which makes the points clear from another stand-point that helps to know how the original empirical idea is developed into a transcendental principle. This is found in Buddhism and Viraśaivism. This is a religion taught for the layman. Kimur, TH. Stcherbatasky, and some others are of the opinion that the Hinayāna is meant for the ordinary people, whereas Mahāyāna for the enlightened people. Similar is the classification in Viraśaivism according to the old texts; that the introspective type of religion is meant for a section of the enlightened, whereas the phenomenological type is meant for the ordinary people. They are called Viraśaivas and Māhēśvaras.⁵⁹ They are, in other words, Jaṅgama and Bhakta respectively. This is a very old concept as stated by Allamaṇḍaprabhū which occurs in the Śūnyasaṃpādana.⁶⁰ The object of both the religions is to realise the highest Reality which is in each and in all.⁶¹

Hinayāna in Buddhism bases its doctrine of Kāya on the human personality of Buddha whereas Mahāyāna on quite a different conception, namely, essoteric. It is because of this

58 One may show that the idea is pre-Buddhistic as it is found in the Upaniṣads; and it is also possible that it might have influenced the line of Buddha's thinking.

59 Ed. R. Karibasava Shastri, Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi, Ch. IV.

60 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti, Śūnyasaṃpādana, Ch. XVII, 52, Bijapur, 1930

61 "The goal of Bodhisattvas is to realise the Dharmakāya. Every being has the Dharmakāya, or the Dharmakāya comprises all beings of the world but as they are blinded by avidyā do not realise this fact. What Bodhisattva aims at is the removal of this avidyā and the realization of the fact he is the same as the Dharmakāya." Dr. N. Dutta, Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism, p. 128. Luzac & Co. London, 1930.

religious principle consisting of dharmas that it is stated to be Sarvāstivāda or Realistic school. The similar view is found in old Śaivism and also in Viraśaivism which is called the doctrine of 'Aṣṭamūrtiḥ'. "Moreover, we find neither in the śaiva siddhanta nor in Trika any trace of the doctrine which views the elements, the Sun, Moon and the Self (Ātmā) as eight forms of Śiva, which is very prominent in Viraśaivism."⁶² This eight foldness is reduced to six foldness and is named ṣaṣṭhala. This is the technical term for the doctrine of Kāya. It is said to be ṣaṣṭhala, because the constituents are six, namely, pṛthvi, appu, teja, vāyu, ākāśa and ātm (earth, water, fire, air, space and self). This doctrine of 'Aṣṭamūrtiḥ' is very old. The origin of this is traced to the Vedic doctrine of Aṣṭavasus by the modern scholars.⁶³ In this sense it is pre-Buddhistic doctrine. Āgamas preach this doctrine which are said to be the essence of the Veda.⁶⁴ No wonder that Viraśaivism inherits the same which has its fountainhead in the Śaivāgamas. Due to this doctrine both Śaivism and Viraśaivism are realistic. The poet Kālidāsa describes the elements that go to constitute the eightfold form in whose writings the philosophy of Viraśaivism is supposed to be depicted systematically by way of suggestion.⁶⁵ Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi, the quintessence of the Āgamic Viraśaivism, states:⁶⁶ pṛthivyādyaṣṭamūrtitva miśvarasya prakṛtitaḥ; (earth, water, fire, wind, sky, sun'

62 Dr. S. C. Nandimath, A Hand book of Viraśaivism, p. 140 L. E. Association, Dharwar, 1942

63 Prof. S. V. Agarwala, Maṭṣapurāṇa—A Study,

64 Vedasāro śivāgamah

65 "The present writer is of the opinion that the kernel of Viraśaiva thought is almost as early as the Upaniṣads, and it may be found in a more or less systematic manner by way of suggestion in the writings of Kālidāsa who lived in the early centuries of the Christian era". Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 46. Cambridge University Press, 1955

66 Ed. N. R. Karibasava Shastri, Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi, pp. 131-32, St. 51, Mysore, 1921

moon and self are the eight constituents of the body of Śiva. This is told). Marintōṇṭadārya, a distinguished commentator of Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi, traces the doctrine of 'aṣṭamūrtiḥ' to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad in his commentary on the above quoted stanza. The mantras in the Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi distinguish the Śaiva conception of the metaphysical stand from that of the Viraśaiva as the view-points are shown to be different. There are Vacanakāras like Uriliṅgapeddi that follow the Āgamic Viraśaiva train of thought. The works like Ekottaraśatasthala also follow the same line of metaphysical thinking. Hence we find a distinction between the Āgamic—Viraśaivite thought and the some of the other Vacanakāras' thought. This is a very important fact to be taken note of in the development of Viraśaiva philosophy. Another point to be noted in connection with the Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi and the Vacanakāras like Uriliṅgapeddi is this that they not only distinguish the Viraśaiva point of view of Aṣṭamūrti as found earlier to them but also tread a new path by reinterpreting the same doctrine in another phase of the development of their thought quite differently.

The ancient ācāryas state that the lord Mahēśvara is the universe-form (visva-rūpa). This view of the Āgamas, they say, is a metaphorical view. This is the view of Urilingapeddi, Ekottaraśatasthala and others. But from the deep study of the Āgamic thought it is clear that the metaphysical thinking of the some of the Vacanakāras is more akin to that basic view point of the fundamental Reality as depicted in the Āgamas. So we have two strands⁶⁷ of thought there in. The Āgama says :

viśvaṁ maheśvarabhavanādi tiṣṭhati ।

viśvātmatāmupacarati yadāgamaste ।

⁶⁷ As quoted by Marintōṇṭadārya and N. R. Karibasava Shastri in their commentary to the stanza 10 of Ch. X, of Siddhānta Sikhmaṇi.

[O ! Maheśvara you pervade the whole of the universe. Therefore you are said to be the universe-form (viśvarūpa) states the Āgmā]. The mantras in the Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi are thus a help to understand the Kāya doctrine and its view as depicted in the literature of the twelfth century.

So both the Āgamic Vīraśaiva and the Buddhistic Hīnayāna views are the personalistic and are similar in this sense. The term Kāya and Mūrti mean that they are composites of dharmas and the bhutas respectively. As Buddha is the substratum so is the Śiva (Linga) in Vīraśaivism. Therefore Realistic Absolutism.

The another form of the doctrine in Buddhism and Vīraśaivism has common idea. It is found in the doctrine called Śaraṇa. Both these religions owe the origin of this Śaraṇa doctrine to the Śvētāśvatarōpaniṣad which states : separate from all the senses, yet reflecting the qualities of all the senses, it is the lord and ruler of all, it is the great refuge of all.⁶⁸ Vasubandhu in the interpretation of Abhidharmakośa brings out the real sense of Buddha, Dharma and Sangha in which the devotee takes refuge. "He said that those who take refuge in Buddha do; in fact, take refuge in the dharmas (qualities) which constitute a Buddha (buddhakāraka), i. e., the dharmas by the acquisition of which a person understands all things. These dharmas are kṣayajñāna (knowledge of the destruction of misery), anutpādayannāna (knowledge of the further non-origination of misery), and samyagdṛṣṭi (right view) of the Aśaikṣas together with the dharmas attendant on the jñāna, viz., the five pure skandhas.... The Dharmakāya then signifies a new purified personality or substratum (āśraya), but it is pointed out that such a dharmakāya is possessed also by an arhat."⁶⁹

68 sarvendriyaguṇābhāsaṁ sarvendriyavivarjitaṁ !
sarvasya prabhumiśānaṁ sarvaśya śaraṇaṁ brhat !!

Śvētāśvatar, III-16.

69 Nalinaksha Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 106, Luzac and Co, London, 1930.

So also in Viraśaivism we have the parallel ideas. The Aṅga takes refuge in Iṣṭaliṅga, Prāṇaliṅga and Bhāvaliṅga the synonyms of which are Guru, Liṅga and Jaṅgama. These are the three forms of Śiva. The person becomes Śaraṇa when he possesses the triple science (traividya) which is Iṣṭaliṅga-lore, Prāṇaliṅga-lore and Bhāvaliṅga-lore. This is assuming the unlimited form. Iṣṭaliṅga-lore is the moral philosophy both the personal and the social; Prāṇaliṅga-lore is the mystic-wisdom; Bhāvaliṅga-lore is the meta-physical knowledge. The person becomes Liṅga (Parabrahma) only when he acquires these lores. Sum of these lores as depicted in the Śūnyasaṃpādane led some modern scholar to state that the 'mūruvidyā' (triple learning) is Ṛk, Yajus and Sāma⁷⁰ which is quite unsatisfactory as the trayi in the context and the tradition does not mean the Vedic trayi. The Kāya is Śūnya sīmḥāsana when a man becomes Liṅga as the qualities of the body, mind and the illusion of the imagination or thought are eradicated.⁷¹ There is no difference between aṅga and Liṅga as the Viraśaivaprakāśike states.⁷²

.na bhēdaścaṅgaliṅgayoḥ !

(There is no difference between aṅga and Liṅga)

Thus the doctrine of Śaraṇa, Iṣṭa, Prāṇa and Bhāva, is Śiva or Śūnya as in Buddhism Buddha is Dharma, Saṅgaha and Buddha or Śūnyatā. Therefore there are a number of synonyms in both Viraśaivism and Buddhism. They are Śaraṇa, Śūnyasīmḥāsana, śūnya, Sthala, Śiva, Rudra and etc., in Viraśaivism and Vṛṣabha, Śūnya, Buddha and others in Buddhism respectively.⁷³

70 Ed. Prof. S. S. Bhoosnurmath, Prof. A. Menezes, Śūnyasaṃpādane, Vol. III, p. 423, Note No. 82, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1969.

71 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti, Śūnyasaṃpādane, Ch. XIX. 126, Bijapur, 1930.

72 as quoted in Viraśaivaśādhācārasaṅgrahah, Ch. VIII. 165 Ed. Pdt. Basavaraj Shastri Murusavirmath, Hubli, 1964.

73 (i) sthalaṃ nāma paraṃ tattvaṃ śivarudrādi sañjitaṃ !

sivānubhavasūtraṃ Ed. Pdt. Y. Nagesh Shastri Murughamath, Dharwar, 1951.

(ii) N. Dutta, Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism, p. 123, Luzac & Co., London, 1930.

There are still deep metaphysical meanings as understood by the teachers in the schools. There are observations in this regard. "The Kārika, in fact, supports the siddhi in regard to the conception of Kāyas, using only somewhat different names. The conception of svasambhogakāya shows a tendency of the Yogācāra school to posit something like the Īśvara of the Upaniṣads behind the phenomenal universe. The Dharmakāya corresponds to the impersonal Absolute of the Vedānta, the Brahman, and the Sambhogakāya to the Īśvara when Brahman assumes name and form.⁷⁴ The same is the view regarding the Vīraśaiva concepts. Dr. R. D. Ranade observes that the 'Iṣṭaliṅga is the phenomenal Liṅga, the Prāṇaliṅga is a mystical Liṅga and the Bhāvaliṅga is philosophical Liṅga. The Bhāva Liṅga is a very important philosophical conception, which can be fully understood only by those, who have mastered both European and Indian philosophy.⁷⁵ The deeper study throws much light on the subtle and more subtle aspects of the metaphysical concepts in both the systems.

A comparative study of the various schools of thought will be of much profit as it throws light on the concepts that are developed by each system of thought. It is worthwhile, therefore, to do it as it helps to understand the difficult concepts such as śūnya, niśśūnya and others. So a comparative study of Existentialism, a modern Western school, and the Śaṭsthala school of thought, which is the subject matter of Śūnyasāmpādana, is sure to bring clarity and enrichment of thought in this direction.

Existentialism and Śaṭsthala school of thought make use of the common language : the language of the people, which is full of concrete words. The same, therefore, is put to

74 N. Dutta, *Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism*, p. 122, Lazac & Co., London, 1930.

75 Dr. R. D. Ranade, *Pathway to God in Kannada Literature*, pp. 209, 210, 221. Bharatiya Vidyabhavana, Bombay, 1960.

philosophical use by both the schools. So they preserved the concreteness and subjectivity the mark of which is emotive expression. The subjectivity that runs through and through the experience is the means of knowing that lays bare the Truth or Reality. Unlike Existentialism, Śaṭsthala school of thought has a language that is not a common man's language but of the gods, namely, gīrvāṇabhāṣe or Sanskrit. It is a tradition in the sense of scriptures. Śaṭsthala school thus has Nigamāgas as an ancient source of literature. Thus Śaṭsthala school of thought has two types of language. It is in this sense richer in its power of expression than Existentialism. The Kannada language, which is a language of the masses, used by the mystics of the twelfth century that forms the dialogues of the text under study gave rise to the opinion that the Vacana literature is only the source literature of the school. This is a view of some of the modern scholars. The radical view based on the use of common language created an opportunity to make a deep and special research in this regard. There are, thus, similarities and distimilarities in this aspect between the Existentialism and Śaṭsthala school.

The subject matter of both the schools is the human being. The human being in the technical terms of the Existentialism is Being-in-the-world whereas in the Śaṭsthala school of thought it is 'Aṅga.' Therefore the method used by Śaṭsthala school of thought is a new method different from the Vedānta schools of thought that begin with Brahmāṇḍa as a starting point as we find in Brahmasutra instead of Piṇḍāṇḍa. In both the Existentialist and Śaṭsthala schools of thought the Being-in-the-world " and 'Bṅga ' occupy a central place and determine the direction and goal of the investigation. The enquiry in the Existentialism is turning back upon the Being-in-the-world which reveals all its constitutive conditions and characteristics, so also looking at the back by bringing it to the front is the metaphysical enquiry in the Śaṭsthala school. One thing to be noted here is this that Existentialism is concerned only with empirical existence whereas the Śaṭsthala school with both the

empirical and the metaphysical aspects of existence. Dr. G. Srinivasan means the same when he states that Sartre and Heidegger are essentially philosophers of human finiteness whereas the Hindu philosophical systems seek to develop a philosophy of human transcendence. This philosophical method is reflective experience and introspection in both the systems. This is grasping from within which helps to understand the deeper and more deep experience of man. It is arriving at the Truth of Existence not by inference or reasoning but by 'subjective experience' (i. e. anubhava) in which knowing and Being (arivu and iravu) are one. This is one of the kinds of Absolutism. What gives rise to philosophical enquiry is not mere intellectual curiosity as the originators of the Western ancient thinkers suppose but the necessity of life or the crisis in the life of the individual. It is a vision that saves man who is facing the difficulties and a vision that lends the same to the others. So it is an integral part of human life but not an abstract thought. Life is not a thing to be rejected. It is life affirmation that is advocated by both the schools of thought.⁷⁶ The 'truth' of human existence is realised only in the subjective experience of the individual. So the highest pramāṇa or means of valid knowledge is 'anubhava'. The anubhava and the experience cannot be put in words both in the Existentialist and Śaṭsthala schools. Existentialism like the Śaṭsthala school examines the truth of ethical, metaphysical matters in the light of the subjective or individual experience which can be found in the highest being of ones existence. Thus they give the supreme place for 'anubhava' in the system of pramāṇa. They place 'anubhava' over and above 'reason' in understanding Existence. The Upaniṣads also lend support to this

76 "Not rejection of human life in toto in the world, it is only a new philosophical attitude taken towards human existence in the world, so as to orient it towards the possibility of its inherent freedom over against the actuality of its "fallenness" (bondage) Dr. Srinivas, *The Existentialist Concepts and the Hindu Philosophical Systems*, p. 13, Udayana Publications, Allahabad, 1967

view when they say " niśābdam brahma ucyate ". All these views are based on a common view that the experience of the ' Sadvastu ' (existential reality) passes beyond logical descriptions but could be realised in the experience. So Śaṅkara commenting on Brahma sūtra, II. iii. 7. states that ātman is prior to all pramāṇas and is self-certain since the very act of denying it implies its affirmation. This is the view held by Descartes when he said that ' cogito ergo sum '. It is the same view upheld by the text under study when Allamaṣṭrabhu states that Brahma (Gohēśvara) is beyond the means of valid knowledge.⁷⁷ The philosophy of Heidegger has resemblance to the kind of advaita as advocated by Allamaṣṭrabhu in some respects.

The experience of the ' horrors ' of finite human existence in the world gives the gloomy aspect of life as the dominant nature of the view of the world. This is not peculiar to Existentialism. We have the same view about the life in the world when Buddha said that it is nothing but agony. So is the experience of the mystics who took part in the discussions in Śūnyasaṁpādane when they give a gloomy picture of the world and life and pray God for the grace to save them from the drudge and dread of life. The difference between the philosophical outlook of Sartre and Heidegger and Śaṭsthala school of thought is quite different. The former stop at the one side of the opposite and merge the other side of the opposite in the darkness or ugliness of life. But the latter gives the picture of both sides of life and goes beyond. It reaches the transcendental source of life which is the ānanda, cit and sat. It is the happy synthesis of knowing and being which is at the root of creation. This is the transcendent experience of life. This is the transcending of finite being which is quite different in meaning from what is meant by the school of Existentialism. Transcendence according to Existentialism is developing world brotherhood. This is the

77. Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti, Śūnyasaṁpādane, XX. 91, Bijapur, 1930.

same as embracing the world instead of one's own country as stated in a Śāṅkṛt saying which does not stop at this ideal. It puts forth a still higher ideal, the ideal of renouncing the world in order to attain the selfhood which is greater than the love of universe (*ātmārthaṃ pṛthivīm tyajēt*). The śaṭsthala school of thought also unlike the Sāṅkṛt statement puts forth an ideal which is not life and world negation but one that is quite opposite. It makes the life the real abode of Truth, Goodness and Beauty. It is not by renouncing but by embracing it one can become the same that lends the full freedom to act in accordance with the logic of that transcendent Reality. This is the ethics. The life that is called authentic is this : it is disinterested action-oriented life. The disinterested life is authentic life in Existentialism. A subtle difference could be shown that exists among the schools that accept the ideal as the ideal of life. The Existential ideal of life, namely, authentic life, is as old as Upaniṣad and Bhagavadgītā and the Siddhāntākhyā Tantra.

The fundamental metaphysical notion on which this ethical life is founded differs in each school. According to Existentialism it is the 'nothingness' or the non-substantiality of the self, whereas it is not the same in the Upaniṣads and Gītā on the one hand and the śaṭsthala school of thought on the other. According to Indian thinkers it is the substantiality of the universal self that modified into the multiplicity. It is this identification of individual self with the Absolute self that is the realisation which leads to the authenticity of life.

Śūnyasaṃpādane uses Śūnya (nothing i. e. jīva) and niśśūnya, (parama i. e. supreme nothing) which are used by another Indian school, is Buddhism. They are most difficult concepts. 'Śūnya' as a being-in-the-world in Existentialism is 'nothing'. It is 'nothing' not in the sense of Existentialism but in a quite different sense. Existentialism does not accept the substantiality of the being-in-the-world whereas the śaṭsthala school does accept and this acceptance is in the sense that it is the evolution of the supreme-nothing called Paraśiva.

The truth of 'Śūnya' is the truth of niśśūnya. The 'being-in-the-world' is 'momentary'. This is the reality about it. In this sense, as the Śūnya implies the same thing, Śaṭsthala school and Existentialism have a common view. 'Being-in-the-world' is consciousness according to Existentialism and it is this consciousness that is to be transcended. The transcendence lies in the practice of disinterested action that implies authentic life. This authentic life is inconsistent in one sense, and consistent in another sense. It is inconsistent because the momentariness and the insubstantiality do not allow to accept authenticity as there is nothing that refers to that view of the Śūnya that lacks the transcendent Reality. The existentialism accepts it stating that one must practice disinterested activity in order to justify the insubstantiality of the 'being-in-the-world'. There is nothing like an 'ego' for whom one must act. 'Being-in-the world' is being out of oneself. It is being in the other i. e. the world outside of the individual. This is transcending the individual. It is in accordance with this principle that the disinterested activity is the logical outcome. The meaning of the disinterested activity or niṣkāmakarma as taught either in the Upaniṣads or in the Bhagavadgītā or in the Siddhāntākhyatantra has quite different metaphysical basis and the life called authentic life has not the same. The metaphysical basis of these texts is this that there is 'supreme nothing' called 'niśśūnya' or 'Parabrahma'. Therefore the selves are real as the modes or evolutes of the Paraśiva i. e. Niśśūnya. This is the cosmic sense that is realised in the being of an individual. This realisation is transcending the being-in-the world. The realisation is possible only by the 'disinterested activity' called 'niṣkāmakarma'. This is found in the Bhagavadgītā. There is another school's text called Siddhāntākhyatantra in which nirupādhikadāna is used for the 'niṣkāmakarma'. Therefore the Śaṭsthala school uses these terms as synonyms. There is nothing to be noted here that there is a subtle difference between the 'disinterested activity' as advocated by the

Existentialism and the Śaṭsthala school as well as Bhagavadgītā. The disinterested action as advocated by Existentialism is ethical and social action, whereas in Śaṭsthala school and Bhagavadgītā it is spiritual action. It is because of this difference that thinkers like Sri Aurobindo and others state that spiritual action is superior to ethical and social action. The 'niṣkāma-karma' or 'nirupādhikadāna' as stated in the Indian texts is intended to overcome the ego or jīva—a social and individual self. The Existentialism states that it is being out of the 'being-in-the-world' or out of oneself. This is overcoming the ego. There is a difference between the Indian schools and Existentialism in this sense also. According to Śaṭsthala school and Bhagavadgītā it is by bringing about a change in the consciousness that the purpose of the ethical and the social self is fulfilled and also a still higher goal is realised. This is the truth of overcoming the ego where the ego is related to and founded in God. There is no idea of God and the relation of 'being-in-the-world' to God in Sartre and Heidegger. We have it in Jaspers, Marcel and Kierkegaard. So the difference is conspicuous. There is one more stage in the 'disinterested action' which has a quite different name given by the Śaṭsthala school. It is called 'sahajadāna'. The difference between 'nirupādhikadāna' and 'sahajadāna' is founded on a sound metaphysical principle. In case of 'nirupādhikadāna' there is a sense of instrumentality of jīvahood. This implies dualism. But there is no sense of the sort in case of 'sahajadāna' as the title itself is eloquent of the absence of instrumentality implying the duality. The stage propounded by the Śaṭsthala school is a logical development of the 'nirupādhikadāna' or 'niṣkāmakarma' in Bhagavadgītā. It is in accordance with the monistic view of the Śaṭsthala school. This is the concrete view of the Absolute where either 'I' or 'Thou' have no predominance leading to the illusionistic theory. This is what is developed by Jaspers as a concrete Absolute where the illusionistic theory of the world is disproved.

Either the term 'Nothingness' in Existentialism or 'Śūnya' in the text under study, that advocates the Śaṭsthala school of thought, gives room for the nihilistic oriented thought. Mādhyamika school of thought, therefore, is said to be nihilistic which is contrary to the facts as shown by the modern research. So also the concepts 'Nothingness' and 'Śūnya' do not mean 'nihilism'. Either 'Śūnya' or 'Nothingness' correctly understood is negation of negation. "The 'Nothing' revealed in dread is prior to any logical form of negation, and the logical form of negation is only derived from the 'Nothing' which is its prior ground or basis, because if something is to be logically negated then something must be given to be negated. That is, negation is possible only on the basis of the 'given' 'not' of something. But the 'given' 'not' of something is itself a manifestation of the 'Nothing'. The 'Nothing' is the basis of not only the logical form of negation but of all forms of our negative behaviour such as 'acting in opposition', 'detecting', 'refusing', 'prohibiting' etc."⁷⁸ This is the metaphysical annotation and the logical method of 'nothing' accepted by the Existentialism. So the negative method used by either the Upaniṣads or Buddhism or Existentialism or Śaṭsthala school is based on something. It presupposes the kind of reality which is not the same in each of the schools.

The Existentialism and the Śaṭsthala school realise 'nothingness' and 'Śūnya' in the day to day life and in the things with which they deal. Either the 'Śūnya' or the 'nothing' is, in this context, the momentariness of things or non-eternality. They logically derive the worthlessness of them as the value term or ethical term. This is not the end in itself according to the Śaṭsthala school. But it is an end in itself according to the Existentialism. Jaspers or Keirkegaard accepts the view that the momentariness points out to the reality that lies beyond it, which is a new category as is accepted by some

78 Dr. G. Srinivasan, *the Existentialist Concepts and the Hindu Philosophical Systems*, p. 131. Udayana Publications, Allahabad, 1967.

of the Existentialists such as Kierkegaard, Marcel and Karl Jaspers and also by the Śaṣṭhala school of thought. As the 'worthlessness' is the counter part of the existential concept of 'Nothingness', 'Samsārahēyasthala' i. e. a stage of experience of disgust about the things of the world called 'iduru' which is other than self and of the aggregate of constituents of the being-in-the-world (Śaṣkandha or Śaṣṭhala) is the counterpart of the ontological category, 'Śūnya'. This is neither the pessimism nor the nihilism. Because either the dread experienced by man according to the Existentialism or the disgust experienced by man according to the Śaṣṭhala school discloses nothingness. Either of the schools does not choose to stop short with the confrontation of the abyss of 'nothingness'. Therefore the choice is different one from that which leads to despair and results into 'sickness unto death'. It is 'not to sink through the vacuum into the encounter with Being'⁷⁹ as Karl Jaspers states. It is seeking the God's help, to put in the words of Kierkegaard; that makes life real and worthy or authentic. So also in Śaṣṭhala school the disgust does not lead to despair. It opens a new, real state of things and being-in-the-world, called, 'saccidānanda'⁸⁰ which is the authentic life's foundation or ground. It is in this Reality the relation of man is grounded. Without this the life is abyss of nothing; the philosophy of pessimism is the outcome. This is the 'Śūnya' in which being-in-the-world (Aṅga) is born, breadup, sustained and in the end returned.⁸¹ Therefore 'nothing' and 'śūnya' as experienced by the individual in day

79 Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 126, Tr. William Earle The Noonday Press, 1955.

80 sthalaṃ nāma parambrahma saccidānanda lakṣaṇaṃ !
 ekamēva param brahma saccidānanda lakṣaṇaṃ !
 sivatattva sīvācāryaḥ sthalamityāhurādarāt !

Ed. Pdt. Y. Nagesa Shāstri, Sīvānubhava sūtraṃ, II-2. Murughamath, Dharwar, 1958.

81 ānandō brahmōti yujānāt Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri

today life is basic truth and is found in the structure of human existence.

‘Śūnya’ experience, as already stated, occurs only as a result of the experience of disgust according to the Śūnya-sāmpādane or of ‘dread’ according to the Existentialism. Both of them indicate a life of transcendence but do not connote the something. The life of transcendence according to the Existentialism is ethical and social that makes man the participant of universal life; whereas the transcendent life is not only socio-ethical but socio-ethico-religious and also metaphysical. This difference makes a difference in their weltanschauung. The latter is confined to the empirical existence as propounded by Sartre and Heidegger⁸²; the former is not only the study of the finite but also of the infinite. The infinite, eternal is the end initiated by the investigation of the finite and momentary. The change in the manner of knowing and doing as is necessary in the Existentialist philosophy so also the same is necessary in Śaṭsthala school. The method, though, is experience in both the schools is not the same. For the one it is confined to finite, momentary individual whereas in case of other it is not only of the finite but also of the Infinite. The experience is yogic experience according to the Śaṭsthala school. This is in this sense differs from the Existentialism. The Śūnya as realised in this yogic experience is the ontological category. This transcendental method not only makes the transcendental Reality available to the grasp but also helps to draw the characters, namely, sat, cit, ānanda, nitya, paripūrṇa and ghaṇa by which the supramental life is manifested. So it is not only the religious but also the metaphysical. It is enlightened life or the śaraṇa (vidyā) life. The Śūnya or momentariness which has its counterpart the disgust now is substituted with Śaṭsthala i.e. omniscience, omnipotence, all contentedness, etc.⁸³ This life on earth is the ideal according

82 Dr. Srinivasan, *The Existentialist Concepts and the Hindu Philosophical Systems*, p. 22, Udayana Publications, Allahabad, 1967.

83 Ed. S. A. Topigi, *Tantrasangrah*, VI 60-63, Murasavirmath, Hubli, 1914.

to the Saṭsthala school which is possible by yogic method—a method of experience. This is the life where the distinction of the inner and the outer disappears. Such is the method of of Saṭsthala school that distinguishes it from the Existential school.

CHAPTER III

"Indian philosophy becomes self-conscious"¹ at a certain stage, one observes, when the critique of knowledge emerges as a special branch of philosophy. This does not mean that thought in ancient times was not reflective or self-conscious. There were debates on metaphysical principles as recorded in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. Kings like Janaka, "the king of the east, who has a leaning to the culture of the west, collects the celebrities of the west at his court much as the intellects of Athens gathered at the court of Macedonian princes."² "So in the great debate of which the Brāhmaṇa of the hundred paths gives an account, among the opponents who seek to trip up the wise Yājñavalkya with their questions, Jāratkāra Atharvaṇa comes forward..And they two went out and conversed together. What they then said, they said regarding action (Karma); and what they then propounded, they propounded regarding action..."³ The Upaniṣad states: "Because time is imperceptible by senses, therefore, this is its evidence, and by it alone is time proved to exist. Without proof there is no apprehension of what is to be proved."⁴ But the processes by which the ancient ṛṣis arrived at conclusions are unknown, states Prof. M. Hiriyanna. This is the scene we see in the camp of one section of Indian thinkers. There is another section of Indian thinkers where discussions were going on that which could not be left unrecognised. "For one thousand years, from 600 B.C. to 400 A. D. the Jains and Buddhists were fully occupied in questions of metaphysics and

1 M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 177, George Allen and Unwin, 1958.

2 Oldenber, *Buddha*, pp. 397-398, The Book Company Ltd., 1958

3 Ibid p. 48.

4 The Upaniṣads, Vol, II, pp. 316-317, Tr. Max Muller, Dovers Publication 1962.

religion.”⁵ The process should be discovered by Indologists. The history of Indian Dialectics, if reconstructed, therefore, could throw light in this direction. As in the days of scholastics in the pre-historic period, the dialectical discussions were to meet the hostile streams of orthodox and heterodox systems of thoughts and also to think on right lines to arrive at valid conclusions.

The age of Śaḍdarśanas, or the six-systems, which is marked by the development of Indian Logical systems or prarrāṇas is supposed by the historians of Indian philosophy to be the age of dialectics. Historians seek reasons for the growth of the method in the hostility among the orthodox and heterodox schools.⁶ For Indian thinkers it was a practical need; because they know that it is knowledge of Reality that alone could lead to attain the desired end and avoid suffering. Hence they were engaged in metaphysical thinking and made a critical examination of the elements, sources, and limits of knowledge. It was also due to a good deal of diversity resulting from independent thinking.⁷ The logical method had been developed to build systems and to examine concepts. In this way each system paid careful attention to the theory of pramāṇas and developed its use systematically. “It will be noticed that logic here is conceived to have a more extended scope than is ordinarily allowed to it, including as it does a consideration not only of mediate but also of immediate knowledge.”⁸ as Krishnachandra Bhattacharya states,

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- 5 S. C. Vidyabhusana, *History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic*, P. XVIII. Calcutta University, 1909.
- 6 The increasing opposition in thought forced each party in the controversy to entrench its position properly, and to the efforts put forth in that direction should be ascribed the generally critical character of Indian Philosophy, in the present. H. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 177. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958.
- 7 M. Hiriyanna, *Indian Philosophical studies*, I, p. 66, Karyalaya Publishers Mysore, 1957.
- 8 Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 70, Progressive Pub. Calcutta, 1956.

The word 'pramāṇa' has come from the Sanskrit root 'mā' with 'pra'. It is cognate with the English word 'to know' and the Kannada word 'ari'. The root 'mā' in 'pramā' is a synonym of the root 'jñā' in 'jñāna'. The word 'jñāna' is used in the sense of knowledge and cognition. As a result of this ambiguity that arises in one case occurs in the other. But the word 'pramā' is meant valid cognition only, which is a point to be borne in mind. So the term cognition, in which ambiguity occurs has nothing to do with 'pramā' the root meaning of which has the sense of cognition without illusion as stated earlier. Thus, one of the two senses of the root meaning of 'mā' is not acceptable in the logical sense.

The word 'pramāṇa' is constituted of the suffix 'lyut'.⁹ The last syllable 'lyut' gives rise to two uses, namely, modal and formal. The use is said to be modal when 'pramāṇa' means evidence, authority and knowledge and formal when it means 'a means or a source of valid knowledge'.¹⁰ These are the two logical uses of the term pramāṇa accepted by Indian thinkers. Pramāṇam (Pramīyatē 'nēnēti) is defined in the Tarka-Dīpikā as pramākaraṇam. 'The instrument of right apprehension'. This definition does not take into account two important functions, namely, the production of jñāna (pramā-janakatva) and the determination of the validity of knowledge (pramātajñātakatva). So the Sarvadarśana samgraha defines it more accurately. It states: sādhanāśrayāvvyatiriktatvēsati pramāvyāptam (proof is that which is always followed by right apprehension, and is united with the appropriate organ and the receptacle of knowledge, viz., the soul). The Mīmāṃsakas define pramāṇa as 'anadigatārthagantr' (that which apprehends an object not known before.) But Śrīkrishna Dhurjati in

⁹ Tarkacandrika also explains the term in the same manner.

¹⁰ S. S. Barlingay, A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic, pp. 14-16, National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1965.

Siddhānta Candrodāya, a commentary on the Tarka-Saṅgraha, states that only the first of the long series of sensations of the same object will be knowledge (pramā) while the succeeding will not be knowledge but the repetition of the first. The attack on Mīmāṃsā is the same as one made against the doctrine of the 'stream of consciousness' of William James and Hume's theory of Knowledge. We may add the Buddhist theory to this. The reply to this objection in each case differs. The Mīmāṃsaka has his own reply which is consistent with the metaphysical stand he takes. He uses the expression 'anadhigata' to 'prevent' bhāvanāsaṃskāra being called the proof of smṛti.¹¹

The etymological explanation of 'pramāṇa' may, in another sense, leads to the following conclusion. The root 'mā' means 'to measure'. So pramāṇa means this 'that by which we measure' or 'the means of measurement'. This points out the object of the pramāṇas. Hence Pramāṇa is measuring or testing the indubitableness of knowledge. The Nyāyasūtra (I. 1. 1.) states : nānupabdhe nanirñite nyāyaḥ pravartate. The same is indicated by the lines that occur in Jaiminiyanyāya-mālāvistāra : lakṣaṇa-pramāṇa-pramāṇa pramābhyām hi vastu-siddhiḥ for anything to be completely established, description and investigation are both necessary. On the basis of the above, Prof. M. Hiriyanna proceeds to find out whether pramāṇas serve any purpose other than investigation or scrutiny. Pramāṇas are means of scrutiny, according to the commentary of Vātsyāyana on the first aphorism of Gautama. The commentary runs : pramāṇair arthaparikṣaṇam (the examination of the data of experience by means of pramāṇa). But Vācaspati means by the term 'pramāṇaiḥ' not all the pramāṇas but only reasoning. This restriction is not the final verdict, as he goes on to explain the statement cited in the commentary on the first aphorism of Gautama as

11 M. Hiriyanna, Indian Philosophical Studies, I. p. 65. Kavyalaya Publisher, Mysore. 1957.
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pratyakṣāgamaiḥ ikṣitasya anvikṣaṇam
 anvikṣā, tayā pravartata ityanvikṣikī (anvikṣā is a reconstruction of what has been attained through perception and tradition (āgama). anvikṣikī is so called because it adopts that as its method).

According to this, only two are recognised as pramāṇas by Indian logicians, namely, perception and śabda. The third pramāṇa, namely, inference, is recognised as the means of knowing the logical validity. This is not indicated in the etymological meaning of pramāṇa. Thus, we have not only the function of pramāṇa as scrutiny of what is cognised which may be true or false, but also a revelation of the existence and nature of things which are new. Neither of these both can be the sole function of any one of the three pramāṇas. The investigation could be done either by perception or by śabda or by inference. Verification is the logical function of perception. So it is svārthānumāna as well as parārthānumāna.

Thus perception, śabda and inference are the main pramāṇas as stated in Śūnya Saṃpādane. According to Viraśaivism, the 'particular' or 'perception' is as much pramā as the 'universal'. One may show that this sort of thinking was going on elsewhere. "Still more express is the testimony that Empedocles declared thinking and perceiving to be the same."¹² There is another Greek thinker, namely Parmenides, who states that 'like perceives like'. But there is much difference between the metaphysical stand of the Greek thinkers and the Viraśaiva thinkers. Empedocles 'laid down the general principle of perception, that each element is recognised by its like in us, and therefore that the nature of thought is governed by that of body, in particular that of the blood which is the central seat of thought. But he did not allow this materialism to prevent him from subordinating sense

¹² W. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 64. The Mac Millan Company, 1957.

perception to reason.”¹³ According to Viraśaivism also, the organs of sense, namely, eye, nose, ear, skin and tongue, whose functions are seeing, smelling, hearing, touching and tasting, are evolved out of fire, earth, sky, air and water, respectively. They perceive, therefore, form, smell, word, touch and taste. The theory of perception as stated above has to be understood in Viraśaivism from two points of metaphysical basis. The one is this that it states that the like perceives the like as in Vaiśeṣika as the sense organs are the evolutes of the elements; whereas in other sense they are the evolutes of the psychic element. According to Vaiśeṣika the perception is the contact between sense and the object. This is limited to the physical objects only. So ṣaṭsthala school is in consistence with Vaiśeṣika theory. This does not mean that it reaches the logical end in this line. The other school is Sankhya where ‘śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam’ as stated in Yuktidīpikā. So is the pratyakṣa in ṣaṭsthala School. We have the synthesis of these two views regarding pratyakṣa in ṣaṭsthala school. This is to be done separately as I have a plan to do. In Empedocles, these are, as in Vaiśeṣika, independent ultimate entities, whereas in Viraśaivism they are the evolutes of the self as is propounded in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa and the Taittirīya Upaniṣads. So it avoids the pluralism of Empedocles or Vaiśeṣika and establishes the monistic view of Śabda.

This is said to be monistic view because there is an identity of the means and the object as well as cogniser. This is the metaphysical identity or ontological identity. So ‘indriyalikṣita’ (i. e. the ‘word of senses’ whose ‘artha’ or ‘vastu’ is not different from indriya) is not different from the indriya i. e. senses. Hence the ‘word’ (śabda) is monistic in this sense. The difficulty entails. It is not a new difficulty. For the Buddhists raised against the monistic way of knowing, held by the Advaitavedāntins. The difficulty is quite different in the

13 E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, p. 50, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950.

case of Śāṅkarādvaita where the senses, the knower and the known are supposed to be identified are not in the strict sense of the term as they are in the Śaṭsthala School of thought. So the objection raised by the Buddhist does not hold good here. For the substance is capable of knowing the ego as it is the result of the dialectic that is inherent in the consciousness. This is called 'idiriṭṭarasuvudu'. It is in this sense as Existentialism and Buddhism Śaṭsthala school also is monistic. The unity of these five elements is the mind, according to Vīraśaivism¹⁴ 'Bhāva', cognition without illusion, is to the particular what 'mahājñāna' is to the universal. 'Mahājñāna' is the knowledge of the whole, which is a nonlinguistic or prelinguistic condition, or that plane of mind called 'arūpa', which is different from 'rūpa'. "It is said that in the plane of Manas there are two great levels, called, the Rūpa and Arūpa levels. The lower is the realm of "name and form", Nāma and Rūpa. Here form means organisation in space ("our" three-dimensional space). This is far from being co-extensive with pattern in a universal sense. And Nāma, 'nāme', is not language or the linguistic order, but only one level in it, the level of the processes of "lexation" or of giving words (names) to parts of the whole manifold of experience, which parts are thereby made to stand out in a semi-fictitious isolation.

..Arūpa is the realm of patterns that can be "actualised" in space and time in the materials of lower planes, but are themselves indifferent to space and time. Such patterns are not like the meanings of words, but are somewhat like the way meaning appears in themselves."¹⁵ Dr. Whorf further states that this doctrine is new to Western science, it stands as unimpeachable evidence. They, namely, the particular (rūpa) and the universal (arūpa), are both the source of knowledge and the knowledge and evidence. For they are forms of self.¹⁶

¹⁴ Allamāna Vacanacandrike, Ed. Dr. L. Basavaraju.

¹⁵ Whorf, Language, thought and Reality, p. 253, U. S. A. 1956.

¹⁶ Śūnyasāmpādane, Vol. V. Ch. XIX. 69, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1972.

This is what Plato said in his doctrine of theory of Ideas which has been differently interpreted. Allama Prabhu, in another place, states that the *pramāṇa* is non-dual, which is self.¹⁷ There is no need of analogy, knowledge, meditation, the *tripuṭi* and the rest. For, each of them is a means and is in search of 'pramā'.¹⁸

Channabasavaṇṇa, like some logicians of Indian schools of thought, is of the view that *pramāṇa* has a twofold function, one of which is to drive away the doubts that are the result of the 'stir of mind', the 'awareness of the body's existence.' The certitude of elimination of doubt is this that there is an experience without illusion.¹⁹ This is in turn certified by the non-dual state.²⁰ This has happened on the moral, religious and mystical planes.²¹ The perception on these planes has different objects. This makes difference in perception belonging to each plane. So also the nature of illusion differs. These are some of the points to be taken note of while dealing with the problem of perception. This is said to be difference in word.

There are many varieties of 'pramāṇas' used by Indian thinkers. Cārvāka accepts 'pratyakṣa' as the only valid 'pramāṇa' and rejects even 'anumāna'. Buddhists accept 'pratyakṣa' and 'anumāna' as the only two valid sources of knowledge. The Jains accept 'laukika' and 'alaukikapratyakṣa' which include both empirical and transcendental knowledge. The other orthodox schools of thought accept 'pratyakṣa', 'anumāna' and 'śabda' as the minimum sources of valid knowledge. The number of 'pramāṇas' beginning with three, may go upto six or eight or more in different orthodox systems. The Bhāṭṭa-school of Mīmāṃsā, the Advaita Vedānta and

17 Ibid., XX. 91, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1972.

18 Ibid., XX. 89, Karnatak University, Dharwar.

19 Ibid., XX. 50, 51.

20 Ibid., XX. 50, 57.

21 Ibid., XX. 52-56, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1972.

Śaktiviśiṣṭhādvaita accept six 'pramāṇas'. They are pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi. But, broadly speaking, there are only three pramāṇas : pratyakṣa, anumāna, and śabda. Many of the schools bring Śabda under anumāna, and reduce them to two only. Like śaṅkara Maruḷaśaṅkara and other mystic-thinkers of the twelfth century accepted śrūta, dṛṣṭa and anumāna²² as the three main valid sources of knowledge. Before the twelfth century, Śrīpati Pandita wrote a commentary on the Brahmasūtra to show that they preach Śaktiviśiṣṭhādvaita. He is one of the distinguished commentators belonging to Viraśaivism. According to him, pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda are the only major pramāṇas. The reference to pramāṇas is made in ancient texts, namely, Pāramēśvaratantra and Pauṣkarāgama, as pointed out by Gubbiya Mallaṇārya in his introduction to the commentary on Vātulāgama.²³ Gubbiya Mallaṇārya's commentary shows that the Viraśaivism unlike Pūrvamīmāṃsā accepted at times four pramāṇas.²⁴

catvāri tāni mānāni pratyakṣādīni hē dvijaḥ !
pratyakṣamanumānaṁ ca śabdārthāpattirēvace !!

According to this verse, pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda and arthāpatti are the four pramāṇas. As far as the Sūnyasāmpādane in particular and the vacanas in general are concerned, that is either in the text under study or in the Śaṣṭhalakṣṭu,²⁵ the pramāṇas accepted are three only. There is any discussion on pramāṇa at all. On the contrary, they are presupposed as wellknown and are set aside as inadmissible

22 Śūnyasāmpādane, Vol. IV. Ch. XV. 49, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1970.

23 Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Śaṣṭhalajñāna Sārāmṛta, p. 119, Murughamath, Dharwar, 1964.

24 Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Ibid. p, 120, Murughamath, Dharwar, 1964,

25 Śaṣṭhalakṣṭu means six fold arrangement of the vacanas of the mystics on the principles of metaphysics, ethics and mysticism.

for the metaphysics of the Śūnyasāmpādane or the Śaṭsthalasāmpādane.²⁶

The vacanakāras (mystics) state that the ' natural ' means or source of knowledge are ' bhavis ' (worldlings). The indriyas, namely, the inner senses, organs of knowledge and of action, are said to be worldlings as they are having downward tendency in one sense. They are said to be worldlings because the perception implies the sense of ego which colours their view in another sense. In the former case it is the instinct that governs the senses and in the latter case it is still higher psychic power. These are to be removed to have the perception proper. They are, in other words, not capable of giving the correct view of the reality. Not only did the Viraśaivas doubt the senses, but almost all the Vedāntins in Indian philosophy. Plato, too, holds that the senses are deceptive. Descartes is another Western thinker who doubted the senses. All these, yet, give the senses their due place in the systems of pramāṇas. But they differ in their considerations of the pramāṇas. The pramāṇas, according to Advaita Vedānta²⁷, such as perceptions, are justified as valid means of knowledge as long as they do not have any pretensions to finality or ultimacy. According to Descartes, neither of the faculties, namely, perception and imagination, gives knowledge. But Descartes has to overcome the difficulty in one way or the other, He overcomes it by bringing in the goodness of God. The senses, along with the existence of God, and therefore of the possibility of the

26 i. Ed. Dr. P. G. Hālakatti, Vēda viprabōdhe, Śāstra, santeyamātu, purāṇa puṇḍara goṣṭhi, āgama aṇṛta nudi, tarka vyākaraṇa kavitra prodhime idukāraṇa. Tannolaganaroda anubhāvinda ghanavillenda kalidēvara dēva. Maḍivala Macidevana Vacana, p. 21: V, 27. Bijapur, 1947.

ii. Tr. Dr. S. C. Nandimath, Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Prof. A. Menezes, Vēda Śāstra smṛtigaḷu stutisalarīyalu. Śūnyasāmpādane, Vo. I. Ch. II. V. 12. Karnatak University, Dharwar. 1965.

27 Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction, p. 83. East-West Centre Press, Honolulu. 1969.

undoubted existence of the world, cannot be doubted. They, thus, become a faithful source of knowledge.²⁸ But the ṣaṭsthala school of thought doubts the senses, which is expressed by the term 'bhavi' (worldling). Advaita doubted the senses, though it gives them a place on the practical level, and thereby reached the conclusion that the object of the sense is illusion. Descartes' object of sense is real. So also Vīraśaivism, unlike Śaṅkara, believes in the reality of the object of sense. So did Aristotle, in Greek Philosophy. But Vīraśaivism although accepting the reality of sense, differs from Descartes as it differs from the monistic view of Śaṅkara. Its belief in sense differs both from Descartes and from Śaṅkara, whose belief is qualified. Vīraśaivism, like Yoga and Jaina, believes sense to be a valid source of knowledge only when purified. "Pramāṇa is in itself a demand for its purification and actualisation in Samādhi.... To have insight is to have the presentation of the concept or vṛtti steadied and characterised."²⁹ The idea of purification differs among these schools. Unpurified senses are rejected.

Three types of perceptions considered are : perception through action, through organs of knowledge, through inner sense organ. It follows :

The Mystics of Karnatak, like the Upaniṣadic sages, say : "karmava māḍabahudallade, vastuvanariyabahude?"³⁰ (one may perform work or religious duties, but can one know the thing (Reality or Principle?) "na.... karmaṇā"³¹ (cannot be known by the performance of religious duties). "kaṅge

²⁸ Discourse on Method, pp. XX-XXI, Every man's library.

²⁹ Krishnachandra Bhattacharya, Studies in Philosophies, Progressive Press, Calcutta, 1956

³⁰ Ed. Dr. L. Baṣavaraju, Allama Vacanacendrike, p. 266, p. 266, V. 1215, Nalinishankara Prakashana, Mysore, 1960

³¹ Muṇḍakopaniṣad, III. 1, 8.

kābaḍe rūpalla...³² (It is not the form to be seen with the eye). “ na tatra cakṣur gacchati na vāggacchati nō mano ”³³ (neither eye nor speech nor mind can reach).

The Śivaśaraṇas tell why these are not able to perceive the Reality. According to them, they do not know that they are the inheritors of the Reality. This is put in a manner of the Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis :

“ bhāvātītavāda nirākārada ghanavu sujñānada mukhakke asādhya nōḍā. ”³⁴ (The absolute which is beyond discursive thought and is formless cannot be known by knowledge). . “ sa ēṣa nēti nētyātmā gṛhyo na hi gṛhyatē ”³⁵ (that self is to be described by No, No! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be (is not) comprehended).

From this survey of the two types of statements it is clear that the sense can know only a particular form of reality. The reality which is to be ‘ understood ’ is not of the type that is to be understood by perception. This does not mean that there is nothing common connecting both forms of reality. The Viraśaiva seers go deeper still to show the reasons why the senses do not perceive that form of reality. They say :

“ rupiṅge rūpu, jñānakke jñāna, prāṇakke prāṇavāda liṅga ”³⁶ (Liṅga is the Form of form, Knowledge of knowledge and Life of life.) “ Śrōtraśya śrotraṃ mānasō manō yat ! vācō ha vācam sa u prāṇasya prāṇaḥ cakṣuṣascakṣurati mucya ’. ”³⁷ (It is the ear of the ear, the mind of mind, the speech of speech, the breath of breath and the eye of eye). Bādarāyaṇa states,

32 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halkatti, Śūnyasaṃpādana, Ch. III. V. 90, Bijapur, 1930

33 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halkatti, Śūnyasaṃpādana, Ch. V. V. 12

34 Ed. Dr. L. Basavaraju, Allamanavacanacendrike, p. 216, V. 979

35 Brhadāranyakopaniṣad, II. 9, 26

36 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halkatti, Śūnyasaṃpādana, Ch. X. V. 66, Bijapur.

37 Kāthopaniṣad, I, 2

all the statements quoted above in cryptic words but in a coherent form :

(1) " tadavyaktamāha hi " ³⁸ (scriptures also declare that it is unmanifest).

(2) api ca saṁrādhane pratyakṣanumānabhyām. ³⁹
(Besides, during the stage of perfect meditation; because scriptures and smrtis say so).

The metaphysical reason given by the ṛṣis and the vacanakāras make the knowledge of the Ground by the senses impossible. True, it is impossible in the sense that the senses are not capable, just as they are of knowing the reality. It also implies that the senses are not capable of looking into themselves. But the way out is suggested and thereby the remarks made above are cancelled : Both the Upaniṣadic seers and the vacanakāras state, "...some wise man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality, saw the Self behind." ⁴⁰ According to the Śivaśaraṇas, it is possible only when one can look at the 'back' and also look at any thing through the back and the tendency not to look at the back is bhavitva. In order to change the course of this tendency, the idea of ' darpaṇa ' is introduced. The ' darpaṇa ' means becoming conscious or self-conscious. Self-consciousness makes evident the nature of the self to man. It is the worship of the ' darpaṇa ' (mirror), to put it in the religious language of the Ṣaṭsthala school of thought.

The term ' darpaṇa ' in Viraśaivism is applied to the Iṣṭaliṅga which is the symbol of individual self. It is in this i. e. self-symbol one has to see the universal-self which is the Parabrahma. Just as one sees one's own face in a mirror the individual sees God in one's own self. This, therefore, is

38 Brahmasūtra, III. 2, 23

39 Brahmasūtra, III. 4, 2

40 Kaṭhapaniṣad, II. 4, 1

called darpaṇa. This is to be traced to the Upaniṣadic origin. It is found in Kaṭhopaniṣad :

yathā'darśē tathātamani yathā svapnē tathā pitṛlōke |
yathāpsu....brahmalōkē | II. 3.5.

(in the self one seen God as in a mirror, but as in a dream in the world of Fathers : and as in water one sees the surface of an object, so one sees Him in the world of the Gandharvas. But He is seen as light and shade in the heaven of the spirit. Tr. Shri Aurobindo, Eight Upanisads, p. 87). This is of metaphysical importance in this context. It is, hence, at once the knowledge of the self and of the other. This knowledge is valid knowledge and could be acquired by the senses. Thus the senses become a valid source of knowledge. This is psychological and also psycho-metaphysical theory.

There is another source of valid knowledge accepted by the Śivaśaraṇas. It is the Śabdapramāṇa. Śabda, in ancient literature meant ' Veda ' and ' samaya ', which were expressed by the term ' tradition '. The term ' tradition ' in the sense of ' Śabda ' is considered in the preceding part of the paper, while in the succeeding part of the paper the term samaya is going to be considered. So this also comes under logic in the extended sense of the term. The sruti according to them consists of the nigamāgamas in the limited sense, whereas the smṛti consists of Kurmapurāṇa, Vāyupurāṇa, Vidyēśvara Saṁhitā, Vāyusaṁhitā, Kāśikāṇḍa, Saurapurāṇa, Śivarahasya, etc. They quote Yāmālas, the texts on Nāthapantha, a branch of Śaivism. Sometimes they use the term sṛti for smṛti as a synonym. Their synonymous use by Śivisaraṇas does not mean that they are ignorant of the different connotations of both the terms, but they have reasons for such a use. The function of Śabda according to them is twofold :

(i) The word, as a faculty of self, comprehends the multiplicity. This stands at the root of coherent thinking called intuition, that forms concepts,

(ii) The word as the faculty of selection is reflection, which is another faculty of the self. The first function of the word is, in the words of Śivaśaraṇas, *anubhāva*; whereas the second is *ṣṛti* and *smṛti*. The second category presupposes second-hand information. This stand is analogous to that of Gaṅgēśa a modern logician. So the term *ṣṛti*, according to Śivaśaraṇas, consists of *nigamāgamas* and *purāṇētiḥāsa*; consists of *nigamāgamas* and *purāṇātiḥāsa*; 'Śabda' as 'anubhava' is the source of first-hand knowledge. The first-handness of *Sruti*, which was supposed by the other orthodox schools, is according to them, reduced to the status of *smṛti*. This view of the Śaraṇas about *ṣṛti* may be supplemented by the Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā, Kaṭhopeniṣad that states: "na bahunā *srutēna*"⁴¹ (not by the many Vedas). The Gītā also says: *nāhaṁ Vedaiḥ*⁴² (not by the Veda). Hence *sruti* and *smṛti* are placed under one head and used as synonyms by the Śivaśaraṇas. So 'Śabda' as 'anubhāva', 'sruti' and 'smṛti', though they seem to be three, form only two classes of Śabda. The *sruti* (i. e. *smṛti*), like *anumāna*; depends on *pratyakṣa*, which is not empirical perception. As *anumāna* can be reduced to *pratyakṣa*, *sruti* also can be reduced to *pratyakṣa* (*anubhava*). Now we see a change in the concept of *pramāṇa* particularly in this quarter of Indian thinking. The change is in case of 'Śabda *pramāṇa*.' This needs further elucidation.

This period in the history of Indian logic is one of the most valuable. The period earlier than the twelfth century may be called an age of scholastics. Logic at this time was primarily an enterprise for developing a rational that is age-serving or age-satisfying-verbal testimony. For, it was as a whole, one of the terms and sentences of texts. Everything, including reasoning and personal experience, was subordinated to faith, and faith as depicted in the texts. "The classical

41 Kaṭhopeniṣad, I, 2, 23

42 Bhagavadgītā, XI, 53

philosophers of India have placed a tremendous weight on authoritative scriptures."⁴³ But during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the cultural matrix of logic is characterised as a tremendous progress of contacts with the ways of different religious life and the events of things. We may name it a Renaissance, the culmination of which is marked by an extraordinary development of religious thinking and socio political and economic changes. These forced themselves upon thinking and living as against the previous era : the era of great metaphysical thinkers and logicians. This age gave birth to a new logic in India.⁴⁴ We even hear criticism of nyāya (Tarka), drṣṭa and śabda. A new way of thinking emerged out of the accumulated result of the Śaṅkarite, Rāmānujite, Kashmira and Tamil Śaivite and the Bauddha and Jaina ways of thinking. The theories of language, the religious and philosophical arguments of the scholastics differed widely from one another according to their religious and the metaphysical position.

Logic, in the sense of consideration of immediate and mediate knowledge, is śabda, which plays a great role in Indian philosophy. The importance attached to śabda is a unique feature of Indian Philosophy. It is one of the ancient pramāṇas. Śabda, in antiquity, is supposed to be tradition in the sense of Veda. It was the Purvamīmāṃsā that accepted śabda in the sense of tradition, i. e. Vedā. It is

43 Karl Potter, *Presuppositions of Indian Philosophy*, p. 85 Prentice Hall Inc. 1963

44 (i) Śankara, Rāmānuja, and Śrīpatipañḍita are some of the distinguished commentators.

(ii) Dignāga was succeeded by the celebrated Udyotakara who is mentioned by Subandhu writing in the 7th century...Now Dharmakīrti is known to have lived in the first half of the 7th century...The most notable productions of this later age are a series of commentaries...There is a distinct tendency towards scholasticism. Ed. A. D. Pusalkar, *Tarka Sangraha of Annambhatta*, pp. XXXVI-XLI, Bombay, Sanskrit Series, No. LX-1963

eternal and has no author. Prabhākara, like Jaimini, accepted it in the sense of tradition. Kumārila differs from both Jaimini and Prābhākara in a qualified sense. According to Kumārila, Śabda is apauruṣeya and also human. In this distinction there is a sign of change in the concept of śabda. The change is of great value, and its causes are yet to be investigated. There is another school that accepts śabda as āptavākya. It defines śabda as "the sentence or proposition (uttered by) a credible or authoritative person." Truth is "an object as it exists in reality."⁴⁵ Āptavākya is of two kinds: one is laukika (i.e. profane, worldly) and the other is Vaidika (sacred). In this sense, both Nyāya and Kumārila have one and the same view of śabda. Śaṅkara is another great thinker who agrees with this view of Nyāya when he states that Śabda is both Veda and outside Veda.

The Tantra literature gives two types of āptavākya. They are of man and of God. The words of man are to be taken as a valid source of knowledge as they are based on perception and inference. The ṣaṭsthala school, though accepts two types of āptavākya, does not mean what the Tantra literature means when it holds the view as stated above. Viraśaivism accepts śabda in the sense of tradition, i.e. 'Nigamāgama' and 'anubhava' on the one hand and 'samaya' on the other. The Viraśaiva does not accept the apauruṣeyatva of the Veda as was accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka for which he has his own reasons; one of which is that the God Rudra is accepted by the Veda as the Supreme:⁴⁶ Veda svayāmbuvenba vādi nīkēlavlō; 'ēkōrudra nadvitiya' nendu nāmbuvudu kāṇiraṇṇā.. (O, you who say that the Veda is uncreated

45 Ed. A. D. Pusalkara, Tarka Saṅgraha of Annambhatta, p. 330, Bombay 1963

a) M. Hiriyanna, Indian Philosophical studies, Vol. I, p. 66, Kavyalaya, Mysore, 1957

46 Ed. Prof. S. S. Basavanal, Basavannanavara Vacanagalu, pp. 138-39, L.E. Association, Dharmwar 1963

The first two lines refer to the valid conditions of profane knowledge in one in whom they are present. The second two lines refer to the transcendental conditions of noumenal knowledge which are also present. Thus the 'āptavākya' is complete in itself, i. e., it fulfils the conditions of valid knowledge, of empirical knowledge, and also has something more in it to say. 'Āpta' in this sense is the God of theistic religions. There is a lot of difference in the connotations of the term 'āptavākya' as accepted by Nyaya, Vedanta and Viśiṣṭaivism. The word (śabda) is pramāṇa in one sense and it is also not 'pramāṇa' as it is based on some one else. This is why the Viśiṣṭaiva school calls 'śabda' ignorance. The mystic thinker Allamaṇḍaprabhu says :⁴⁹

“nāneṃbudu pramāṇa nīneṃbudu pramāṇa svayaveṃbudu
pramāṇa. paraveṃbudu pramāṇa. pramāṇaveṃbudu
pramāṇa. Gohēśvaraneṃbudu apramāṇa.”

(What is called 'I' that is pramāṇa, what is called 'you' that is pramāṇa. What is called 'itself' is pramāṇa. What is called 'beyond' is pramāṇa. What is called 'pramāṇa' is pramāṇa. Gohēśvara is apramāṇa). Therefore, according to the Ṣaṭsthala school of thought śabda, though a pramāṇa is not the highest pramāṇa as it pre-supposes the other pramāṇa, namely, 'āpta'. Veda, Śabda, is ignorance. The Veda, in the sense of religious injunctions, leads to rewards and places of honour in the other world. Veda, śabda, in the sense of jñāna, the fourth āśrama called Sanyāsa, knows no liberation. Therefore, atyāśrama is found by the Upaniṣadic sages to achieve liberation. And those who think of a personal God do not attain self-realization or liberation, as stated in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka :⁵⁰

⁴⁹ i) Ed. Dr. L. Basavaraju, Allamaṇḍa Vacanacendrike, p. 255, V. 1163, Nalanisankaraprakasana, Mysore, 1960

ii) Śūnyasāmpādane, Vol. V. Ch. XX I, 90, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1972

⁵⁰ Brahmadāraṇyakopaniṣad, I. 4, 10

ītmā hyeṣṭm sa bhavati atha yō 'nyāmdēvatāmupāstē'
nyō sāvaṇyō | hamasmiti na sa vēda yathā paśurēvaḡm
dēvānā mau ||

(No, if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know. He is like a beast for the Devas).⁵¹ Thus the Śivaśaraṇas and the Upaniṣad in this sense are of the same view. Therefore, the interpretation of śabda in Viraśaivism will be on a new level. Hence it differs from all the earlier views about śabda. This needs further elucidation...

The new interpretation of śabda pramāṇa is as follows: Sensation, which is laukikapratyakṣa, is translated into sound, or āhataśabda. So also, transcendental perception is to be translated to sound called anāhata śabda. "Word (śabda) is explained either as a percept of one worthy to be trusted, or as a right percept. It refers to visible or invisible objects," states Max Muller. There is no difference in the meaning of śabda in its formal character. The difference lies in the different characteristic features of śabda. The Laukikapratyakṣa or Vṛttijñāna is divided into perception and inference. The latter depends on the former for its validity. In the terminology of the philosophy of language, if there are no words, there is no proposition or vākya: 'vākya' is that which consists of 'vāk', as concept consists of percepts; 'no percepts; no concepts', when put in the words of psychology and reasoning. So also, there are two types of Vedic perceptions. They are sruti and smṛti. The latter depends on the former and presupposes the former. The division so made in both types of perception (śabda)-laukikapratyakṣa and alaukikapratyakṣa which are āhataśabda and anāhataśabda respectively, is based on the material conditions or characters. So material characteristics are the bases of classification of śabda. Following the criteria of the classification of śabda, Śivaśaraṇas make

classification in transcendental word.⁵² They state that there are two types of transcendental word. But these types are not identical with those we already have in Indian orthodox schools, namely, *sruti* and *smṛti*. So the two types are *anubhava* and *sruti* (i. e. *smṛti*). *Sruti* (*smṛti*) draws its strength from *anubhava*. *Anubhava* is the vision of the self. This has no author. It is uncreated. So it is *apauruṣeya*. But this use of the word is not the same as made by the *Mīmāṃsaka*; nor is it used in the sense of *apauruṣeya* as in *Nyāya* or *Vedānta*. In the former case, there is no God, therefore it is *apauruṣeya*, whereas in the case of the latter there is personal God who is the author of the *Veda*, but no man is author of *Śabda*. As God is eternal, so also is his word eternal. Hence there is a lot of difference in what the word *apauruṣeya* means for the *Mīmāṃsaka* and for *Advaitavedānta* or *Śaktiviśiṣṭhādvaitha*. So *Śabda* as 'anubhava' is the source-light from which both *sruti* and *smṛti* draw strength. This is not the same as the *Śabda* advocated by *Bhartṛhari*, as it does not accept the theory of 'sphoṭa' or 'explosion'. What we are now at is the material aspect of *Śabda*, but not its formal aspect. 'anubhava' is a transcendental *pramāṇa* that forms one class of *pramāṇa*, whereas *sruti* and *smṛti* together form the second class of transcendental *pramāṇa*. In the wordness as such in the transcendental *pramāṇa* there is no difference. 'Anubhava' is a word without the element of personal or ego sense. This is the highest achievement in the material character. It is in this *Śabda* that 'me' and 'other' are identified. Therefore, the *Śaraṇas* use this spiritual experience as the highest

52 'anubhava' a *pramāṇa* of *Viśiṣṭaivism* as in the *pramāṇa Śāstra* of Jainism is *pratyakṣa*. It is not *Vyavahārika pratyakṣa* but *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* (transcendental perception). According to Jainism it is direct immediate and independent of any assistance of the media of the external senses and mind. It is direct apprehension obtained by the soul. It is what *Kathopaniṣad* contends when it states :

yamēvaiṣa vṛṇtē tēna labhyas tasyaiṣa ātmā
vivrṇute tanuṃ svāṃ ! I. 2, 23

pramāṇa. This is not a new practice.⁵³ Even then, there is a difference in the sense of this spiritual experience. So they criticise nigamāgamas, whenever they are in contradiction with their experience. The difference between the modern logicians and the stand taken by the Śivaśaraṇas about Veda is quite radical. Though this is an age in which the spirit of inquiry predominates in almost all walks of life, the modern logicians did not dare to disregard the authority of the Veda in the transcendental matters. It is true that they were bold enough to discard the authority of the Vedas in empirical matters. Śaṅkara Miśra discarded the authority of the Vedic passage that contradicted the truth of experience; whereas Vācaspati Miśra places equal reliance upon the authority of the Veda and of perception. He holds that the truth of perception cannot be cancelled by the authority of the Veda simply because it is held to possess a superior authority.⁵⁴ Though this shows a shift in attitude to tradition, it is not as radical as that of the Śivaśaraṇas, who discarded the authority of the Veda in transcendental matters. It is in this way that their treatment differs from the earlier orthodox systems. The other orthodox systems state that experience must be consistent with the texts, whereas the śaraṇas state that the mystic experience need not be so. For the nigamāgamas are the creation of the self. Therefore, whenever they contradict experience, they are liable to investigation and criticism. A number of statements may be quoted in support of this :

- 1, Vēdavēmbudu ōdinamātu (Veda is a matter of study and reading).
2. Vedakke oreyanikkuve (I arrest the Veda).

53 Eliot Deutsch, 'It has been', therefore, rightly pointed out that "For purposes of philosophy, we may generally substitute in place of faith in scriptures spiritual experience." Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstructions, East-West Press Honolulu. 1969

54 Ed. K. Bhattacharya, Indian Heritage, Vol. III, p. 127

3. Śabdajālaṅgaḥinde baḷaladīru (Do not follow a net of words).
4. Veda, śāstra, śruti, smṛtiḡaḷu stutisalarīyavu. (The Veda, Upaniṣads, religious texts, systems of philosophy and law books cannot praise Him.)
5. nigamāgama śāstravanolle (I do not want nigamāgamas, systems of philosophy).
6. Vedavanōdidavaramunde aḷukaṇḡeyāhōte, śāstravanōdi davaramunde aḷukaṇḡeyā.... (O ! You lamb you cry before those who have read Veda and those we have read the systematised religious literature.)

From the above survey it is clear that the Śivaśaraṇas are highly rational in their treatment of the authority of Śabda. But this is not the final verdict of the Śivaśaraṇas. They respect Veda and quote from it whenever it does not go against their own experience. This brought about a great change in the outlook of thinkers in this area of philosophical activity. This is the removal of the age-old accepted view of the authority of Veda. The first change took place when its authorship was traced to Rudra. The second change in the authorship from that of Rudra to mystic thinker is one of the changes in the critique of thought which is no less a revolution. This means a good deal, as the Śabda of the Śaraṇas differs from the traditional sense of śabda. Ācennabasavaṇṇa, Uṛilīṅgapeddi, Maḡivaḷa Mācayya, Siddharāmayya quote the Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvaveda in suitable contexts. The liberty that the Śivaśaraṇas take may be the reason why some modern scholars who have written on Viṛaśaivism brand them as radicalists. They state that the Śivaśaraṇas trod a new path that is in no way related to the Vedas and Āgamas. However, the spirit of revolt that Śivaśaraṇas show is present even in the Ṛgveda and Upaniṣads. It is the characteristic mark of critical thought. Self-criticism is the hallmark of all thought. So, wherever thought is characterised by criticism, it is not necessarily heretical as it may be easily supposed to be.

The Śivaśaraṇas accept the authority of Śabda, not in the sense of the Veda, but in the Vacanāgamic sense. The vacanas are accepted as authority because they are Godspoken. They are the Divine Itself.

- i) *ṛāteṃbudu jyōtirliṅga* (word is Effulgent Light).
- ii) *māteṃbudu liṅgaikya* (Word is no other than Divine union).
1. *ādyara vacana paruṣa kaṇḍyā* (Śaraṇas words are a touch stone).
2. *śaraṇaru manaderedu mātanāḍidare liṅgava kāṇa-bahudu*. (One may see Liṅga when Śaraṇas speak kindly).
3. *Śabdasōpānava kaṭṭi naḍisidaru dēvalokakke baṭṭe kāṇirō* (The ancients lead to the realm of Light by the path built of word-speps).
4. *tanna tānaridaḍe nuḍiyalla paratativanōḍā* (All words are divine principle when one has selfrealisation).
5. *Kūḍala Saṅgamadeva bhaktana nuḍiya naḍuve rāsiyā-gippa*. (God is in heaps in the words of Śaraṇas.)

This is how Śabda is understood and used by the Śivaśaraṇas, as the higher than the highest śruti. The above examination of Śabda gives a picture of the different uses of the Śabda pramāṇa by different schools of thought belonging to both orthodox and heterodox systems. In ancient times, Śabda was understood as tradition. The tradition was supposed to be of two types, namely, śruti and samaya. The tradition in the sense of śruti has been dealt with so far. Now the other part of the tradition, namely, samaya, is the topic to be discussed as pramāṇa. The history of samaya-pramāṇa goes back to the period of the Brāhmaṇa literature, as stated by Prof. M. Hiriyanna.⁵⁵ Samaya pramāṇa, he states, is the

⁵⁵ Prof. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 91, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958

habitual observances of the cultured man (Śiṣṭa). The samaya-pramāṇa is substituted for śruti-pramāṇa only when there is no quotable text to support a current practice. But the Kalpa-sūtras did not accept this as pramāṇa, for according to them it is only the uncreated and eternal śruti which is pramāṇa and nothing else that is worthy to be called pramāṇa. Moreover, the habitual practices of the śiṣṭa are based on the authority of the śruti. The liberty of thought and the sense of self-respect already appeared in different forms which are embedded in the acceptance of samaya-pramāṇa. The uncreatedness and the eternality of Śabda were first refuted by Śvētāśvatara when it stated :⁵⁶

yō brāhmāṇaṁ, vidadhāti pūrvaṁ ।
yo vai vēdāṁsa prahiṇōṣi tasmai ॥

This, one may say, is one of the forms of the spirit that underlies the samaya-pramāṇa as stated above. That is expressed through acceptance of authorship. This is a change in the connotation of Śruti-pramāṇa. According to the Mīmāṃsā, this might be a heretical stand. This has undergone a further change, giving to the human vision the supreme place as pramāṇa. There is more than one way of justifying 'samaya' as pramāṇa, according to the Gautamadharmasūtra (I. 6). This brings to light the effect of the force with which it is at work in spite of the weight of Śruti-pramāṇa as understood by the Kalpa-sūtras. This Śiṣṭa, or samaya, prevails with greater force, as could be discerned in the accumulated philosophical and religious literature belonging to the orthodox schools. The change in the connotation of samaya-pramāṇa recurred in the connotation of śruti-pramāṇa. This is very clear, as the uncreatedness and eternality of śabda meant differently during the scholastic period of the Indian philosophy. This is a tremendous change. There is no difference between samaya as a racial intuition and śruti as revelation. Āptatā meant the

same in both. As a result of this change, meaning a lot, smoothening work was undertaken by the orthodox thinkers. Again, the spirit of samaya was suppressed systematically. But the effects of this spirit found quite different expression in the mystic thinkers of the twelfth century. The change in the connotation of the one occurred in the other simultaneously in this orthodox school of thought. The Śabda, i.e. śruti, which was held as the authority, was reduced to the status of smṛti by the mystics, whose discourses are recorded in the book under study, and anubhava is raised to the highest place that was once given to Śruti by the scholastic thinkers of the orthodox schools. The Śaraṇas say that this is niśśabda, as there is no element of the ego-sense. They sometimes use Śabda in the sense of niśśabda, as dealt with by me elsewhere in the present work. So śabda raised to the highest state of pramāṇa is nissabda and is superior to Śruti. This is a historic change in the science of Śabda-pramāṇa. This is the change that took place in Indian pramāṇa śāstra during the twelfth century. It happened in Karnatak in general, and at the Śivānubhavamantapa of Kalyana in particular. If I assumed that this added to the environment out of which modern logic was evolved during the thirteenth century, it would not be wrong. People from all parts of India, including Kashmir and Bengal, attended the discourses that took place in the Anubhavamantapa at Kalyana. This gives a historical picture of the time and the sceptic or dialectical spirit that was preeminent like the change in the connotation of Śabda it changed and is raised to the place of highest pramāṇa samaya too. It is samaya that sometimes became the testing verbal testimony not only of Śabda (scriptures) but also of anubhāva. The Śaraṇas examined their anubhava in the light of the samaya sometimes. There are such occurrences recorded in the Śūnyasāmpādane. Ghaṭṭivāḷayya and Prabhudeva provide such extraordinary instances.

Ghaṭṭivāḷayya, a mystic of the highest order, whose Experience (Divine-knowledge) was as high as that of Prabhudēva,

when faced with the problem of religious observances, had to listen to Siṣṭas like Cennabasavaṇṇa and Allama in spite of his anubhava-pramāṇa.

The example of Allama Prabhu adds to the supremacy of samaya when he was to heed the words of a Siṣṭa like Basavaṇṇa. Again, Siddharāmayya, a distinguished Śivayōgi, did not refuse to listen to the Siṣṭa inspite of the aid given by Allama Prabhu in the discussion. So, one may add to the examples of the supremacy of the Siṣṭa or samayapramāṇa to show that sometimes the samaya-pramāṇa became supreme.

CHAPTER IV

The philosophers since immemorial days are busy with the work of clarifying the philosophical concepts of systems to which each of them belonged. The work of mystic-philosophers of the twelfth century in Karnatak who assembled around the great reformer and philosopher-administrator, Basavaṇṇa, did what they could to the ṣaṭsthala school of thought. They discussed two important terms, namely 'śabda' and 'niśśabda'. The discussion forms a part of the record in the form of the book, *Śūnyasaṃpādane*. Therefore the concern is to know more about the nature and place of terms in the system of thought.

Śabda and niśśabda have different connotations accordingly as they occur in metaphysical, religious and mystical contexts. The two concepts, śabda and niśśabda, are two different types of metaphysical entities; and also pertain to two lores leading to two types of enlightenment. The Upaniṣads, the Bible, the Qur'ān and the Pyramid texts are those in which the philosophy of the 'word' is expounded. Therefore the 'word' is a striking common link that connects the occidental and oriental worlds of religion, mysticism and metaphysics.

Śabda in its different aspects dominates the Upaniṣadic texts. And the meaning of the two terms varies from one text to the other. Śabda is praṇava and udgīta in Yajurvedic and Sāmavedic Upaniṣads respectively. The term Śabda is used in the sense of the Absolute.¹ Śabda is the uncreated principle and it is out of this the form of universe and thought came into existence.² The uncreatedness of Śabda is the view of the

1 (i) The Taittiriya Upaniṣad, 1. 8 (ii) Akṣara means both syllable and imperishable, i. e. Brahman. 'The Upaniṣad, Pt. 1. p. 1. Tr. Max Muller, Doverse publication, 1962

2 Āgamaparijñāna, pp. 22-23 Shambhulinga Shivācārya Bijapur 1930

Pūrvamīmāṃsā.³ It is also explained as 'Parabrahma' and Īśvara⁴ in the Māndūkya upaniṣad. The creative energy of Parabrahma is Īśvara⁵ in Śvētāśvatara. Īśvara or Śakti, is an aspect of Parabrahma. 'Hara' is Akṣara (Word or syllable).⁶ 'Hara' is endowed with māyā.⁷ So is Śabda.⁸ As the cosmos is the work of the possessor of māyā, it was Śabda that created it.⁹ Śabda is form and content of thought. This is the metaphysics of Śabda.

Śabda in the mystical sense is a process of purification and contemplation with which one is able to realise God within one-self.¹⁰ Śabda is not only the means of realization but also it is a goal.¹¹ There are two distinct ways of Śabda. One, that enables one to realise the self as immanent i. e. Śabda, and the other that leads to the realization of the self as transcendent Niśśabda. The former is sometimes called Saguṇa, whereas the latter is called Nirguṇa. The word (Śabda) is sound in two senses: anāhata śabda and āhata śabda, or aethereal and non-aethereal. Śabda, as omkāra in its different forms, is heard in yogic experience and is called nādabrahma. Śabda is avāḡjapraṇava which is beyond yogic hearing also. Avāḡjapraṇava is the word where the nādabrahma loses its forms and becomes

3 Karmamīmāṃsā p. 36 Dr. A. B. Keith. The Heritage of India series. 1961

4 praṇava hyaparambrahma praṇavasca parah smrtah. Māndūkya Upaniṣad Kārikā, I, 26

5 See note to the Śvētāśvaropaniṣad, I. 3. Rāmakriṣṇāśram. Mysore, 1962

6 Śvētāśvataropaniṣad, I. 10

7 Ibid., VI, 10

8 na sivaḥ śaktirahitō na śaktiḥ śivavarjitah. Mataṅgapāramesvarāgama.

9 (i) The creation is māyā, in its original sense of the work, then of phenomenal, then of illusion. The Upaniṣads, Pt. II. XXXVI Tr. Max Muller. (ii) Svetasvataropaniṣad, XXIV. 9

10 A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 342 Dr. R. D. Ranade Oriental Book Agency Poona. 1926

11 Kathopaniṣad.

avāgja. These are the forms of Śabda according to mysticism. The nādabrahma is common to all the forms of mysticism. But this avāgja is not so.

The ' word ' in the Bible is said to be with God as well as God. This is the doctrine of Logos. It is one of the Christian trinity. The word, in the modern philosophy, is the testimony. The twentieth century is known for the philosophy of word in the Western philosophy in its different forms. This is the metaphysical role of the word that predominates the present day philosophical thinking. Similarly, in the Qur'ān, the word is power as it is in Christology, where logos is used in the sense of creative energy. But word as the power of Allah is quite different from the power in Christianity, as it means the fiat of Allah. Thus the Qur'ānic and Biblical connotations differ.¹² ' Christian ' mysticism as well as ' Sufi ' mysticism diverge from their texts in their view of the nature of God and creation as well as their natural relation. The logos in Greek or Christian philosophy and logos in Upaniṣadic philosophy are analogous but not identical. The logos in the Upaniṣadic philosophy, plays a subservient and secondary part to the Ātman.¹³ These are the various senses of the word in the Bible, Qur'ān and Upaniṣads.

We could now trace the relation between the Upaniṣadic and Vacanāgamic doctrine of the Śabda. Śabda in the Śūnyasampādane means Liṅga, the highest Reality, as in the Upaniṣads. Gohēśvara is the word;¹⁴ Gohēśvara is Liṅga. Therefore the word is Liṅga. Liṅga is the ground of microcosm and macrocosm and also the goal of them.¹⁵ So is

12 Comparison of Religions, pp. 198-203 Beacon paper Back. 1962

13 Op. Cit., p. 95 Dr. R. D. Ranade.

14 Śūnyasampādane, Ch. I. 72 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti Bijapur, 1930

15 The Siddhanta sikhmani, VI. 37 And An Agamic stanza quoted to support VI. 37 by N. R. Karibasava Shastri.

Śabda and is Mahāliṅga¹⁶ or 'Karmasādākhyā.' Mahāliṅga is the condition of the beginning of cosmic creation. In the sense of 'Sādākhyā' also it is the same thing as the term 'sādākhyā' means the beginning of the existence.¹⁷ Mahāliṅga or sādākhyā may be compared to the 'Hiraṇya-garbha' or the cosmic-man in the Upaniṣads and to the Logos in the Greeks. Mahāliṅga is conscious force. It is in its different forms nāda, 'bindu' and 'kalā.' So cit, Mahāliṅga, sādākhyā, praṇava, and śaraṇa are synonyms. The Cit was born in the Śūnya (Formless), or Void so that the Formless might not remain in the same state.¹⁸ This is its sport. 'O' is formless. 'OM' is form.¹⁹ To put the same either in the words of the Ṛgveda, of Taittirīyāraṇyaka or Taittirīya Upaniṣad, cit (Śabda) is born of the formless, is quite different from 'Asat' which has no existence at all. Formless is unmanifested one. Cit is form. In the words of Aristotle, it is the potential becoming actual. As cit is form and cit is Śabda, Śabda is form. Śabda and Niśśabda are form and formless. When we say that Niśśabda is beyond comprehension or word, we mean thereby that it is formless but not agnosticism. Niśśabda defies words as does the Asat of the Ṛgveda. As cit, the first germ of mind, was born in the Asat of the Ṛgveda,²⁰ so was Śabda (i. e. cit) born in Niśśabda which is Nirguṇa-brahma in the sense of unmanifest form of Saguṇabrahma of Vacanāliterature. This is as good as saying 'sat' (Śabda) is born in Asat (Niśśabda). Śabda, therefore, as matter with power to become manifold, is the world of multiplicity. Hence Śabda (idea) is dominated by māyā as Kant alludes.²¹

16 Saṣṭhalajñāna sārāmṛta, pp. 18-19 V. 33. Ed. Dr. R. C. Hiremath Murughamath, Dharwar. 1964

17 Ibid., p. 153

18 (i) This may be compared to one of the theories of creation as is stated in the Brahmasutra (ii) Śūnyasāmpādane, Ch. VIII. 25, CH. VII. 24 (iii) Saṣṭhalajñāna sārāmṛta, pp. 22-23. V. 38

19 Śūnyasāmpādane, Ch. XIII. 18

20 The Rgveda, X. 129. 1

21 The Psychological Types, P. 59 Dr. J. G. Jung Kegan and Paul, 1933

The mystical sense of Śabda and Niśśabda is found on the metaphysics of Śabda and Niśśabda. Śabda is 'mahadahāṅkāra' in Niśśabda-brahma.²² It is the beginning of 'saṁsāra,' that is ignorance. It is called Śabdasaṁdāni, 'emprical existence.' The emancipation consists in the process of changing Śabda into niśśabda. This has two fold proccss. The process in its two foldness is Śabdabrahma and Niśśabdabrahma. These two lores presuppose two types of enlightenment : one, due to the word from without; and the other, due to the word from within.²³ The enlightenment from without is Śabdabrahma which is being advocated and practised by almost all the schools, since it still accepts the duality of subject and object. We have the counterpart of it in the 'Veda'. In this specific sense śabdavidyā taught in the Veda is a first step to the Niśśabda vidyā of the Upanisads.²⁴ The emphasis here has shifted from object to subject in the sphere of lore as in the sphere of metaphysics. The light that comes from without is subordinated to the light within. Even the masterhood and disciplehood which belong to the plane of mind, recognised in the text under study, was challenged by 'Prabhu' on the ground that there lingers ulihu (noise) of the word. This is still a psychological and moral. To know thyself represents the psychological plane and to know thyself (ātmānaṁ ātmanāpasyē) represents the metaphysical plane. This contrast between the Greek and the Indian dictums is shown by Prof. Max Muller.²⁵ This disappears when the plane of the Self is reached where there is no witness.²⁶ This is the

22 Śūnyasampādane, Ch. VIII, 26

23 Ibid, Ch. II, 23-26

24 Sri Aurobindo on Tantra, p. 38, Ed. M, P. Pandit Sri Aurobindo Āsrama Pondicherry, 1964

25 A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 11. Major Basu Bhuvanesvari Ashram, Allahabad, 1859

26 ārudhiya kūtadalli nānāraṇū sāksiya kāne — Śūnyasampādane, Ch. II. 22. Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti, Bijapur, 1930

plane of Niśśabdabrahma.²⁷ The lore to be followed to attain the Niśśabdabrahma is niśśabdavidyā. This in contrast to the other lore and the plane where dependence on guru in the sense of the inner guide was considered and shown that such an idea is ignorance. So the inner guiding principle and yourself are not two different principles. Knowing consists, therefore, in knowing oneself by oneself²⁸ though both (Guru and Śiṣya) hold good for the common man but does not hold good for the realised man.²⁹ This discourse on subtler and more subtle forms that occurs in the text is thrilling. The subtlest nature of the 'Śabda' category, which is in the form of enlightenment, is challenged by 'Allamaprabhu' even when it performed the function from within. This is a psychological problem: a problem of subject and predicate in modern psychology. The argument affirms the duality. The synthesis is reached on a higher plane. The text suggests that the 'Sākāra' (Śabda from without) and the 'nirākāra' (Śabda from within) are two forms of ignorance. Nirākāra is the subtler form. It is just the brilliant golden lid that covered the face of Truth to put in the words of Upaniṣadic saying.²⁹ This golden lid is removed when the nature and function of nirākāra (i. e. guru in the form of inward enlightenment and its consciousness) is seen to be a subtler form of sākāra, which is Śabda that represents the 'I' ness and 'otherness' (tānu mattu idiru) in the subject. This two fold functions, to put in the words of modern thinkers, are concept and percept: "It is the basic process in forming concepts stands at the root of coherent thinking. 'I' that it--" word " presupposes the faculty of soul i.e. intuition that comprehends the multiplicity. In another sense it is the faculty of selection and formation of the system or a whole. In that the word refers to that faculty of the soul called reflection. Thus the word has to fold function which is

27 Ibid., II, 23, 24

28 Ibid., II, 26

29 hiranmayēna pātrēṇa satyasyamukhaṁ apihitam. Iśāvāsyōpaniṣad, II, 26

mythical as well as linguistic and the theoretical thinking or logical thought."

According to the text under study, a stage is reached where the words in mystic experience become an impediment and their rejection is advised. The ineffability of the mystic experience is the hallmark of all the systems of the world mysticism. The Upaniṣad and Śūnyasāmpādane mean that mind has no capacity to understand the Reality, when they say 'no cakṣusā grhyatē nāpi vācā,'³⁰ etc., and 'nuṭiya-gaḍaṇake silakuvude niśśābdabrahma? That Śabda stands for the psychic entity'³¹ which is a very ancient notion in Indian philosophy.³² Śabda in the sense of mind or psychic entity implies the multiplicity of the world.³³ It is a realm of percepts and concepts which is 'Śabdasandaṇi.' Realization is the cessation of the Śabda. This is a state of Niśśabda.³⁴ This is the mystic experience that lies beyond the Śabda principle. So the 'Buddha' kept silent over the mystic experience. So did 'Ajaganna' and Maruḷasaṅkara. The masters in the field state that if one tries to describe the experience one will lose it. Therefore it is wise to remain silent.³⁵ The mysticism naturally practised silence. This poses a problem to a student who is inspired by the spirit of inquiry. Allama-prabhu is such an enlightened sceptic who held the investigation in collaboration with 'Muktāyakka.'

30 Muṇḍakōpaniṣad, III. i. 8

31 Śatapathabrāhmaṇa, XIV. 6. 2. 11; Śūnyasāmpādane, II. 36; The Chāṇ-dōgya Upaniṣad, I-i-2

32 Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 139 Prof. M. Hiriyanna George Allen and Unwin, 1958

33 i) Buddha, p. 446 Dr. H. Oldenberg The Book Co. Ltd., Calcutta, 1927

34 Śūnyasāmpādane, II 36, 39

35 Bommavanu aridihare summaniddirabēku / Bommavanu aridunudidihare kaḷahogi kommidanatakku 'Sarvajna'// Sarvanjana vacanagalu, p. V. Ed. Dr. C. D. Uttangi.

The investigation begins in two directions. The beginning of the investigation in the direction of Yoga psychology is one phase of the problem of Śabda and Niśśabda. The ideal, namely, Niśśabda is yoga. Niśśabda is attained in almost all the schools of thought. The disappearance of Śabdasandāni (multiplicity in mind) in different schools has different metaphysical bases. Therefore the mystic experience of the Buddha, of Pātanjali, the author of the yogasātra, of Jaigīṣavya, the author of the Dhāraṇasāstrā³⁶ which was rejected by the Buddha and accepted by Hinayāna³⁷ and of the Ṣaṭsthala school differ. The disappearance of multiplicity in the mind, or cessation of words, is by suppression of the senses and by controlling the agitation in the mind. The cessation of nāma (word) is the everlasting goal in Buddhism. This psychic entity consists of sensations, perceptions, conformation and consciousness.³⁸ Cessation of the word means cessation of all these except the pure consciousness. That is nirvāṇa. Therefore nirvāṇa is cessation of words or of continuous change in the mind. The method is metaphysical, namely, 'paticca-samutpāda.' In Pātanjali, 'cittavṛtti-nirodha' is the process of stopping the agitation in the mind. This process arrests the activity of 'Prakṛti' and separates the self from 'Prakṛti.' That is the mystic experience according to Pātanjali. In Buddhism, the highest reality is 'cit.' The mystic experience is utter silence or pure consciousness. This experience consists of the act of stopping, that is blowing out, the activity in cit. There is nothing in Buddhism like the 'Prakṛti' of 'Sankhya-

36 i) The Nyāyasūtra, III, 2, 43 quoted in the Sāṅkhyakārikā, p. 18 Dr. Mainkar Oriental Book Agency, 1964

ii) The Jaigīṣavya is seventh among the twenty eight Śivayogācāryas. This is a tradition to which Allamaṃprabhu, Basavaṇṇa and others belong (of Allamaṇa vacanacendrike, pp. 33-35 Dr. L. Basavaraju). Twenty-eight is Lakulīśa who lived in the second cent B. C.

37 The Buddhacerita, Pt. II (Intro.) Tr. Johnston, Pujnab University, 1936

38 Buddha, p. 447 Dr. H. Oldenberg.

yoga ' though there is corporeality. This evolves out of cit or psychic entity. The mystic process is emptying the cit.

The act of cessation of words is not suppression of the senses, in Buddhism,³⁹ whereas it is the suppression of the senses in the Yoga system of Pātañjali, Jainism and the Vedāntins. The suppression is based on a metaphysical foundation. The senses in Buddhism are evolutes of the consciousness.⁴⁰ In Pātañjali they are the evolutes of Prakṛti, which is a metaphysical category in Sāṅkhya.⁴¹ The senses are products of 'Pudgala' or matter in 'Jainism',⁴² and are obstacles both in Jainism and Pātañjali. In Vedānta, the senses are 'bhautika,' as in 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika' whose source is māyā.⁴³ Therefore the rejection of matter is the ideal of the above mentioned schools except Buddhism. For them the suppression of the senses is necessary. The 'Ṣaṣṭhala' school states that 'indriyas' are evolutes of the five elements themselves the evolutes of the self.⁴⁴ This is a similar view to the one that is found in the 'Taittirīy Upaniṣad'. The senses in Ṣaṣṭhala school of thought do not belong, therefore, to the category which is not of the nature of self as in the 'Vedānta' of 'Śāṅkara' or 'Rāmānuja' or 'Madhva.' The defect in the power of the senses has to be understood differently from system to system. This depends on the category of which they are the products. So the Ṣaṣṭhala view differs from the Jaina view. The defect in the senses according to the Ṣaṣṭhala school is to be overcome not by punishing them, as we see in the Jaina system, but by sublimation. This is in accordance with the metaphysical

39 Buddhacarita, Pt. II p. xi-ii, Tr. Johnston Punjab University, 1936

40 Ibid.

41 Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 270 M. Hiriyanna.

42 The Pañcāstikāya-sāra—The prefaces, pp. 38-39 Ed. K. B. Jindal, Calcutta, 1958

43 Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 341-43

44 A Handbook of Viraśaivism, p. 144 Dr. S. C. Nandimath L.E. Association Dharwar, 1942, Taittirīyopaniṣad, II-1

stand taken by the Śaṭsthala school. 'Sabda' is the product of the senses in the empirical senses. The mind is filled with 'Śabda' as they enter from without. Therefore, to stop the agitation in the mind means the stopping of the flow from without.

The satiated state of mind in Pātañjali is a rippleless pond-like state. This state of mind involves neither loud thinking nor silent speech. This ideal is demanded by the metaphysics accepted by Pātañjali in order to separate the self from the bond of 'Prakṛti.' Separating one from the other is mystic method, and the achievement is the ideal and the mystic method both. The achievement of this is the mystic experience in the 'yōga' system. Their separation involves the problem of their original coming together, which warrants an independent study. In the Śaṭsthala school, the goal is not separation of aṅga and liṅga, but bringing them together, which is quite an opposite process. Therefore, 'Yōga' in the Śaṭsthala school is not 'Viyoga' i.e. separation or going assunder as in the Sāṃkhya-yoga school. Separation of 'puruṣa' from Prakṛti leads to inaction. This is silence in Pātañjali. Cessation of words in Buddhism is breaking up of twelve-fold link. It is the state of pure consciousness. This pure state is Niśśabda. The union of aṅga and liṅga, according to the 'Śaṭsthala' school of thought, is the state where absence of words prevails. It is a condition for the release of grace, or the higher power after which the activity of the senses is inspired 'liṅga' (Divine Principle). The mind-seed, which so far motivated the activity of senses is now replaced by the 'liṅga-seed'. Now the internal and the external senses of knowledge and the organs of action are in full possession of Divine. The eye which is the evolute of 'agni' (fire) is now turned to 'Śivaliṅga' that aspect of 'Mahāliṅga'. The nose which is the evolute of 'Pṛthvi' (earth) is turned to 'Ācāra-liṅga' that aspect of Mahāliṅga. The tongue (taste) the evolute of 'appu' (water) is turned to 'Guruliṅga' that aspect of Mahāliṅga. The touch which is the evolute of 'vāyu' (wind)

is turned to 'Jaṅgamaliṅga' that aspect of Mahāliṅga. The ear (sound) which is the evolute of the 'ākāśa' (space) is turned to 'Prasādaliṅga' that aspect of Mahāliṅga. The soul which is the evolute of Mahāliṅga is turned Mahāliṅga. This is how the whole of the personality of man is changed into the Divine-personality. Therefore, the senses cannot any longer produce 'śabda' but only niśśabda. This niśśabda is quite different from the dead silence that is produced by the yogic process in Pātañjali or the dumbness of the Buddha in the mystic experience. Therefore niśśabda represents quite a different category in the Ṣaṭsthala school of thought. It is that stage of union of Liṅga and Aṅga in Ṣaṭsthala where senses are no longer active in man but reveal a new type of outlook and understanding and activity.⁴⁵ At this stage, niśśabda is also termed śabda. śabda (i.e. niśśabda) of the 'śaraṇa' differs from that of the unrealised man because of the difference of categories. In other words it is the difference of svarā. The word of śaraṇa is said to be effulgent-liṅga (Jyōtīrliṅga); whereas the word of man is mind. The silence of man is not the silence of śaraṇa. It is the silence of mind in śaraṇa. So ineffability has differently meant here and is different from the mystic schools as it has quite a new meaning, niśśabda or silence represents the inability of mind in other schools whereas in Ṣaṭsthala school of thought represents the category of self. Thus śabda and niśśabda represent two categories.

45 Śūnyasāmpādana, VI. 64

CHAPTER V

(A)

The word *niśśabda* (silence) occurs in many places in the *Śūnyasaṃpādane*. The work categorically states that silence should be necessarily observed on the topics such as *Liṅgaikya*¹ (*nināṇa* or *Bayalu*), *Parabrahma* or *Liṅga*² (Absolute), and *Ācāra*³ (Discipline). Silence is prescribed not only on these categories but also on some other occasions or contexts. The use of the term silence (*niśśabda*) in the text under-study, namely, *Śūnyasaṃpādane* by different mystic-philosophers gives two types of pictures of Reality⁴ though they use a single language and live in a particular region. This is because ' the change in language can transform our appreciation of the cosmos.'⁵ We have similar view about such things in Buddhism. This is an important another Indian school of thought. The silence, as it is of great value, that gives rise to number of interpretations. So this demands clarification. As a result an attempt is made to meet it.

The self imposed silence (*niśśabda*) on one who realised *Liṅga* or *Śūnya* (Absolute) or Reality may mean that it is nothing but agnosticism; or it may mean that the silence does not mean ignorance of Reality, but knowing too much to express; or it may also mean that it is not necessary to give a metaphysical account of the Reality as that account may not be adequate. The Reality or Absolute (*Ghana*) is beyond expression.⁶ It is beyond word and thought as there is no

1 *Śūnyasaṃpādane*, Ch. ii-39 Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti, Bijapur, 1930

2 *Ibid*, Ch. ii-118

3 *Ibid*, Ch. iii Songs. St. 1

4 *Ibid*, Ch. ii-27, 32

5 *Language Truth and Reality*, p. 263 B. L. Whorf Ed. Carrod, 1956

6 *Śūnyasaṃpādane*, Ch. ii-12; Ch. iii-101

scope or space for word.⁷ In other words this great solid is without a word and without grossness.⁸ It cannot, therefore, be reached either by reason or by intellect.⁹ This is one way of expressing the nature of Reality. This method is upaniṣadic, which may even be traced to the Rgvedic way of describing the nature of 'Asat'.¹⁰ The advocate of which is Yāñjavalkya. This approach to Reality is again popularised by Allamaṣaṇṇa.¹¹ As pointed out by distinguished mystic Cennabasavaṇṇa. There is another method of philosophising the nature of Parabrahma (Śūnya). This is the positive method advocated by Basavaṇṇa. According to this method niśśabda is Truth-word.¹² This is effulgent Liṅga.¹³ This is a word without knowledge¹⁴ we say knowledge. It is a word spoken by Śaraṇa which is termed niśśabda.¹⁵ For the word without mind is niśśabda which is Absolute. So they are said to be silence passages. The silence represents a different category or the different order of Reality. So it is not antimetaphysical.

There are silence passages which give a different kind of picture of silence. The instances :

i) It is wise to be silent in the midst of the worldlings (bhaviḡaḡu). Giving them the word (Mantra or Śabda) would help neither.¹⁶

7 Ibid, Ch. iii-55

8 Ibid, Ch. ii-12

9 Ibid, iii-112

10 Rgveda, X-129

11 Śūnyasāmpādane, Ch. vii-2

12 Truth-word is Āgama which is nothing but the embodiment of experience. Ibid, Ch. i-58

13 Ibid, ii-28

14 Ibid, Ch. ii-36

15 Ibid, ii-

16 Ibid, Ch. iii-12, 60

ii) It is wise for those devotees who are love sick for God to be silent.¹⁷

iii) Silence is to be maintained instead of engaging in mystic discourses with those who do not know the nature of God which is imposed either through discipline, hearing, religious texts or through inward or outward purity.¹⁸

iv) He is wise who keeps silence instead of being busy in arguing and counter arguing; for the knowledge gained so is the knowledge with which we all of us are familiar as it is the result of churning the senses.¹⁹

v) The mystic experience would not be expressed to one and all; for it is not a commodity to be sold in the street.²⁰

vi) One should remain silent in cases of bet.²¹

vii) Silence is to be maintained in a case where the freedom of tongue results in the expression of undesired word.²²

viii) My word was sweet to his ear and his to mine. The words of both of us became one. Therefore silence or non-word penetrated into each of us.²³

ix) The god entering the heart merged and emerged in soft and truth-conversation.²⁴

x) I saved myself by seeing the state of him who is the supreme master called Cennamallikarjuna that talks while in union with the root-force of the world.²⁵

17 Śūnyasampādane, Ch. iii-104

18 Ibid, Ch. ii-29

19 Śivaśaraneyara vacanagalu, p. 436, V. 69 Ed. Dr. R. C. Hiremath
Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1969.

20 Ibid, p. 450 V. 100

21 Ibid, p. 436 V. 67, p. 447, V. 96;

22 Ibid,

23 Śūnyasampādane, xix-154

24 Ibid, xix-155

25 Ibid, xvi-88

xi) Mystic experience is available because of the availability of the company of the Śaranas.²⁶

xii) As you converse so shall you be free from word.²⁷

xiii) The ultimacy of the Trayi (triad) is spoken to me.²⁸

xiv) It is not within the grasp of smṛti and sruṭi.²⁹

xv) Parabrahma is the word which is beyond all the pramāṇas.³⁰

xvi) I am undone without listening Basavaṇṇa who is elderly man fit to put faith in.³¹

xvii) No need of inquiring the others as the knowledge becomes the self. In other words the self-experience is the highest certitude.³²

xviii) She attained self-knowledge undoubtedly. So her words are never without truth.³³

xix) One vacana of Mahādeviyakka is the best of all the vacanas of all. It is the etymological explanation of the mystic-talks³⁴.

xx) Knowing the text (śabda) is not realization.³⁵

xxi) The praise does not yield any fruit. For silence is Brahma. Silence cannot be within the power of praise.³⁶

xxii) How to know the Liṅga that is beyond word and mind?³⁷

26 Ibid, Ch. xvi-65

27 Ibid, Ch. xix-141

28 Ibid, Ch. xix-141

29 Ibid, Ch. xx-6

30 Ibid, Ch. xx-9

31 Ibid, Ch. xvi-85

32 Ibid, Ch. xvi-64

33 Ibid, Ch. xvi-40

34 Ibid, Ch. xvi-60

35 Ibid, Ch. xix-52

36 Ibid, Ch. xx-1

37 Ibid, Ch. xx-5

Chapter V

xxiii) Neither there is 'I' to tell; Nor there is You to listen. Because there is no duality³⁸.

xxiv) The word, namely, Kalidēva is the same Niśśabda-brahma i. e. there is no difference between śūnya and manifold or multiplicity.³⁹

xxv) Knowledge of Me united in the self. So I live without distinction.⁴⁰

xxvi) I lost name and form as Mahādāni Soḍḍala remained in the self-dwelling when He enjoyed the bliss of 'soham'.⁴¹

xxvii) There remains no other to talk as I am united in God.⁴²

xxviii) Liṅgaikya cannot be expressed.⁴³

xxix) The word became silent in Kūḍalasaṅga.⁴⁴

xxx) The name kūḍalacennasaṅga loses in formless.⁴⁵

xxxi) Mystic experience cannot be said to be the rub of words.⁴⁶

xxxii) The knower became silent in the known.⁴⁷

xxxiii) How is ethics possible without the word that is to be spoken of?⁴⁸

xxxiv) For one whose word is silent there is no need to burst forth in words while the fellowship is put to test.⁴⁹

38 Ibid, Ch. xx-4

39 Ibid, Ch. xx-56

40 Ibid, Ch. xx-58

41 Ibid, Ch. xx-73

42 Ibid, Ch. xvi-90

43 Ibid, Ch. xx-87

44 Ibid, Ch. xx-42

45 Ibid, Ch. xx-54

46 Ibid, Ch. xx-7

47 Ibid, Ch. xx-39

48 Ibid, Ch. xx-9

49 Ibid, Ch. xv-46

xxxv) May one desire to talk about the private life related to husband and wife? You see it is ridiculous to have debate on mystic experience in the busy market place.⁵⁰

From the survey of the above silence passages one may conclude that the silence is prescribed as a moral code to those who are mystics. If at all one wants to talk one should do talk only with those who have the mystic experience but not with those who are worldlings. Thus keeping silence on mystic experience does not mean ignorance of what one has for the inner sight. Being silent is connected with a question of choice of right persons and occasions. It is not a public affair as the mystics do not share their experience with one and all. Therefore that is designated as a secret lore. This is one phase of the character of mystic experience. The Upaniṣadic seers are of the same view in connection with 'Upaniṣad.' The very term 'Upaniṣad' implies the same. That is in accordance with the method which is advocated by Basavaṇṇa.⁵¹ According to this there are speech passages.

Śaraṇa cannot but talk of truth of Absolute.⁵² Śaraṇa is not said to be talkative even though he talks.⁵³ For whatever he talks is silence,⁵⁴ as the word spoken by Śaraṇa is devoid of knowledge and such knowledge is not the experience of the union with the self-divine.⁵⁵ It is the supreme teacher who has united with the primal śakti of the universe who alone is able to talk.⁵⁶ Word is said to be Liṅgaikya (union with God) when the mind becomes Liṅga and Liṅga the mind.⁵⁷ 'Śaraṇas'

50 Ibid, v-79

51 Śūnyasāmpādane, Ch. viii-2

52 Śivaśaraṇeyara vacaṅgaḷu, p. 463 v-8 Ed. Dr. R. C. Hiremath.

53 Śūnyasāmpādane, Ch. iii-104

54 Ibid, ii-32

55 Ibid, ii-37

56 Ibid, Ch. xvi-8

57 Ibid, Ch. ii-125

word is enlightenment⁵⁸ and also Refuge.⁵⁹ God is in heaps in the midst of Śaraṇa's words.⁶⁰ The word of self realised is the transcendental principle⁶¹ which is niravaya or Śūnya. Śivayogi who has forgotten knowing, talks not a word but a spell.⁶² Word, then expressed without letting the ego, is Wisdom.⁶³ But the word without self realization is illusion.⁶⁴ If Śaraṇa talks whole heartedly the Liṅga could be seen.⁶⁵ "To speak of wisdom, and cry you are lost, is ignorance."⁶⁶ To have Śaraṇas' word is more than the possession of God.⁶⁷ Śaraṇas' words though bitter to the mouth are sweeter to the stomach.⁶⁸ The words of Śivaśaraṇas are like alchemic stone.⁶⁹ Talking the mystic talk with the mystics is essential for mystic life.⁷⁰ Mystic-talks of the Lover is a way for survival.⁷¹ Śaraṇas' tongue is tied so that he may not talk the talks other than that of the Lord.⁷² If one fails in discipline and contemplation one must have counsel with the Śaraṇas alone but not with any one else. The discussions with the Śaraṇas is a land of liberation

58 Śivaśaraṇeyara vacanagaḷu, p-34 v-93 Ed. Dr. R. C. Hiremath.

59 Ibid., p. 76 v-191

60 Vācanasahitya Saṅgraha, p. 8 v-24 Government of Mysore, Bangalore 1965

61 Śūnyasāmpādane, Ch. ii-30

62 Ibid., Ch. ii-32

63 Ibid., Ch. ii-30

64 Basavannanavara vacanagaḷu, p. Ed. S. S. Basavanal L. E. Association, Dharwar 1962

65 Ibid.

66 Śūnyasāmpādane Ch. ii-18

67 Devara Dasimayyana vacanagaḷu p. 1 vi Ed. Dr. P. G. Halakatti Samaj pustakalaya, Dharwar 1966

68 Basavannavar vacanagaḷu,

69 Ibid.,

70 Sivasaraneyara vacanagaḷu, p. 32 v-36 Dr. R. C. Hiremath

71 Ibid., p. 363, v-8

72 Ibid., p. 37 v-94

and of God. It is the destruction of Māyā.⁷³ Clusters of the Śaraṇas' words are side wedges to the wheels of life's cart.⁷⁴

These speech passages as against the silence passages give instructions and cautions. Both the kinds of passages though use different languages give the idea of a single Reality. This is the uniqueness about them. In one case the word (śabda) is impediment in the mystic life and also for the self transcendence, where as in another case the word is a path to the realm of light and protects the self from the ills of life. Word is Brahma, Prasāda.⁷⁵ It is pregnant with mercy and brings light into the darkness of life. The word is the guiding force, the companion of life and the energizing power from within to upwards towards the ocean of peace and liberty which has no agency of 'ego'. Therefore it is called Niśśabda (silence). So one may well realise that the word has been put to new use. Hence it forms a new language and new life and the new world-view. It is for these reasons one may state that the word represents a truth unfamiliar so far. Therefore the word does not produce illusion.⁷⁶ These words are monastic, but neither in the sense of Śaṅkarite nor of Rāmānujite, as they do not produce the sense of two categories.⁷⁷ These monastic words that reveal Reality and are Reality which creat self-confidence—a virtue of the self and spiritual braveness. This helps to lift oneself up.⁷⁸

Thus the term Niśśabda represents two types of language and the use. In the case of one Niśśabda is strict silence in the real sense of the term, and in case of other Niśśabda is a word without the agency of ego. Therefore Niśśabda in Śūnyasaṃpādana—the work under study, has different functions.

73 Vacanaśāstra rahasya, p. 145 v-2 Dr. R. R. Diwakar Adhyatmakāryālaya, Dharwar, 1928

74 Devara Dāsimayyana vacanagaḷu, p. 17 v-2 Dr. P. G. Halkatti

75 Śivaśaraneyara vacanagaḷu, p. 376 v-180 Ed. Dr. R. C. Hiremath

76 Śūnyasaṃpādana, Ch. ii-32

77 Ibid, Ch. ii-27

78 Ibid, Ch. ii-33

(B)

The mystic philosophers, who held discussions on the nature of Reality and the methods to possess it, were concerned about the meaning of words, as they had to do with words. It was so not only with these mystic philosophers of the twelfth century, but also with all the philosophers in all the ages. It is not important to which school of thought they belonged, to which part of the globe, and what was their language.¹ This is quite clear from the history of philosophy. According to the mystic philosophers with whose discourses we are dealing, the word is effulgent Linga²; the path to the world of Light.³ There are a good number of words discussed in the Śūnyasaṃpādane, one of which is 'niśābda' (silence). The mystics used this term with different meanings according to the contexts. So it demands efforts to understand.

“niśābda” means “Knowledgeless State” (i. e. jñāna-śūnyasthala). That is the state of the supreme-Brahman. This is stated in the literature of the Ṣaṭsthala philosophy.⁴ “niśābdaṃ brahmanamuccyate”⁵ (silence is told to be the Brahman). In the technical terminology known as Ṣaṭsthalakāṭṭu it is “one state beyond hundred”. That is the highest state to which the rest of one hundred lead. This is a little also of the philosophical text. The text is in Sanskrit and is one of the outstanding works on the Ṣaṭsthala school of thought. There are books with a similar title in Vedic and Buddhist literature. They are Śatapathabrāhmaṇa and Aṅguttaranikāya respectively.

1 Clarity Is Not Enough, p. 20 Ed. H. D. Lewis, George Allen Fllnwin 1963

2 Śūnyasaṃpādane, vol, I, II, 28 Tr. Ed. Dr. S. C. Nandimath, Dr. R. C. Hiremath, Prof. A. Menezes, Karnatak University, 1965

3 Chennabasavannavara vacangalu, p. 330 v-687 Ed. Dr. R. C. Hiremath Karnatak University, Dharwar

4 Śūnyasaṃpādane, Ed. Prof. S. S. Bhoosanurmth, Advani Kallumath 1958

5 (i) Ibid. III, 118 (ii) Nāḍabindapaniṣad, 48

The work "One state beyond hundred" (Ekottara śatasthala) is based on Kāmikāgama⁶ which is the first among the well known twenty eight Śaivāgamas. It is also stated that the subject matter of this text is dealt with in the Tantra named Siddhānta.⁷ The Ekottaraśatasthala covers the end portion of all the twentyeight Śaivāgamas.⁸ Hence the mantras that speak of jñānaśūnya are of Āgamic origin. Thus the source literature on this subject is as far as we know both in Sanskrit and Kannada. The Śūnyasaṃpādana is the quintessence of vacana literature as the Gitā is that of the upaniṣads.

The term niśśabda (knowledgeless state) has far reaching philosophical implications. Knowledgelessness is the state or nature of the self in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika. niśśabada is niravaya and is, therefore, suggestive of nirguṇa brahma of Sankaras' monism. niśśabda is actionlessness and hence aims at Kevalatva or Karmaṣanyāsa. That is the nature and object of Sankhyapuruṣa and Yoga respectively. niśśabda means knowledge is not possible, in other words, agnosticism. Thus the term niśśabda touches both fields, namely, ontology and epistemology. niśśabda, when understood as Parabrahma, implies that (i) there is self (tānu) and there is the other (idiru) as well as (ii) the self alone is there and there is no other (idiru) as such which is other than the self.

According to the first, the other is both other than the self and the other self. According to the second, the other (idiru) is the self and therefore there is no other than the self. This means that there is the self only. This does not mean that either there is self which is also self or there is any thing different from the self.

6 Śivadāsa Gitanjali, Ed. Dr. L. Basavaraju, Jagadguru Sivaratresvara Granthamala, Mysore 1963

7 Siddhantasikhamani. v-14

8 Śivadas Gitanjali, p. XVII, Ed. L. Basavaraju Sivaratrisvara Grantha-
mala, Mysore

If niśśabda is the self, then there is no other. Because the other cannot be the other, other than the self. If there is the other, the other is other than the self. This implies distinction of categories. When niśśabda implies this according to which niśśabda is a self or it is both the self and the other, then the second part of the statement is not acceptable. For it can not be both self and the other. If the other is self, then we are saying that knowing is the knowing of oneself by the other self and vice versa. Is then, knowing the other self knowing as one's own self or is it quite differently? This needs clarification. If knowing the other self is as knowing one's own self, then knowing is knowing. If knowing is not knowing as knowing one's own self, then there is no knowing other than the former. So knowing differently is no Knowing. So niśśabda as self is one's own self.

If we know that knowing the self is quite differently, then knowing is not knowing as we know knowing. So, knowing the self as we know, is not knowing it. So also knowing the self by the kind of knowing which is other than the knowing we know knowing is same as knowing the other self differently. This knowing is knowing other than knowing we call knowing. Therefore it is stated that this is a different knowing.

But is this knowing at all? For one may say that to know differently is to know nothing at all. Because, to know one need not bother about what one does with knowing. Therefore, knowing as you say is no knowing. This does not lead any where, though this differently knowing is no knowing.

If knowing is one thing to me and another to you, then, this is no knowing. This also will not do. Because there will be no knowledge equally acceptable to different persons.

If knowing needs something common to different knowers, then true knowledge is possible. But this also creates a difficulty. The difficulty is the difficulty of the third man. For there may be a case where the lack of the common element does not show that knowing is not true knowing.

From the above survey it is clear that if niśābdā is known as a self, then this is a different knowing. This knowing will come to a stop only when knowing is Jyōtirjñāna—the indubitable knowledge, the self realization. From this indubitable, namely, Jyōtirjñāna the rest of them follow. They are matijñāna, śrutijñāna, manaparipurnajñāna, avadhijñāna, kēvalajñāna. Hence niśābdā is knowable beyond doubt and the consequence is that the knowledge is possible in either case. Therefore niśābdā does not imply agnosticism or scepticism.

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Dharwar.

2. Diṅnāgana viśīyakavādi mattu ātana granthagāḷa
baḡge barediruva vimarsātmakavāda....ilekhanavu... bahaḷa
hṛdayaṅgamavāgi vicārapūrnāvāgide.....jijñāsu vargakke
bahaḷa upakāramāḍiruttāre. Ilekhanavu pramāṇabaddhavāgide.

23-7-1972

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